Issue Three

Surrogacy and the Creation of a Reproductive Proleteriat

by Philomela

THE PRESENT SITUATION

On 5 April 2011, the European Parliament adopted a ‘Resolution … on priorities and outline of a new EU policy framework to fight violence against women’ in which two paragraphs on surrogacy were included:

20. Asks Member States to acknowledge the serious problem of surrogacy which constitutes an exploitation of the female body and her reproductive organs;
21. Emphasises that women and children are subject to the same forms of exploitation and both can be regarded as commodities on the international reproductive market, and that these new reproductive arrangements, such as surrogacy, augment the trafficking of women and children and illegal adoption across national borders.1

Four years later, on 16 December 2015, the European Parliament accepted a motion on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter, which included this paragraph on surrogacy:

114. Condemns the practice of surrogacy, which undermines the human dignity of women since her body and its reproductive functions are used as a commodity; considers that the practice of gestational surrogacy which involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for financial and other gain, in particular in the case of vulnerable women in developing countries, shall be prohibited and treated as a matter of urgency in human rights instruments.2

This article is about the various inequalities implicit in surrogacy and how surrogates are exploited. Just as businesses locate factories to the cheapest parts of the world — and justify labour at the cheapest possible price — those who look to buy children will search out access to the cheapest, more accessible bodies in countries with the most permissive legislation. This globalization enables rich Westerners to use their purchasing power to mine the bodies of poor women. Although many developed countries ban commercial surrogacy for their own female populations, they actively enable the instrumentalization of foreign women and the consequent trafficking of their children by providing legislative frameworks to legitimize these actions, making international surrogacy a fait accompli, entirely discarding laws and public policy considerations. 

Britain’s perspective on surrogacy is diverging from that set out in the European Parliament’s motion and resolution above, and instead is being supplanted by another ideology—the fetishization of the free market. Add rampant liberal feminist arguments about ‘choice’ and the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and there results a toxic mix for poor women. This is due to two factors: first, ECtHR judgements have extended more and more human ‘rights’ to individuals and couples demanding their own genetic children, in turn creating more demand for women’s bodies; and second, as Claire Fenton-Glynn and Jens M. Scherpe of Cambridge Family Law point out, the British courts are “expected to balance the regulation of surrogacy, while also protecting the best interests of children.” ‘Best interest’ is interpreted to mean a judge is expected to make a ‘parental order’ conferring all legal rights of parents over their surrogate children.

Words describing surrogacy are also diverging from their straightforward meanings. Seemingly designed to be obfuscatory, these euphemisms incorporate notions of ‘equality’ in order to lure the public into perceiving surrogacy as a loving and selfless act. They include words such as ‘intended parents’ for ‘baby buyers’ and ‘surrogates’ for ‘exploited women.’ The word ‘surrogacy’ is a euphemism itself. Etymologically, it is derived from two Latin words, with an early 17th-century origin. The word surrogatus means ‘to elect as a substitute,’ from super-, meaning ‘over,’ and rogare, which means ‘to ask,’ and so has the broader meaning of ‘to stand in for.’ However, in relation to pregnancy, this substitution effectively warns opponents not to dissent, try to unpack or otherwise analyse what is really going on. This has the effect of disguising exploitation.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE

The meaning of surrogacy is a particularly painful one for feminists because it highlights the ongoing operation of patriarchy, examples of which Gerda Lerner believes can be traced back to Mesopotamian society.4 She gives, as an example, a Babylonian couple’s childlessness, the “consequences of which was loss of property in the male line.” To remedy this, a sales contract, purchasing a woman from her father, specified that the daughter, Shamash-nuri, was to act as a ‘wife’ to the husband and a slave to the wife.

Further examples of surrogacy can also be found in the Bible. However, those who cite biblical precedent as justification undermine their arguments, for in each case the result of mortals ignoring what they are told is the ‘will of God’ is familial discord. One example, from Genesis 16, involves Abraham, Sarah, and Sarah’s slave, Hagar.5 Abraham and Sarah seem unable to conceive, so Sarah ‘gives’ him Hagar. Hagar subsequently gives birth to his son, Ishmael. Sarah, however, unable to control her jealousy, inflicts abuse on Hagar. Exodus 16:6 says that she “dealt harshly” with her, so Hagar ran away. At God’s command, Hagar returns to Abraham and Sarah, only to encounter yet more trouble when Sarah gives birth to Isaac. Sarah then tells Hagar to leave, and she and Ishmael are cast out. The interpretation often given to this story is that had Sarah and Abraham trusted in God — and not attempted to circumvent his will — their family troubles could have been avoided. Importantly for world religious relations, though, the birth of Ishmael marks the beginning of the genealogy of Islam. Some family troubles have larger implications than others.

But the story of Sarah, Abraham, and Hagar illustrates Gerda Lerner’s point. Enslaved women could be used to reproduce their master’s children because women were the first forms of private property (p. 214). The story also lends credence to anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s ‘exchange of women’ theory, which posits ‘women as wealth’ and emphasizes the commodification of their sexuality and reproductive capacity (p. 213).

Sarah was acutely aware of the whims of patriarchy: her status as a wife was insecure and dependent on her ability to have children. After all, Sarah tells Abraham, “Go; sleep with my maidservant; perhaps I can build a family through her.”6

The story of Rachel and Jacob also reinforces the shame biblical women carry if they are unable to bear children for their husbands. Rachel tells Jacob, “Give me children or I’ll die,” and later, when Rachel’s husband conceives a child with Bilhah, her slave, Rachel says, “God has vindicated me.”7 It is clear that women, both wives and slaves, were seen as vehicles for reproduction, and that they were made to feel shame if they did not fulfil the ‘biological destiny’ assigned to them in ancient Hebraic culture.

Many cultures carry these ideas forward, if in less pointed terms. The plight of Shamash-nuri, Hagar, and Bilhah are only three ancient examples of what was, no doubt, a common problem of women who held no property but were, instead, viewed as property. Today’s surrogates may ostensibly have their freedom, but they are still having to use their reproductive capabilities to survive.

Fast forward to the modern era, where slavery is illegal: if a couple is unable to conceive, they may instead turn to assisted reproduction. They might choose IVF, where the couple’s own gametes are used and implanted in the female partner, but some consider surrogacy to be the only suitable way to fulfil their desire for a child.

Tracing the developments of surrogacy case law, it becomes clear that some still confer importance to this form of social legitimacy and believe they must have it at any cost — even the cost of compromising the dignity, safety and legal rights of women residing in countries across the world. This is a thousands-of-years-old entitlement, a hangover from the ultra-patriarchal Babylonian and biblical times: the supreme right of men to control reproduction.

Women fought for their parental rights for millennia, so they could have access to and be able to keep custody of their children, especially upon separation from their husbands. In England, starting in 1839, Caroline Norton’s courageous campaign heralded some success.8 Norton’s husband deliberately kept her from their three sons, but following her long campaign, Parliament allowed women to petition for the custody of their children and to request access to children over the age of seven.9 This did not work in Caroline’s case because her husband simply removed their children to Scotland, which has its own legal system, thus evading English law. The law changed again in 1873 when Parliament decided that the wants of fathers were no longer the most important principle and that the needs of the child should take precedence.10 However, it was not until 1973 that Parliament conferred upon mothers equality of parental rights. They now had power “in relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor,11 and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of income of any such property.” This relatively recent development illustrates how unequal mothers have been in the English legal system for almost all of recorded history, and this is important because of the dissemination of English law via the Commonwealth.

There is little doubt that Parliament intended these very new legal rights to be upheld when it enacted the Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985.12 This law, according to the Stanford University News Service, enables the use of ‘altruistic’ surrogates, but not ‘contract’ motherhood.13 S.1A of the Surrogacy Act states, “No surrogacy arrangement is enforceable by or against any of the persons making it.” English law, therefore, entitles surrogate mothers to change their minds. They are a legal parent of the child they give birth to and, in theory, cannot be forced to hand that child over.

ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ENTANGLEMENTS

The involvement of the moral philosopher Lady Warnock in framing the first law on surrogacy was pivotal for conferring these rights upon mothers. In her report for the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, established in July 1982, to examine the social, ethical and legal implications of recent and potential developments in the field of human assisted reproduction, she mentions the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ 46 times.14 Although Lady Warnock does not define exactly what ‘morality’ is, she does say it refers to “some barriers which are not to be crossed … some limits fixed, beyond which people must not be allowed to go.” Furthermore, she says that boundaries are not “a mere whim or fancy” (p. 2).

Lady Warnock is also clear in her insistence that commercial surrogacy brings “danger of exploitation of one human being by another” and this “appears to the majority of [the committee to] far outweigh the potential benefits” (p. 46). She identified that the payment of money establishes the exploitation inherent in such arrangements, saying, “Such treatment of one person by another becomes positively exploitative when financial interests are involved” (p. 46).

Gary Powell, who studied under Lady Warnock at Oxford and has written about and campaigned against surrogacy, uses the concept of instrumentalization as a framework for discussing the exploitations involved in surrogacy.15 Powell distinguishes between “acceptable and normal” instrumentalization and “unacceptable” instrumentalization, which “should be treated as abnormal and opposed.” Furthermore, he says, “the question is the balance between regarding a person as a means to an end and as an end in herself.” The type of instrumentalization surrogates endure, he says, “negates their dignity and rights as a human being,” an argument that has also been applied to prostitution. These breaches of dignity and rights are detailed below, but in summary, it is the poorest women around the world who find themselves acting as egg donors and surrogates for wealthier individuals or couples. These women face all kinds of dangers and indignities.

Lady Warnock’s recommendations were a response to the negative publicity following the first British commercial surrogacy case, involving Mrs Cotton, a childless Swedish couple, and an American agency. According to BBC news, Cotton was paid £6,500 (£21,366 in today’s money) to engage in partial surrogacy — that is, she used her own egg.16 Mrs Cotton was in a precarious financial position. Klein recounts how she left school at 16, was married at 18 and had her first baby at 19 — none of which was unusual in the 1970s; however, these common occurrences did place women in positions of financial dependence.17 Cotton says she was influenced by a morning television show at a time when her young family needed extra money, raising the question of how genuine her choice really was. The fact that surrogacy can be ‘performed’ alongside bringing up small children undoubtedly provides an attraction to women in such a situation.18

In developed countries, it can be hard for commissioning parents to find an altruistic surrogate. An example from 60 Minutes Australia illustrates the difficulty of finding domestic surrogates whom commissioning parents could be sure would not be degraded and mistreated.19 The programme features David and Nicky Beard, a gay couple, describing how they “really searched hard” for an Australian woman to be their surrogate who was “looked after” and not “ill-educated or vulnerable,” revealing their awareness of the economic pressures on women. However, when they could not find such a woman, they went to Cancún, Mexico, instead. The Beards’ fears were realized: one of their surrogates, pregnant with twins, was suffering pregnancy-related sickness, including “bleeding for more than two weeks”; she was not receiving proper treatment, and the clinic was not paying her the agreed amount. The Beards’ experience suggests that for women contending with fewer adverse economic circumstances, surrogacy is not appealing. Chief Justice Robert Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court noted the same in the Baby M case in the US, where the surrogate mother declined to hand over the child she gave birth to: “We doubt that infertile couples in the low-income bracket will find upper-income surrogates,” he wrote, and, as such, this “called into question the voluntary character of such agreements.”20 The economic realities that drive the surrogacy market necessarily constrict the agency of the women providing the service of their bodies.

THE SURROGACY MARKET FOLLOWS OPPORTUNITIES OF GEOPOLITICAL UPHEAVAL

With one in seven UK couples experiencing fertility issues, and the belief that they will face no legal censure for buying a baby, demand for foreign surrogates is growing.21 Those wishing to purchase a baby can take advantage of fluctuating human rights situations around the world. For example, since both India (for foreign buyers) and Thailand banned the exploitation of women’s reproductive capabilities in 2015 after a Japanese billionaire ordered 16 babies, a popular source for live humans has been Ukraine.22 Military conflict in Ukraine since 2014, according to the World Bank, “led to the rupture of economic and political relationships and the realignment of commercial relationships with regard to the region and the rest of the world …”23

Ukrainian women who enter surrogacy arrangements are powerless to negotiate the terms of their contracts and they have no say at all over what happens to the children they are handing over, a legal situation which is used by predatory surrogacy organizations. For example, William Houghton of Sensible Surrogacy says that Ukraine is “now the most affordable, legally secure and stable option for childless couples starting their own family.” Research by the EU has determined that under Ukrainian and Californian law, unlike English law, “the intended mother can be automatically regarded as the legal mother.”24 This automatic process highlights the extent to which women’s feelings and parental rights are disregarded, denying them the opportunity to change their minds, underscoring the extent to which women are instrumentalized, placing women’s rights in developing and troubled countries at the same level as those of 19th-century British women.

Houghton’s emphasis on couples starting their own families highlights the motivation of commissioning parents: they want a child genetically related to one of them—and because female partners usually give birth if they can, the father’s genes are most often used. There have been ‘mix-ups’ at fertility clinics where the ‘wrong’ gametes have been used to create an embryo, and some of these are evident from birth. A story appeared in 2019 detailing how a married heterosexual couple, both with blond hair and blue eyes, used a surrogate who subsequently gave birth to a child with “Asian features, black hair and brown eyes.”25 The father’s Reddit post (which has now been deleted) said: “We don’t care about race; we are just upset that the baby wasn’t both of us.” The problem for this couple is that babies cannot be sent back.

In straitened economic circumstances, it is not hard to see why some Ukrainian women are signing up for surrogacy. Research by Open Democracy reveals that they can earn around £18,000 per pregnancy, are often single mothers, and need the money to purchase a home to achieve financial stability.26 While this does not sound like a lot, according to the Average Salary Survey, the “most typical salary in the Ukraine, before tax, is c. £7,500.”27 Open Democracy reports the words of a woman called Oksana, who had to leave her home city due to armed conflict. She says, “Few [women] stop after the first surrogacy. They do more because they need money. So did I. No other motivation exists …” The philosopher Michael Sandal refers to this as ‘tainted consent.’28 Judge Dedov, a judge on the bench of the ECtHR, recognizes these pressing economic imperatives in his 2017 Paradiso case dictum: “The statistics and the facts of the surrogacy cases examined by this Court demonstrate that surrogacy is carried out by poor people or in poor countries. The recipients are usually rich and glamorous. Moreover, the recipients usually participate in or decisively influence the national parliament.”29 Giving arguments often used in favour of surrogacy, he states that “It is much easier to earn money using the body, especially if one takes into account that strong demand exists for bodies for surrogacy … This could help to resolve unemployment problems and to reduce social tensions … In the situation of a radically increasing global population, it could be considered reasonable, from an economic perspective, to exploit the body.”

It can be seen, therefore, that ‘consent’ to use one’s body in such a way is never arrived at in a vacuum. What does exist is economic disenfranchisement, which, in countries where surrogacy is most commonly used, is caused by structural inequalities that deny women their full potential.

Added to these structural inequalities are the inequalities built into the contract ‘negotiations’ between the potential surrogate and the surrogate agency she deals with. Elizabeth Anderson explains in ‘Is Women’s Labour a Commodity?’ that “The surrogate mother often operates according to the norms of gift relationships. The surrogate agency, on the other hand, follows market norms. Its job is to get the best deal for its clients and itself, while leaving the surrogate mother to look after her own interests as best as she can.”30

This should come as no surprise to anyone who understands that a business’s first duty is to its shareholders. There can be no equality between a birth mother and a commercial surrogate agency because they have fundamentally different motives which are diametrically opposed to each other.

In addition, examining the altruistic/kind/loving language that Mrs Cotton uses in the earlier story, for example, illustrates the following assertion by Anderson:

This situation puts the surrogate agencies in a position to manipulate the surrogate mothers’ emotions to gain favourable terms for themselves. For example, agencies screen prospective surrogate mothers for submissiveness, and emphasize to them the importance of the motives of generosity and love. When applicants question some of the terms of the contract, the broker sometimes intimidates them by questioning their character and morality: if they were really generous and loving they would not be so solicitous about their own interests.

The agencies and the commissioning parents are aware that the women they rely on are poor, but they nonetheless travel around to find the very best deal, illustrating that the loving and giving involved in surrogacy is unidirectional.

WIDE VARIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKES FOR NO LAW AT ALL

It is just as well that surrogacy is recognized for the exploitation it is by some in the Ukrainian government. For example, deputy Iryna Sysoyenko, according to an article in El País, “co-authored a bill to ban foreigners from using surrogates, or at the very least to stop couples from countries where the practice is illegal.”31 Such a law should, in theory, prevent the coming into existence of what researchers Van Beers and Bosch call a “reproductive proletariat” or a “breeding class.” 32 However, Sysoyenko’s objective, to prevent the exploitation of Ukrainian women and their children, will not, in reality, be achieved in Ukraine or anywhere else in the world without the simultaneous implementation of widespread educational and economic reforms.

The point about improvements to education and the economy so that they benefit women equally has been made by SisterSong, “North America’s largest national multi-ethnic Reproductive Justice collective.” Its membership “includes and represents Indigenous, African American, Arab and Middle Eastern, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Latina women and LGBTQ people.”33 In reference to reproductive justice, researcher Alison Bailey expands on SisterSong’s work with her ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy’: “Social justice for entire communities requires a complete vision of health for women and girls including an understanding of issues such as sex trafficking, youth empowerment, women’s health, family well-being, educational justice, unsafe working conditions, domestic violence, immigration injustices, environmental racism, and globalization.”34 Only complete structural change will challenge power inequalities for the betterment of women who may find themselves depending on income from surrogacy.

Stanislav Kutsenko, the head of territorial administration of the Justice Ministry in Kyiv, conveys the injustices of the current law in the El País article above, saying, “In the last two years, around 40 or 50 women have come to us saying they wanted to keep the baby after giving birth. We find ourselves in the situation of explaining to them that they have no rights over the child.” Although it may be true that these women will be able to secure their livelihoods, this is a high price to pay for a lifetime of heartbreak and mourning. The absence of protections betrays a blatant disregard for their human rights. Given the 2019 Human Rights Watch report on Ukraine, which highlights a litany of troubles, this is unsurprising.35

According to Families Through Surrogacy, quoted in Euronews, all European countries aside from Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Albania explicitly outlaw commercial surrogacy.36 Despite this, they effectively allow their citizens to instrumentalize the bodies of much poorer women in those countries which do allow it, creating a position in which European resolutions, national laws and public policies are routinely ignored. According to Van Beers and Bosch, this regulatory inconsistency creates an environment in which commercial surrogacy is, de facto, legal (p. 368).

Yet, even in countries where commercial surrogacy is outlawed, such as Sweden, there are objections that banning it goes against women’s freedom of choice. Kajsa Ekis Ekman, a Swedish writer and activist, reports for the Guardian that these arguments come from “intended fathers,” who say that “if a woman wants to be a surrogate, surely it is wrong to prevent her from doing so.”37 This is a familiar argument and is used by Australian liberal feminist lawyer Sarah Jefford. She says that a “core belief of any feminist is that a woman has the right to full bodily autonomy. That includes reproductive autonomy; the right to determine if and when she has children, how many, and the right to make decisions about her fertility and reproduction.”38

One problem with this statement is that women who live in Western countries with well-developed economies volunteer in small numbers, even when, as in the UK, the expenses earned can be on a par with commercial rates paid elsewhere. As we have seen, impoverishment, rather than free will, is the driving force behind poor women’s decisions. In light of this, arguments deployed by liberal feminists such as Jefford are particularly pernicious and look to a self-serving individualism whilst ignoring the economic and material realities of women as a whole. The arguments also do not address the systemic failures which lead women into their ‘choice.’ Family lawyers practising in the area of surrogacy—and authoring and selling books on the alleged merits of surrogacy—stand to earn a lot of money from such ‘liberalization,’ after all.

Second, the assertion of bodily autonomy is untrue. American feminist organizer Gloria Steinem, in a 2019 letter to Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of New York, wrote that “the legalization of commercial surrogacy contracts in New York state will undermine women’s control over their bodies, thwart women’s reproductive rights.”39 Steinem’s assertion that women’s control of their own bodies is undermined by surrogacy is backed up by Julie Bindel’s research. In a 2016 article, Bindel describes the conditions for surrogates in Akanksha Infertility Clinic in Anand, India—revealing that control is the very last thing the surrogates have.40 Surrogates are “kept in a gated hostel close to the Akanksha clinic, where they eat, sleep and are monitored on a daily basis.”

Furthermore, Bindel’s article cites research by Sheela Saravanan of the Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine at the University of Goettingen in Germany. Saravanan states (as quoted by Bindel) that “They are overfed, restricted in movements, not allowed to go up and down the stairs and not given codes for the elevators … They aren’t supposed to do normal household work, and they are just supposed to lie around watching TV for those 10 months, and they are not allowed to meet their family or children.”

Bindel summarizes the indignities suffered by these women:

The women are told when and what to eat and drink and are not allowed to have sex, ride bicycles or take any exercise without permission. The women are prevented from using painkillers but are required to take products to help achieve pregnancy. These include Lupron, oestrogen, and progesterone, all of which can have damaging side effects. The women usually are impregnated with several embryos to increase the chances of pregnancy, and they can be forced to undergo selective abortion of one or more foetuses if multiple pregnancies occur.

It is disheartening that Steinem, Bindel and Gary Powell still need to say this, over thirty years after Wilentz said, “we suggest that … consent [in surrogacy agreements] is irrelevant. There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.”41

Lastly, Jefford’s ‘reproductive autonomy’ is a ‘luxury’ belief when juxtaposed with SisterSong’s aspirations for ‘reproductive justice.’ Jefford’s view is an idealized approach which presupposes that surrogates have autonomy in all other areas of their life, but such a phrase is blind to the very recent history. It is ironic that poor women around the world are now being paid to give birth to rich people’s babies when previously they were sterilized because, among other reasons, they were poor — and blamed for that poverty because they had children.42 In both cases, surrogacy and forced sterilization, women are robbed of their agency.

Jefford’s phrase also glosses over the constraints surrogacy recruits live under: sadly, there are examples of women who have had to abort their own foetuses because they need money to birth other women’s. Renate Klein tells Parvati’s story (p. 68). Parvati says that she discovered she was pregnant whilst receiving treatments to prepare her body for surrogacy. She decided that “we needed the money more than a baby.” Although this is ‘just’ an anecdotal example, it does rather suggest that there are other women out there sacrificing their own families so that they may provide babies for others — and besides, the ‘good news’ stories of surrogacy are also anecdotal in the absence of properly conducted research of the myriad aspects highlighted in this article. The concern, if this kind of self-sacrifice is normalized, is how much longer will it be until poor women are blamed for their poverty if they decide not to be co-opted into their exploitation?

WHAT IS WORK, WHAT ARE PRODUCTS?

One argument as to why babies should not be bought, and their mothers should not be used, is that they are neither things nor goods. This is a point discussed by moral philosopher Elizabeth Anderson, who believes that “To love or respect someone is to value her in a higher way than one would if one merely used her.”43 By “respect,” she means that commissioning parents should have regard for the interests of the ‘birth mother.’ Anderson is particularly concerned about how surrogacy denies the “significance of reproductive labour to the mother who undergoes it,” and in doing so dehumanizes and degrades her (p. 80). This degradation occurs when a woman’s labour is transformed into a commodity, which changes the relationship between her and her child from a parental relationship into one governed by production processes and economic norms. Accordingly, Anderson says, this turns women from people worthy of respect into objects of use (p. 81).

To assert that one may rent a womb is also to make a category mistake; women are not sets of discrete parts that can be carved up and treated as though they are not an integrated whole. Bodies and minds belong together—violate one and the whole will suffer. Buying a baby, therefore, violates the very core of humanity; in Anderson’s words, the mother is disregarded.

Neither the liberal version of bodily autonomy Jefford speaks of (above) nor the respect Anderson refers to were present in the case of Elizabeth Kane—‘America’s first surrogate mother.’ Klein refers to Kane’s specification that she did not want her doctor filming her baby’s birth, which was nonetheless ignored (p. 113). This violation turned what is usually a personal moment into a matter of public consumption, suggesting that, at the moment of birth, the commissioning parents felt that their parental rights were more important than their duty to consider the baby’s birth mother, and suggesting in turn that many commissioning parents see the birth mother as a mere instrument and thus disposable once she has performed her part of the contract (see the example, below, of a women left with unpaid medical bills when her commissioning parents abandoned her).

It is disturbing that, with increasing innovations of biotech companies, Dworkin’s statement that “the state has constructed the social, economic, and political situation in which the sale of some … reproductive capacity is necessary to the survival of women” seems truer now than when she wrote it. Add in globalization and liberal economic ideologies, and it is risible to suggest that ‘selling’ might be an ‘act of individual will.’ Dworkin identifies this act as the only female act that is “vigorously defended” by men.44 Women are only permitted to use their brains to acquiesce to the conception of themselves as members of a reproductive class. Under such a system, individuality is denied.

PIVOTAL CASE LAW

Judgements of the ECtHR have expanded access to women’s bodies and have done so by legitimizing surrogacy arrangements entered into by the citizens of European countries. For example, the case of Paradiso (2017), referred to above, whilst ostensibly upholding Italian national law outlawing surrogacy, conceded that the genetic link shared between babies born to surrogates and commissioning parents was a “central point of judgement” in deciding whether to allow that child to live with the commissioning parents.

The Paradiso decision came just three years after the ECtHR said, in the Mennesson (2014) case, that “giving priority to a purely biological criterion ‘appear[ed] highly questionable.’” This is hugely important. The shift in the Paradiso case may well have a detrimental impact on children currently under the care of a local authority, or in foster care, waiting to be adopted. It may well encourage those who would have previously considered creating their family through adoption to instead seek a poor foreign woman to bear a genetic child related to at least one of the parents, thereby encouraging child trafficking.

Recently in the Supreme Court, Lady Hale summarized the effect of the ECtHR’s decisions in Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v. XX (2020), in which the court agreed that the claimant could recover the costs for four surrogate pregnancies, as damages for medical negligence.<sup>46</sup> The decision was based on public policy grounds, with Lady Hale and Lords Kerr and Wilson agreeing that “these provisions do not indicate that surrogacy as such is contrary to public policy. They tend to indicate that the issue is a difficult one, upon which opinions are divided, so that it would be wise to tread with caution … If there is a trend, it is towards acceptance and regulation as a last resort rather than towards prohibition” (para. 11).

Lady Hale described how English law has “bent over backwards to recognise the relationships created by surrogacy, including foreign commercial surrogacy” (para. 52). Outlining guidance, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed, with two dissenting, that:

  1. the proposed programme of treatments must be reasonable,
    1. it must be reasonable for the claimant to seek foreign arrangements, and that such arrangements are unlikely to satisfy this requirement unless the legal rules in the relevant country safeguard the interests of each of the surrogate, child and commissioning parents; and
      1. the costs must be reasonable.

      Leaving aside the fact that commercial surrogacy is still formally illegal, that no surrogacy programme can be ‘reasonable,’ that it is never ‘reasonable’ to seek a surrogate, and that it is unreasonable to pay for a life, the Supreme Court has effectively legitimized international commercial surrogacy.

      HUMAN RIGHTS TEND TO EXPAND FOR EVERYONE BUT WOMEN

      Each time ‘human rights’ are expanded for commissioning parents, some woman, somewhere, is the victim of bodily exploitation. The case of Re Z (A Child) (Surrogate Father: Parental Order) (2015) opened the door for single parents in the UK to apply for parental orders for babies they have bought from surrogate mothers, something they had previously been excluded from under section 54 of the 2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.47 In Re Z, the Family Court was asked to interpret this provision so that it was compatible with the rights set out in the Human Rights Convention, which it was unable to do. Despite Parliament not being obligated to amend the law, they did so. Although Re Z now means single men and single women can now apply, it is likely that, given the absence of a womb, more men than women will use this judgement to their advantage. Sperm donation is, after all, available to fertile women.

      2018 saw the further expansion of men’s rights — and the contraction of women’s—when an entitled male couple asked the NHS to pay for IVF and surrogacy. Ross and Chris Muller realized that, while IVF is available to same-sex couples, this is no use if one half of a couple does not have a uterus. Complaining that “gay men are effectively excluded” because of a lack of the correct biology, they told The Daily Record that they decided to lobby their MP to help them get their way.48 The NHS quickly lifted its ‘blanket ban’ on gay couples accessing free IVF and established the precedent that the state should pay for a surrogate. Following the ruling in Re Z, it is likely that the ECtHR would have had to have made a ruling in the Mullers’ favour, on the basis of breaches of Articles 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination). ‘Equality’ now appears to mean, for those demanding that the state remedy their childlessness, that no differences between the sexes may be acknowledged.

      Gary Powell, himself a gay man and a supporter of Stop Surrogacy Now, perceives this continued extension of human rights as “socially harmful, irrational, and bullying” and expresses his concern that “the gay and lesbian community should not view the availability of surrogacy arrangements as a progression in LGBT equality or rights” because they are in direct conflict with the rights of poor women, whom he says are “vulnerable” to the risks of “unequal power and wealth.”49 To be clear, Powell opposes all surrogacy.

      ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY REPACKAGED AS ‘KINDNESS

      The outcome of the Mullers’ challenge also suggests, first, that the lack of a uterus is something that can and should be redressed by the state and, second, that the burden of growing and birthing a baby should be met by a kind woman. Indeed, this is the attitude adopted by Mrs Cotton, the UK’s first commercial surrogate, referred to above. She told Kashmira Gander, “My children are my life and if you’re lucky enough to be able to give birth and have a child, you should share your fertility.”50 It is thoroughly depressing, but entirely unsurprising, that organizations such as COTS trade on gendered tropes which characterize women as self-sacrificing All-Mothers who are somehow selfish if they choose not to place their bodies at the disposal of others. Despite these tropes, COTS does not appear to be attracting British women in any great numbers: the BBC reported in 2014 that it “closed its membership because of a shortage.”51 Indeed, Mrs Cotton complained in 2019 that “the biggest problem is the lack of surrogates volunteering. This is because our hands are tied regarding advertising, so lifting the ban will hopefully create an avalanche of new surrogates.”52

      Framing women’s reproductive capabilities in this way echoes the “reification of women” that Gerda Lerner writes of (p. 213). Reification is a translation from the German Verdinglichung and means ‘making into a thing.’ In this conception, women are no longer whole people, but baby vending machines. The essentializing approach to women’s bodies is said to empower women as private individuals but ironically forces their bodies into public usage, revealing that women are not conceived of as their own people, but are only valuable for the use they provide for others.

      RISK ASSESSMENT

      There are dangers that travel with surrogacy. Increasingly, surrogates are expected to use not their own eggs but donated ones, either from the commissioning mother — if viable — or from a third woman. This is called ‘gestational surrogacy.’ According to Renate Klein, “Traditional surrogacy is rarely done any more because, with this method, the birth mother’s genes form half of the child’s genetic heritage” (p. 5). In the USA, high-performing female students are targeted by companies. The motivation here is different from sourcing poverty-stricken women in developing countries, although the same economic manipulations are deployed. One company in New York, the Center for Human Reproduction, pays between $8,000-$14,000 per cycle, extracting oocytes (immature eggs) from women as young as 18.53 As an incentive, the Center publishes a table listing potential earnings. Such targeted advertising suggests that biotech companies understand the temptation of such a large amount of money. The temptation may be especially difficult for a young woman to resist if she foresees herself drowning in student loans.

      Jessica Cohen wrote for the Atlantic of her experience answering an ad placed in the Yale Daily News requesting “a young woman over five feet five, of Jewish heritage, athletic, with a combined SAT score of 1500, and attractive.”54 The offer was for $25,000. She was rejected because she was not considered attractive enough.

      Kathleen Sloan, feminist leader and human rights advocate who also serves as a special consultant for the US Center for Bioethics and Culture, told PR News Wire about the “extensive risks” involved in egg donation, which include “Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome from the profusion of synthetic hormones and fertility drugs such as Lupron, oestrogen (linked to breast and uterine cancers, heart attack, stroke, and blood clots), and progesterone they are injected with; ovarian torsion; and kidney disease.”55 These risks are minimized on egg donation websites because detailing them would deter women from choosing to donate.

      The side effects of donation can be deadly. In 2010, it was reported that a 17-year-old Indian girl died after her third egg donation. Her death was attributed to “the procedures used to extract eggs.” PR News Wire also reports that her post-mortem report states she had “one abrasion, four contusions and a blood clot in the head, plus six injection marks” as well as “congestion in the ovaries and uterus.” Evidently her young eggs were considered more desirable than respecting her as a person.

      According to the US National Institute for Health, an American government agency, no one has conducted any long-term study into the safety of egg donation, but in 2017, the New York Times reported a request to do so by Drs Ahuja and Simons of Cromwell Hospital, London, back in 1998.56 The Times describes the study, in which the doctors asked the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority “to confirm that ovarian stimulation in volunteer egg donors does not increase the risk of cancer over and above the background rate.”57 Given the increasing frequency of egg donation, this should be a pressing concern.

      Large-scale studies of women who have been implanted with donor eggs, have, however, been conducted, and they reveal significant risks. A 2019 study published by the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology compared the pregnancies of six groups of women: one group that had no fertility issues (called simply “fertile”); one that underwent treatments for infertility; and four that bore children conceived by in vitro fertilization (IVF). The study examined 1,477,522 pregnancies and births. Some discoveries included:

      • Women with IVF pregnancies that used donors’ eggs, whether fresh or thawed, were more likely to require an unplanned hysterectomy.
        • The groups of women with IVF pregnancies that used donors’ eggs had the highest rates of hypertension (high blood pressure) for the whole duration of the pregnancy (that is, both pregestational and gestational hypertension).
          • Children conceived by IVF from donors’ eggs had the highest rates of admission to the NICU, and their birth mothers had the highest rates of admission to the intensive care unit.58

          A contributing factor for these outcomes may be the age and poor health of the mother, but there is little information available on this. Another contributing factor may be that IVF is more likely to result in multiple births. Data published by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showed that approximately 46% of babies born in 2011 following IVF treatment were either twins or higher-order multiples, and the British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology says that “multiple pregnancies, caused by the practice of transferring more than one embryo into the uterus, is the commonest treatment‐related adverse outcome of in vitro fertilization (IVF).”59 Dr Rebecca Sokol, president of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, told the Telegraph: “We have long known the dangers of high order multiple pregnancies.”60 The National Health Service states that “If you’re pregnant with more than 1 baby, you’re at higher risk of pregnancy complications, such as anaemia, pre-eclampsia and gestational diabetes.”61

          Women implanted with donor eggs should, therefore, be warned of the potential health concerns for both them and their children.

          It must also be asked: how many poor women in developing countries have died or been injured giving birth to babies for other parents? Deaths related to surrogacy might be hard to track down in developing countries, but deaths of surrogates in countries such as the USA are reported. One example comes from 2020 and concerns Michelle Reeves, who died giving birth to her second surrogate baby.62 No woman can be certain what she is signing up for when she gives birth, and it is unreasonable to expect her to expose herself to such risks for strangers. Such a loss is compounded if the surrogate has her own children to provide for. Given the existence of ‘surrogacy insurance’ to provide for a surrogate’s family in the event of her death, this is clearly something that agencies are aware of.63

          Surrogates have been left with medical bills where international commissioning parents have reneged on their moral responsibilities when they have needed treatment for pregnancy- and childbirth-related complications. Meeting these costs can sometimes negate the financial incentives of surrogacy. For example, Kelly, from South Dakota, told the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and Jennifer Lahl of the US Center for Bioethics and Culture about her experience. She said that one set of commissioning parents left her with “thousands of dollars in unpaid medical bills.”64 Kelly says this about how she was treated: “I am a broken woman who has been used, lied to, and exploited. If I could take back my surrogacy journeys I would in a heartbeat, because it changed me for the worse.”

          With access to the media and women’s organizations, Kelly was able to voice her concerns and hurt. There are undoubtedly thousands of women, however, who cannot, and who are living with the knowledge that they are viewed as mere machines with little recourse to justice or the ability to obtain reimbursement for healthcare costs should they be injured in childbirth, for example.

          There are also very real risks to a surrogate’s mental and physical health. It is inhumane to expect women to forget what labours their bodies have performed and endured — and one cannot predict whether their bodies will ever recover from the experience of giving birth. As cited by Alison Bailey, “The National Family Health Survey reveals that only about 36.4 percent of women across the country receive any postnatal care within two days of giving birth. For every maternal death in India, an estimated 30 more women suffer injury, infection, and pregnancy-related disabilities.”65

          The belief in a body/mind dualism fails to take into account the trauma produced when the body and mind become dissociated. This can be seen in the adverse psychological effects suffered by prostitution survivors. In Being and Being Bought, Ekman argues that one commonality between prostitution and surrogacy is the psychological demand for dissociation. The prostituted woman, as with the surrogate, is forced to create a ‘split self’ in order to fulfil her role as tool or object whilst remaining a person.66 Ex-prostitute Huschke Mau describes how, “In order to endure prostitution, you have to split your awareness away from your body, to dissociate. The problem is that you cannot just slip back into it later. The body remains without contact to your soul, your psyche. You just do not feel yourself anymore.”67

          Lindsay Curtis wrote for the Huffington Post of her post-birth experiences of heartbreak — and how she signed up again to try to banish these feelings. She writes of finding “a small group of women who shared my experience and feelings, most of whom had their own children but still struggled with feelings of loss after the births of their surrogate babies.”68

          Women’s wombs do not simply ‘grow a baby.’ Their entire bodies are affected by hormones which are designed to help the mother nurture the life they have created. Removing a child is bound to affect the mother’s body — which includes her mind.

          ARE WOMEN’S RIGHTS REALLY HUMAN RIGHTS?

          The potential risks and negative outcomes for surrogate mothers suggest that human rights laws should be protecting women against the shopping list of demands from commissioning parents, rather than pursuing the wants of commissioning parents. Questions should also be asked about why adoption is not promoted as a viable alternative for childless couples. After all, as of 31 March 2020, 3880 children were waiting to be adopted in the UK alone. 69 Jessica Kern, a campaigner against surrogacy, herself born to a surrogate mother, says, “[The] institution [of adoption] was not … created for the parents, to give them a kid. It was created for the opposite, to put children in a home, because they’re here already and we’re responding to a catastrophe.”70 There are enough children awaiting adoption to satisfy demand, although this may also result in trauma for both the birth mother and her child.

          The legal philosopher Van Beers and the child’s rights researcher Bosch critically examined the proposals put forward by the Law Commissions of England and Wales and Scotland, following their 2019 consultation on surrogacy, and found them wanting.71 One of the Commissions’ recommendations, due to be published in a draft bill in 2022, is that the law should keep pace with society. This conceptualization has led to radical legislative changes, such as same-sex marriage and civil partnerships for all. These reforms have, however, been convincingly argued; the ability to marry the person of one’s choice creates no societal harm and is a natural extension of the abolition of the penalties for engaging in homosexual sex. In contrast, the changes the Law Commissions propose to the laws on surrogacy will have unavoidable mental and physical consequences for surrogate mothers. In the case of surrogacy, a conservative approach to the law is warranted: laws provide moral frameworks which deter undesirable behaviours. By providing regulation for commercial surrogacy — and no real punishment for those who decide nonetheless not to abide by the regulations — Parliament will be signalling that fait accompli approaches may replace actual law. What this means is that legal precedent and ‘the pace of society’ will be set by the very people who are circumventing the law.

          If legislation around advertising for surrogates is loosened in the UK, as requested by Mrs Cotton, it is likely that more women will be persuaded to sign up for this ‘altruistic service,’ mirroring the ‘choices’ of poor women in developing countries. Van Beers and Bosch worry that, in particular, it will be women who have lost their jobs in the COVID-19 pandemic who will find it difficult to avoid exploitation, and this is particularly the case because “the fertility industry is expected to be able to recover quickly” compared with other sectors (p. 352). If so, then their choice underscores a failure of imagination on the part of national governments, a failure of empathy for poor women, and a stark abandonment of “the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life,” otherwise known as the welfare state.72

          The idea that just because rules are being broken on a small scale means those rules do not work at all is false; laws should not be made to accommodate the lowest forms of behaviour. The Law Commission should also be mindful of Lady Warnock’s statement in her 1985 report that “In recommending legislation … we are recommending a kind of society that we can, all of us, praise and admire” (p. 3). At present, this is only possible if the Overton window is shifted away from the idea that babies may be purchased by surrogacy tourists taking advantage of women living in the very worst conditions.

          But there is another way. This would require global co-operation and the will to put the health and wellbeing of women — and the poor in general — ahead of funding wars,73 funding fanciful research, and the interests of biotechs and law firms which, in their ways, contribute to the extraction of women’s biological resources.74 If women’s rights are human rights, surely the dangers, abuses, and heartbreak that are of a piece with the surrogacy industry cannot be laid on the bodies of poor women the world over. The combination of exploitation of women’s sex and economic vulnerability is the very definition of oppression of women as a class. Surrogacy always risks this abusive status because it requires an ability that is only given to women’s bodies.

          Philomela volunteers for a UK safeguarding organization. She is an ex-English and law teacher with undergraduate degrees in law and classics and a postgraduate degree in classics. She researches and writes about objectification of the female body and is currently researching sex robots. This article was written for ‘UK Against Surrogacy.’

          1 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2011 on priorities and outline of a new EU policy framework to fight violence against women.’

          2 ‘The European Parliament Condemns Surrogacy,’ No Maternity Traffic, 18 December 2015.

          3 Claire Fenton-Glynn and Jens M. Scherpe, ‘Surrogacy: Is the Law Governing Surrogacy Keeping Pace With Social Change?’ Cambridge Family Law.

          4 Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 91.

          5 Christianity Stack Exchange, ‘Why Sarah Was Angry About Hagar.’

          6 Genesis 16; 2, 3.

          7 Genesis 30; 1, 4; 6, 2.

          8 Catherine Lee, ‘World Changing Women: Caroline Norton,’ Open Learn, 25 February 2015.

          9 ‘Custody Rights and Domestic Violence,’ UK Parliament, 2021.

          10 Wikipedia, ‘Custody of Infants Act 1873.

          11 ‘Guardianship Act 1973,’ The National Archives.

          12 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, The National Archives.

          13 Stanford University News Service, ‘Does Surrogate Motherhood Reinforce Inequality?’ Stanford University, 2 March 1992.

          14 Mary Warnock, ‘Report of the Committee of Enquiry Into Human Fertilisation and Embryology,’ Department of Health and Social Security, July 1984.

          15 In a private email exchange between the author and Mr Powell, dated 8 February 2021.

          16 ‘Thirteen Years of Controversy,’ BBC News, 14 October 1998.

          17 Renate Klein, Surrogacy: A Human Rights Violation (Victoria: Spinifex Press, 2017), p. 111.

          18 This ‘convenience argument’ is mentioned in Breeders: A Subclass of Women?. Another example can be found in Amy B. Wang, ‘Surrogate mother forced to give away own child after surprise twin pregnancy,’ The Independent, 3 November 2017. Jessica Allen says that she signed up for surrogacy to “become a stay-at-home mom, as well as save for a new house.”

          19 60 Minutes Australia, ‘Inside the corrupted world of commercial surrogacy,’ YouTube, 1 October 2019, . 

          20 Michael J. Sandal, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 92.

          21 Fertility Problems, Assessment and Treatment,’ NICE, 20 February 2013, . Although there are no actual statistics collated for surrogacy births, parental orders have been examined and it has been suggested by family lawyer Natalie Gamble, who also runs Brilliant Beginnings, a UK surrogacy agency, that whereas there were just 51 parental orders made in 2007, by 2016 this had risen to 316. Nina Avramova, ‘The UK’s restrictive surrogacy laws are hurting couples and pushing many abroad,’ CNN, 18 January 2019.

          22 Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Interpol investigates “baby factory” as man fathers 16 surrogate children,’ The Guardian, 23 August 2014,  William Houghton, ‘International Surrogacy Options,’ Sensible Surrogacy.

          23 Karlis Smits and others, ‘Ukraine Growth Study Final Document: Faster, Lasting and Kinder,’ World Bank, p. 4.

          24 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department, Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘A Comparative Study of the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States,’ European Parliament, 2013.

          25 Courtney Pouchin, ‘We hired a surrogate but once I saw the baby I knew something was very wrong,’ The Mirror, 8 August 2019.

          26 Polina Vlasenko, ‘Ukraine’s surrogate mothers struggle under quarantine,’ Open Democracy, 10 June 2020.

          27 ‘Average Salary Survey,’ 22 February 2021.

          28 Sandal, Justice, p. 92.

          29 ‘Case of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy Judgement,’ European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 24 January 2017.

          30 Elizabeth S. Anderson, ‘Is Women’s Labour a Commodity?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 19.1 (Winter 1990), 71-92.

          31 Silvia Blanco, ‘The dark side of Ukraine’s surrogacy boom,’ El País, 1 October 2018.

          32 Britta van Beers and Laura Bosch, ‘A Revolution by Stealth: A Legal-Ethical Analysis of the Rise of Pre-Conception Authorization of Surrogacy Agreements,’ The New Bioethics, 26.4 (2020), 351-71.

          33 Sister Song, ‘Reproductive Justice.’

          34 Reproductive justice “recognizes that life conditions such as a living wage, quality education, affordable healthcare, freedom from environmental hazards and state violence must be in place for women to make fully autonomous heath decisions.” Alison Bailey, ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy,’ Illinois State University, Faculty Publications—Philosophy, 1 (Fall 2011).

          35 Kenneth Roth, ‘World Report 2020: Ukraine, Events of 2019,’ Human Rights Watch.

          36 Alice Cuddy, ‘Where in the world is surrogacy legal?’ Euronews, 13 September 2018.

          37 Kajsa Ekis Ekman, ‘All surrogacy is exploitation—the world should follow Sweden’s ban,’ The Guardian, 25 February 2016.

          38 Sarah Jefford, ‘Feminism and Surrogacy,’ .

          39 Center for Bioethics and Culture, ‘Gloria Steinem calls upon New York Gov. Cuomo to not legalize commercial surrogacy,’ 11 June 2019.

          40 Julie Bindel, ‘Women in India suffer as they serve as surrogates,’ Truthdig, 3 December 2016.

          41 Versuslaw, ‘First Surrogacy Case—In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 109 N.J. 396,’ 3 February 1988, para. 66.

          42 ‘Against Her Will: Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Women Worldwide,’ Open Society Foundations.

          43 Anderson, ‘Is Women’s Labour a Commodity?’ p. 77.

          44 Andrea Dworkin, Right Wing Women (New York: Perigee Books, 1983), p. 182.

          45 ‘Case of Mennesson v France Judgement,’ European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), 26 September 2014, para. 72.

          46 ‘Judgment: Whittington Hospital NHS Trust v XX,’ 1 April 2020, , p. 52.

          47 ‘Re Z (A Child) (Surrogate Father: Parental Order)—1 WLR 4993,’ 2015

          48 Jon Hebditch, ‘Scotland’s first gay couple to get IVF on NHS speak of joy ahead of welcoming baby,’ Daily Record, 4 May 2020.

          49 Gary Powell, ‘ Stop Surrogacy Now‘.

          50 Kashmira Gander, ‘UK’s first surrogate mother on carrying someone else’s baby and how the law must change,’ The Independent, 23 March 2017.

          51 Catrin Nye and Smita Patel, ‘The fraught world of UK surrogacy,’ BBC News, 21 August 2014.

          52 Kim Cotton, ‘Baby Cotton onwards: UK surrogacy law needs to keep pace,’ Bio News, 26 August 2019.

          53 ‘Egg Donor Requirements and Egg Donation Process FAQ,’ Center for Human Reproduction, 10 December 2020.

          54 Jessica Cohen, ‘Grade A: The market for a Yale woman’s eggs,’ Atlantic, December 2002.

          55 Center for Bioethics and Culture, ‘Egg donation and exploitation of young women results in death,’ PR News Wire, 13 July 2012.

          56 Molly Ridriff and others, ‘Advocating for Longitudinal Follow-up of the Health and Welfare of Egg Donors,’ Conceptions, 102.3 (2014), 662-66.

          57 Jane E. Brody, ‘Do egg donors face long-term risks?’ New York Times, 10 July 2017, 

          58 Barbara Luke and others, ‘Risk of Severe Maternal Morbidity by Maternal Fertility Status: A US Study in Eight States,’ Original Research Obstetrics, 220.2 (2019), 195.E1-E12.

          59 T. El‐Toukhy, S. Bhattacharya, and V. A. Akande on behalf of the Royal College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians, ‘Multiple Pregnancies Following Assisted Conception,’ Scientific Impact Paper 22, BJOG, 125.5 (April 2018).

          60 Sarah Knapton, ‘Twins born through IVF “more likely to suffer problems,”’ Telegraph, 20 October 2014, . Sarah Knapton, ‘Twins born through IVF “more likely to suffer problems,”’ Telegraph, 20 October 2014.

          61 NHS Health A-Z, ‘Antenatal Care With Twins,’ 13 May 2019, .

          62 Jennifer Lahl, ‘Biggest winners and losers of 2020,’ Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, 13 January 2021.

          63 The availability of insurance is mentioned here: www.ngalaw.co.uk/knowledge-centre/wills-and-life-insurance-for-surrogacy.

          64 Jennifer Lahl, ‘The Handmaid’s Tale shows exploited surrogacy as fiction, but it’s happening in our world today,’ Verily Mag, 26 April 2017.

          65 Alison Bailey, ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy,’ p. 18.

          66 Kajsa Ekis Ekman, Being and Being Bought: Prostitution, Surrogacy and the Split Self (Victoria: Spinifex Press, 2013).

          67 Huschke Mau, ‘What makes exiting prostitution so hard?’ trans. by Inge Kleine, Huschkemau, 8 August 2017.

          68 Lindsay Curtis, ‘I chose to be a surrogate mother: I didn’t know it would break my heart,’ Huffington Post

          69 CoramBAAF Adoption and Fostering Academy, ‘Statistics: England,’ 

          70 Kirsten Anderson, ‘Jessica Kern,’ Surrogacy Awareness, 25 June 2014.

          71 ‘Surrogacy: Current Project Status,’ The Law Commission.

          72 Peter Bondarenko, ‘Welfare State,’ Britannica, .

          73 For example, the Nobel Prize-winning Senior Vice President and Chief Economist for the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, who, with Linda Bilmes, co-wrote a book about the costs of the 2003 Iraq War, arrived at a cost of “more than $3 trillion to the USA alone.” Operating a war machine thousands of miles from home, to no end, is a greater priority than ensuring women are not forced to rent their wombs out.

          74 For example, in 2013 the European Union funded a 1.6-billion-euro research project which aimed to create a human brain: Martin Banks, ‘The one billion euro brain,’ Horizon, 21 May 2013, . Unsurprisingly, it was an abject failure and was described as having “unrealistic goals, un-useful goals, poor organization, waste of scarce research resources,” etc. Imagine how many childcare facilities, refuges, employment routes out of prostitution, or extra domestic violence workers could be funded with 1.6 billion euros? See Mind Matters News, ‘Why did the Human Brain Project crash and burn?’ 9 December 2020, .