by Esmée Streachailt
Soyons réalistes, nous exigeons l’impossible! [We’re realists, we demand the impossible!]
— May ’68, graffitiYou know, when you’ve survived Stalinism, not much scares you.
— Julia Kristeva, Revolt She Said
I want to talk about biography and meaning for a little while, and I want to risk the anger of my philosophical ancestors by attaching some (some!) of the meaning of their projects to their subjectivity and their actions outside of writing (if there is an outside of writing!?). In this and the next section of ‘RE: Framing Radical Feminism,’ I’ll concentrate on the birth and life of post-structuralism, and its cousin postmodernism, as meaningfully connected to the life of Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction, the philosophical method, did not expound on a politics. It’s nothing like Hegel’s phenomenology that way. But the way deconstruction functions does have huge political implications that I read as supportive or cooperative with radical feminist projects.
I do this to answer a charge often laid against ‘postmodernism’ and ‘post-structuralism’ (the ‘post-’s): that they are at best morally ambivalent and politically disengaged. This charge is made by people from as broad a swath of humanist positions as Steven Pinker, Fred Turner, David Brooks, the editors (at various times) of both The New Yorker and The National Review … You take my point.
So, this second part of ‘RE: Framing Radical Feminism’ takes a historical and then a biographical detour — mostly about a male philosopher whose work is still celebrated or denigrated for its effects in philosophy and the world. Many have, and still do, lay all that is confused or confrontational or inconvenient at the feet of the postmodernists and post-structuralists. So, I want to spend a minute with Derrida, a progenitor of this ‘post-’ era, who promoted the work of marginalized thinkers including women and philosophers in colonized African nations. Politics may not be the philosophy, but philosophy is a vital aspect of a politically committed life.
‘Postmodern’ and ‘postmodernism’ are insults now, no matter which position on the political spectrum it’s coming from. Everybody likes to talk shit about something they think of as ‘postmodernism.’ It is too ‘abstract’ and too ‘inaccessible,’ too ‘relativist’ and too ‘fascist,’ too ‘prevalent’ and too ‘irrelevant,’ and everyone agrees that it is too ‘French.’ I think all of these descriptions are not-even-wrong. Wrong because they are either inaccurate or just lazy. And not-even-wrong because some of them derive from thinking that is not even a little bit philosophical. I get salty about it. ‘The post-s’ (my nickname for postmodernism and post-structuralism) are libelled in many of the same ways that radical feminism is misrepresented and misunderstood.
The last two sections here, ‘The Algerian Who Destroyed the Lyceum,’ and ‘Text and Context,’ are a bit knotty. I have tried very hard to lay out a few key ideas in Derrida’s early work because they are germane to both to debates about the ‘postmodernism’ of various political movements (including radical feminism) and to the ways that some radical feminists of the post-structuralist kind develop his ideas to feminist ends. I have made this all as accessible to general readers as I am able and apologize in advance if I still left some passages too academic. One learns these ideas mostly in the academic idiom in which they are created, and popularizing them has to be done quite carefully. Part of the shit-talking about these ideas results from rather un-careful popularizations. I may not have succeeded.
There is a pay-off, however, for engaging this gloss of one of the most difficult philosophers of the 20th century. This instalment of ‘RE: Framing’ will continue in a future issue with a look at how Derrida’s biography signals a ‘politics’ of deconstruction, suggesting a few ways that this opens up a felicity with radical feminist projects, and then rewarding all of your intellectual hard work with a close reading of a poem that attempts to trans the very Earth herself. (I know!) And all of that together sets up an engagement with Mary Daly’s critique of patriarchy in her gyn/ecology and her imagining of an authentic women’s be-ing of pure lust.
DEATH AND HALF-LIFE OF AUTHORS
Saintliness means turning pain to good account. It means forcing the devil to be God.
― Jean Genet, The Thief’s Journal
Before the mid-20th century, cultural criticism took art works for formal operations that generated meaning more-or-less ex nihilo. This is the position of the New Criticism, for instance, in literary studies. In some ways, this self-contained art object was connected to the idea of ‘art for art’s sake.’ While we think of that aesthetic as decadent now, it was revolutionary when it first emerged. Before the 19th century, art was religious, or political, or both, and commissioned by the church, or landed classes, and the bourgeoisie. Without these patrons for context, meanings were transferred to the author’s own biographical particulars and to the artwork itself. In the middle 20th century, after a whole constellation of intellectual history solidified into post-structuralism, this biographical fallacy and the idea that a work could be isolated from its ‘situatedness’ were finally done away with.
Art and literary or philosophical works became nodes of meaning in larger cultural-historical-political flows or nodes of meaning-making as case studies in the forces that shape whole generations and peoples, and vice versa. This move to context was one that led conservative (or just competing) intellectuals to claim that post-structuralism and postmodernism had dispensed with things like meaning and moral value. Rather, the post-s had become sceptical of accounts of how meaning is made, not that it is made. The post-s considered more than the reader and the author’s situatedness, but also problems of form and language that troubled the ‘easy’ emergence of meaning between these agents. This more complex matrix of meaning eventually gave rise to approaches to art-literature-philosophy that were deeply critical of The Tradition itself (feminist, post-colonial, and race studies). The New Critics may have forbidden reading for ‘authorial intention’ but, at least they valued The Tradition (valued, hell they created it by curating it into anthologies). The post-s were deeply sceptical of tradition, of the stories told to justify our societies, the ways that these stories worked so well to the advantage of the advantaged. Between the generations of the New Critics and the post-s lay the wasteland of world wars, cold wars, pogroms, the glacially slow economic recovery of Europe after World War II, the ends of nearly all major empires, and so on.
Many of this new generation of philosophers were immigrants to the countries where they did their work. These were displaced by the reshuffling of people and borders across each other that took place across Europe and Africa after WWII. They were looking at their host-post-war homes with the other’s eyes, experiencing it always a bit from the outside even as they worked in some of its premier institutions. History had recently made a mockery of long-held ‘truths’ about ‘goodness’ and ‘human nature’ and ‘power.’ For these émigré philosophes, all meaning was more layered and chaotic than for previous generations of natives and the elite classes. These thinkers went to work to decentre the masculine subject and the European continent as both locations and profiteers of knowledge and power, arguing that the cultures of the world were valuable and honourable. In their young lifetimes, a major world power had just bent its will to the utter destruction of two peoples — the Jews and the Roma — along with dissenters, lesbians, homosexuals, most artists. And when that was done, the Reich set its sights on the destruction of all the many rich cultures of the world beyond Europe. While these young thinkers wanted to defend the beauty and complexity of these other cultures and non-normative modes of humanity, they did not endorse every practice of those cultures and people. And they didn’t launch this defence by saying, “Hey look at all these discrete instances of high cleverness across all these peoples, surely we are not so special.” Because that doesn’t work. What they did instead was to excavate the internal contradictions of Western metanarratives, to teach the West that it has been believing its own hype for too long.
To be culturally respectful is not to be a moral relativist, as many humanists would have us think. Hierarchies like white over black, Europe over Africa, man over woman, owners over workers, Occident over Orient, capital over colony—binaries—were noted for the discourses of power that they are instead of natural/divine principles to be followed and enforced in ordering the world. The post-s made these binaries objects of critique in themselves by deconstructing/subverting/swerving them and took the products of literature and philosophy for textual practices that revealed them as much as any law or doctrine or social custom could. Some called this process ‘problematizing,’ a matter of refocusing critical attention to include the judge as much as the accused, to focus on the ‘narrative’ or ‘frame’ as much as facts or content. Feminists, post-colonial critics, critics of racial and all manner of oppressive hegemonies found tools in post-structuralism and postmodernism that strengthened their projects. Derrida and Deleuze, as well as Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray, found the linear, the grid, the brackets of industrial time, the forever-suspect perfect parallels of railroad lines with their neatness and schemata not very adept at describing the less ruly and more wavy organic human world so full of luck, accident, and terror. The story that death came to the deserving, for example, had been wiped away by the death camps and the bombings of Guernica, London, Dresden — who died and who lived began to feel much more earthly and accidental than any divine plan. These thinkers were more interested in the fold, the chiasm, the line of flight, the chora, the flows of feminine fluidity as that which is mis-repressed by (masculine) rationality’s taxonomies and as hews closer to the emergent and complex messes from which humans make their ideas, art, and worlds. These modes of critical investigation were very effective. The post-s were decentring master- and meta-narratives that supported the oppressive forms of power while dressing them in the inevitability implied by classical symmetry. Worse for the humanists and conservatives, the proponents of the post-s were gaining international notoriety.
Names we still pronounce with reverence or revulsion: Althusser, Barthes, Cixous, Deleuze, Derrida, Eco, Foucault, Jameson, Kristeva, Irigaray, Ponge, Sollers, Salazar, et al. In many ways, we have yet to develop beyond their work. Writerly thinkers and deeply thoughtful writers, their styles of voice and self were direct challenges to all statuses quo.
More vexing to their humanist and conservative critics, many of the post-s engaged in a critique of language itself that destabilized our understanding of the very idea of ‘natural’ or ‘given’ meanings (all covertly secured by divine creation) and exposed a more natural fluidity, mutability, and relationality of meaning. Concepts of undecidability and rhizomatic connections troubled any obviously given or easily manipulable theory of meaning. Some of these scholars seemed bent on helping younger generations imagine their way into a new world, new values, new problems, new ways of being and being together, and that was a threat to the order. I remember, in the early days of the internet, all these lists of ‘100 Most Dangerous Academics.’ I wanted very much to end up on one of those lists!
It seems like ancient history, but politics in the US is still repeating the trauma of those events framed entirely by issues that originated in the mid-20th century. We think of the era that included Vietnam, May ’68, Woodstock, Stonewall, the civil rights and environmental and women’s liberation movements, and the counter-cultures of Haight-Ashbury and the Castro as convulsion, but it was an emergence of desire to remake the shape of human life. This all had to stop. And the best way to put a stop to it was to charge the philosophers of this generation with an absurdist, morally laissez-faire and sexually libertine nihilism. A charge also laid at the existentialists before them, also falsely. There is nothing to see here, no useful tool, no effective insight, only hysterical rebellion and anarchy, defenders of power and common sense would say in quick paragraphs dismissing a whole school of thought, tagging unrelated movements with the same dismissal. These conservatives would dodge the challenge laid at their feet to defend an Enlightenment and rationality that had just, in the form of the Nazi Party, nearly destroyed the world with the racist, sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, fascist, and instrumental energies that formed the ‘unconscious’ or the ‘internal contradictions’ of the Enlightenment.
Conservatives call all of this critical shift ‘postmodernism.’2 When they do, they paint the liberatory elements of this era with the stain of the truly relativist, even nihilist elements. The turn that took place beginning with existentialism and then onward was a gestalt-level rejection to a challenge thrown down in several forms, all of them quite powerful, which displaced many supremacies: the male, the European, the white, the Christian, and the capitalist. The backlash has been the informing energy of the last 60 years of cultural friction and political struggle in the US. In the US, conservatives have laid the existence of this friction at the feet of ‘postmodernism,’ never mind that the hippies were not reading Derrida. Some were reading Marx, Hegel, the Frankfurt School, but the deep absorption of ‘postmodernism’ didn’t happen until the 1980s. In the process, conservatives perfected (though they did not invent) many tactics in the strategy of misrepresenting the competition as just terrible and no good when not hopelessly naïve and misinformed, both powerfully dangerous and yet also too miserable to be worried over.
THE MYTH OF THE FAIR AND UNSOURCED PRESENTATION OF YOUR OPPONENT’S POSITION
I don’t care who you are, don’t do this.
— David Foster Wallace
This critique of the post-s fails because it is a caricature. One particularly comprehensive example is Frederick Turner’s 1995 publication, The Culture of Hope: A New Birth of the Classical Spirit, which I take as a case study in this section. 3 In that book, Turner argues that the West and the Enlightenment, even patriarchy, may well be our best path forward into a flourishing future respectful of peoples and their differences if we embrace complexity with a renewed classicism. The antagonist in this dialectic is not neoliberal capitalism, but something he calls ‘postmodernism.’ Turner’s version of postmodernism is a collection of misguided challenges to the Enlightenment. As you will see, this ‘postmodernism’ has no authors, only effects. He references not one of its major voices or texts. Indeed, a genealogist/historian like Foucault (who trained in the classics) needed some elements of the Enlightenment very much — its preference for evidence over faith being one. What the post-s will point out, however, is that the European Enlightenment had never been the only source of evidence and reason as ways of engaging the natural and social world. Rather, the post-s showed that Europe’s particular form of the Enlightenment was just the way that Europe did it, and the self-aggrandizing idea that Europe’s was better than all the other knowledge traditions was both presumptuous and a massive power move.
As I trace my critique of Turner’s unsourced presentation of the post-s, think of it as a lesson in the intellectual abuses committed daily on Twitter in what passes for public intellectual/political engagement. Keep in mind that Turner’s ‘analysis’ of a basket of social and philosophical movements that all happen after WWII takes about five or six pages of a whole book. I name these abuses:
- Colossal obfuscation.
- Sleight of amplitude.
- Reversal of intention.
- The golem.
- Sleight of anachronism.
- Sarcastic accountability.
- Deflected accusation.
Frederick Turner and I agree heartily that the goal of civilization should be the fullest possible flourishing of every living human being — the ‘culture of hope’ of his book’s title. Where we differ is in thinking about why, in all this time, with all this wealth, no civilization of which we have a good archaeological record ever organized itself toward these goals. Turner, you must understand, offers no analysis of power and its benefits or motivations. By revising history, Turner engages in colossal obfuscation. Men have not, you see, oppressed women:
As the struggle for equal rights is not yet over, we must not relax our efforts in that direction. But it is not accurate to portray that struggle as the effort of an oppressed sex to throw of the tyranny of an oppressor sex. [All of feminism is, you see, misguided.] Nor would it be wise in the long run to do so. Some, perhaps many, of the classical values and institutions of the old matriarchy and patriarchy may be salvageable, reshaped and detached from the restrictive elements that limited human achievement. Moreover, the struggle is one in which both sexes have an interest, and will not be achieved if one sex is excluded or alienated by being the target of hatred and prejudice. Nor should the struggle be glibly described as the throwing off of an evil or tyrannical old system designed to foster the interests of a few. (p. 143, emphasis mine)
Take a breath. I did.
He just waved off the radical feminist analysis. We shouldn’t think of our struggle for equal rights as throwing “off an evil or tyrannical old system designed to foster the interests of a few.” Indeed, rather than radical feminism, Turner would prefer a more liberal feminism (if any). This is all a misunderstanding, no need for such intensity. The ‘matriarchy’ he refers to here is not the pre-historic world that created the Venus of Willendorf, but the ‘matriarchy’ of women’s work and traditions, hearth and home, functioning in blissful, unambitious harmony with the patriarchy (p. 144). Like the matriarchy was and will be a contented 1950s style US housewife. We should take care that we do not alienate men or aim our hatred or prejudice at them in our pursuit of equality because Not All Men. Surely the system of sex-based oppression that has denied women freedom of movement, of mind, and of body cannot be described as tyranny? This is familial structure we’re talking about here, surely that’s just love. After all, we can’t have fully articulated culture without the “restoration of matriarchy as well. The household is right at the centre of human life,” and the truly great works of art are not those by men we revere, but those domestic works that “make a home into a place that recalls our beautiful and tragic past” (p. 144). His analysis of race and colonialism runs along similar lines. Yes, we are still having this very same argument with lots of faukes on Twitter.4 The colossal obfuscation continues: in Europe, the “restrictive elements that limited human achievement” were men in families of royal and landed lines who went to some lengths (the clearances, primogeniture, serfdom, prima nocta) not to share with women or serfs (but perhaps to share in the women who were serfs). The interests of a few, indeed. Weirdly, it is the humanist here who is pretending history can be rewritten in any form he chooses.
Just some abstraction we need to sort out, these restrictive elements, bit of a glitch. And, remember, #BeKind. We must not simply reverse patriarchy’s hatred of and prejudice against women lest the male sex be excluded from the good world the feminist revolution (or a re-classicized culture of hope) might create. I don’t personally want to exclude men from a flourishing future human civilization, but they will need to up their humanity game or face some actual consequences. Radical feminists do seek to throw off the evil of patriarchy, but there is nothing glib about it. The characterization is insulting.
From tsk-tsking radical feminism, Turner goes on to argue that the myth of the oppressive Occident put forward by ‘postmodernists’ is a deceptive and tempting story of “moral regeneration and underdog crusade” that instead offers only a cognitive dissonance of “logical, moral, and psychological double binds” which may “cripple its adherents” (p. 144). I often wonder if, in Turner’s taxonomy, Edward Said or Mary Wollstonecraft count as postmodernists. Turner presents himself as offering these corrections in good faith. He’s wrong about the corrections, but I credit him his motive. It’s just that his good motive would leave us with no effective tools to redress the harm that accompanies the tradition he defends, so it isn’t enough reason for me to abandon my tradition or my analysis.
From the pedestal of his good intentions, Turner worries for our souls that the myth of “Western hegemonic dominance” is another source of “traps, excuses, contradictions, and double binds” threatening “unfulfilled human potential” more fiercely than any sexist or racist could possibly do (p. 145).5 See how that happened? An entire history and socio-political system is brought down to the actions of a wee little individual racist or sexist (or homophobe, or queerphobe, or transphobe).6 There is no society, only individuals. I call this the sleight of amplitude, a sudden shift from the abstract to the detail, from system to person. If you agree to the argument in the detail – form, you are forced to accept the abstract form as well. So racism becomes a lone racist easily disarmed with your good grace. In the literary arts, we call this a shift of scale. It helps to create poetry’s sense of profundity. The universe in a grain of sand—that sort of thing. In a history of ideas, it’s a bit of cheat. Turner may find that Thatcherite reference a bit too much, but this is where he places himself rhetorically. Individual sexists and racists, though not structural ‘restrictive elements,’ can be opposed with “firmness, imagination, compassion [!!!!], hope, and a cheerful mind” (p. 145).
Now, remember, Turner is a humanist. He is not some self-aggrandizing libertarian. He’s not Jordan Peterson or Joe Rogan or Senator Rand Paul. He is the real deal. He really has faith in something that Bannon, Cheney, Miller, et al. can’t be bothered with in their bald pursuit of power and profit. Turner believes the classical humanist tradition has much to offer, including a hope of saving us from ourselves, if it’s only put to less glitchy and damaging uses. He is not wrong. He is defending the imagination and the humans who embody it. I am enthusiastically and intrepidly on the side of the ethical imagination and the humans who embody it.
But Turner has no clear sense of how the law, and state force, and money, and random-winked-at acts of violence support a deep and foundational system that cannot, at this late date, be rescued from itself. As Manda Scott reminds the audience of her Accidental Gods podcast: the mindset that created a problem cannot solve that problem. Patriarchy will not solve patriarchy. 7 Reifying gender-as-stereotyped-roles will not deconstruct gender (neither will making gender an ‘inner essence,’ but that’s for another essay). Turner’s benevolent patriarchy of neo-neo-classism is not a change of social mindset. As Turner says, we merely need to edit the “restrictive elements that limited human achievement.” It’s neo-, alright: neoliberalism at its gentle best.
Another of Turner’s suspect moves is to take the weakest forms of several analyses derived from several schools of critical thought and treat them as if they are one tradition or movement. I call this cheat The golem. The golem is a kind of character attack, an amalgam of imputed thought-crime, nefarious associations, and ill-will that the targeted party is not participating in. This is the mistake that trans-rights activists and many, many Tweeters make online when they present ‘radfems’ as aligned with the political right and funded by the religious right, or as ‘wishing trans women didn’t exist,’ or threatening them with violence. I’m sure all these do happen, it’s just not radical feminists doing it. But the repetition of these assertions builds up a monster that can be deployed to frighten away allies and to smear the feminists themselves. The golem winks as it replaces actual radical feminists and our analysis in the social imagination. There are people and groups who advocate positions that overlap with (a handful of) radical feminist positions (mostly that biology is real and sex is dimorphic) who are utterly intolerant of both extra-heterosexuality and women’s social autonomy. Both the fascist and religious right groups/parties work against the interests of radical feminists and all non-conformists, and will use the one against the other as suits their ends. Shellacking us with their sentiments makes it difficult for radical feminists to do our work (which is the point), and it makes the work of trans and LGB people holding their own social and legal space nearly impossible.
The golem wrecks everything as it stumbles and flails, so it gives those patriarchal forces more room to operate against weakened challenges. Turner heads off into this genre of misrepresentation in the next few paragraphs:
What is the myth of Western hegemonic dominance? Essentially it proposes that a single social and racial group — white Europeans — developed an alienating, hierarchical, and dualistic mode of thought which, by sacrificing the human values of bodily experience, relatedness, and harmony with nature, gave them a kind of Faustian control over society and nature. Other human cultures lived in peace and mutual tolerance with their neighbours, welcoming their cultural differences, but the Western conquerors were racists by nature, and oblivious to the cultural riches they were destroying. The victims could have raised the economic and technological demon to defend themselves, but did not wish to, because of their greater wisdom, which warned them against the perils of ecological destruction, social discrimination, commodity fetishism and economic oppression. (p. 145)
The first sentence is a pretty good characterization of Medieval Catholicism and its domination of European life through to the secularization of the 20th century. But to hold this super-clean dichotomy as an actual worldview, one would have to ignore the histories of the whole world’s cultures. Ancient Persia was a colonial power. Many civilizations collapsed because they over-farmed the land near their cities and eventually ran out of food. In these passages, Turner conflates actual anthropology and archaeology with gauzy New Age spiritual-bypassing rather than with any known history. The foundational Hindu text The Mahabharata is not a tale of peace and easy cohabitation. The pre-Columbian Meso-American civilizations engaged in various forms of violence, both religious and political; they did not dehumanize the other in the way Westerners have so consistently made sub-humans and animals of their enemies and others.
This ‘Occident is all things bad’ is not an argument post-s make. Post-s critique the mechanisms used, the assumptions driving the project, but that the West is “uniquely” bad is not their claim (p. 146). Turner is conflating parts of arguments, and then offering a lie. Indigenous people did not raise the demon to defend themselves, because they were so wise and gentle? It’s Rousseau who dreamt up the ‘noble savage’ without ever leaving France. That line of argument is a sleight of anachronism, and that’s another move people make in writing off a whole tradition: holding it accountable for ideas/policies that came well before it. Nothing in anyone’s history shows that living closer to nature, even taking the earth herself for divine, means one’s society is egalitarian and knows nothing of war. Seriously.
The new Western tribe of cold, grasping, and arrogant white males closely identified with the oppressive patriarchy … spread out over the world and reduced other cultures to colonial subjection and slavery. The process continues unabated, as the West moved into a new phase of ‘late-capitalist’ economic colonialism; its most subtle twist is to use ‘Western values,’ which are in fact hypocritical systems of control and mystification to maintain dominance. Among those so-called values are rationality, empirical objectivity, democratic due process, the control of the body and emotions by reason, delayed gratification, and such abstract essentialistic ideals as goodness, truth, and beauty. The central tenet of Western ideology is that there is only one overarching truth; this totalizing idea denies the diversity and relativity of cultural values, and the great ideals of diversity and pluralism. (p. 145, emphasis mine)
Note how the word “tenet” goes too far. The “one overarching truth” is not a tenet every philosopher or culture argued for from Athens onward. This unity of metaphysics is a structural element: holding that we are the best humans (whoever we are) and the rest are barbarians. Especially since the Crusades, Europeans have taken with them to war the idea that they are the defenders of the faith, of God, of the Good — while the Jews and Muslims they went to fight were nearly inhuman extensions of the Devil himself. This ideology carried over into the colonization of the Americas — that there is only one true God and that the peoples of the Americas would be brought to his worshipful service or die. That version was written down in the ‘Doctrine of Discovery.’ If we pretend this doctrine and the doctrine of ‘Manifest Destiny’ didn’t exist, Turner’s objections might hold. Centre replaces centre replaces centre, but European males remain most adjacent to the guarantor of power — Godhood, then God, then Reason, then Commerce, then Tradition, then MAGA. The fact that the French spoke French and English spoke English only means that their wars were basically family squabbles to discover which cousins God thought should dominate the Earth. As I showed us in Issue One, in ‘The Plot Twist,’ Irigaray calls this coincidence that runs through civilization the process by which “any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the masculine.” We find this same form repeated again and again. Turner knows perfectly well that much of ‘history’ is just many royal families/empires/religions competing (through both murder and war) for God’s Imprimatur and Divine Rights Over All. We teach this competition as History. The one meaning, the one justifying goal for all their bloodshed and brutality, is that the winner was more blessed and therefore more ‘real’ than the loser. He’s not wrong that it also supported all the innovation and creativity and intellectual adventure we call Western Culture. This is the shining legacy that Turner wants to protect from the incursions of ‘postmodernism,’ but to do that he has to forget that most of this beauty served the interests and projects of this globalizing empire. It was the model imported north by the Romans, and it was very — Malcolm Gladwell would say — sticky. But, you know, part of building up a golem is ignoring a lot of evidence and documentation, along with conflating various lines of investigation, and oversimplifying claims developed over whole books, careers, and intellectual movements.
Then there’s the cheat I call sarcastic accountability. Turner complained above that ‘postmodernists’ think the values essential to Western Culture are merely “hypocritical systems of control and mystification to maintain dominance. Among those so-called values are rationality, empirical objectivity, democratic due process, the control of the body and emotions by reason, delayed gratification, and such abstract essentialistic ideals as goodness, truth, and beauty” (p. 145). These pillars of culture that Turner defends against attacks accusing them of nefariously distracting us from the bloody-mindedness of the West are the basic features of mature human beings almost everywhere on Earth. Delayed gratification, for example, is a skill most humans attain by the age of six just to get on with other humans. As I pointed out in the first instalment of this series, no science that wants to claim women are less intelligent than men because their femurs are shorter is actually doing empirical objectivity, but rather are dressing up a power move in the finery of empiricism, and that right there is the hypocrisy.8 It’s not the value the post-s find suspicious, it’s the disingenuous application and the eventual installation of that disingenuity in the place of the more subtle complex truth. Nobody really believes that the US is trying to ‘bring democracy’ to the Middle East anymore given that we could not have gone about it in a more obtuse manner. The replacement of reality by ideology — of reality by its representation — this is what Fredric Jameson identified as ‘the postmodern condition,’ and he was not a fan.
It is a further fact that a host of European nations did reach out over the world to subdue its peoples and reap their resources; it was called The Age of Empire, and in that era kings and queens ‘built economies’ by taking a land and its riches because we hadn’t yet invented industrialism and concepts like ‘productivity.’ The better your maps and ships, the more successful your exploits. European nations went to war with each other over these territories, and over the shipping lanes that moved their resources to Europe, and why did they do this? Because they’d reached a point in the process of conquering each other where they’d appropriated all the resources they could on the continent and their political and military powers rendered them about equal. Nothing to do then but expand the franchise. But, again, what’s missing in Turner’s reading of ‘postmodernism’ is an honest grappling with the post-s’ analysis of power. Critics of the West’s form of patriarchal imperial domination don’t think Europeans are ‘naturally racist,’ just that racism is a sticky ideology they adapted (not invented) to justify their appropriation of land, resources, and human beings to prop up an undue sense of superiority.
The deflected accusation is made by accusing your opposition of whatever galling violence or criminality you yourself are up to. In politics it’s tactical triangulation. In psychology it’s projection. These are not precisely the same thing, but they tend to appear together. Power and those who seek it default to this sleight:
They’re cheating you in business!
They’re just looking for money and publicity!
They’re nihilists bent on the destruction of meaning itself!
They’re going to steal your wives and turn them into lesbian witches!
They’re a cult. They’re preying on your insecurity.
They’re going to side with their whiteness, like always.
They’re going to rig the election with the mail-in ballots!
They hate you and don’t want you to exist!
They seek you out on Twitter to harass and threaten you!
The deflected accusation has a profoundly destabilizing effect, putting (usually) earnest interlocutors on the defensive and clouding up the discursive space so that good arguments and facts cannot overpower bad arguments and lies. Steve Bannon calls this ‘flooding the zone’ with so much bullshit that your opposition is simply exhausted by trying to sort out or establish any truth at all. It creates so much uncertainty that people simply default to believing whatever makes them feel most comfortable in a consumerist kind of cognitive surrender. In Steve Bannon’s case, that flood is ‘elites’ and ‘Soros’ and ‘caravans’ and ‘taking away your guns’ and ‘walls’ and whatever else comes to hand that gives his listeners a target that is not Big Oil or shady Multinationals or Russia (is our friend!). But, you know, it’s really those unpatriotic Democrats you need to hate, with their socialism, feminism, and critical race theory. This poisoning-the-well combined with psalm-like ad hominem is effective. Effective, but still bullshit.
SOMETHING APPROACHING SUBSTANCE
Différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of différance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify, would not function.
— Jacques Derrida, Positions9
To counter this casual dismissal of the most fecund and revolutionary period of thought in recent history, I want to appeal to authors’ biographies again. At a time when it’s easy to dismiss radical thinkers by simply ignoring their lives along with what they actually said, I want to re-vivify their relevance to radical feminism by referring to their actions in the world. Indeed, Turner treats the post-s much the way media and institutions now treat J. K. Rowling, reflexively and without due diligence.
See, the charge of nihilism is coupled with a charge of elitism, even obscurantism, and because of that additional charges of political disinterest and passivity. That is to say: you’ll be told that post-structuralism has nothing to offer current justice movements and may even be a source of hostility to them. Today we have a situation where people like Jordan Peterson deplore ‘postmodernism’ as much as does the most ardent woke-warrior. Take as an example the ‘yellow cake’ lie that excused the US invasion of Iraq. That was Dick Cheney’s doing. And when confronted on national television with documented accusations of this lie, he responded with (I paraphrase), “We are the most powerful nation in the world. Reality is what we say it is.” It was a catastrophic perversion of even the most relativist postmodernism, this reduction of the living world to whatever powerful men want to say about it. That is the truly nihilist form of postmodernism, and it takes advantage of the incomplete relationship of representation to things. Rather than explore the creative productivity, the liberation that can be found or created in that gap, men like Cheney insert their agendas and drive to their own ends.
Many of the post-s get themselves in trouble by being hard to read. Most radical feminists are not among them.
I will stipulate that some (most) of these texts are hard to read. It was the fashion in this period in France to write in a near-Baroque poetico-scientific style. Partly this is due to the influences of phenomenology, linguistics, psychology, and sociology on these thinkers. That background makes for a complex web of technical terms and desiccated academic style infused with paradoxes and metaphors. Partly the complexity is down to thinking on several levels at once, refusing to isolate connected and layered phenomena, representation from its effect in the world. We need help to read Derrida or Irigaray only as much as we need help to read Plato, Kant, or Pascal. Hegel is no walk in the Jardin des Plantes either.
Nonetheless, many of these philosophers were deeply political people who participated in activist causes or used their teaching and leveraged their position to advocate for them. Much of what they did outside of philosophy was indicative of what they experienced their own thought to mean. The correlation is not perfect, these are humans we are talking about and humans work at cross-purposes to ourselves all the time. While Foucault was expert in classical literatures and his writing style imprinted with those lexical habits, his genealogies of state and cultural power and how such power shapes our lives are completely influenced by his experiences in the May ’68 uprisings and the aggressive police and government response. Had Foucault not been in the marches and on the barricades, had he not been a gay man in mid-century France, we likely would not have the indispensable Discipline and Punish. Kristeva, in Revolt, She Said, begins in her experience of May ’68 and moves in the opposite direction from Foucault. Rather than chart the interpolation of the self by the state to create a cooperative subject, Kristeva traces the flight lines of revolt as a constant question to the status quo and the creation of more and more liberating possibility for oneself and one’s society.
All of this ‘postmodern’ work in Europe took place in the same era as the civil and women’s rights movements. They’re all examining systems that support ideologies that harm people. Some more than others are deeply interested in the revaluation of the other as a co-equal positive subject in the world. Not equal. Not the Same. Something possibly new and less imagined. The content of books by Firestone, or Dworkin, or Lorde, or Jordan is painful to encounter and grapple with, but it is not stylistically difficult to approach. Writers such as Turner or Peterson, and alliances such as the woke-left and queer-theory academics, will argue that second-wave feminism is no longer relevant to solving today’s still very second-wave problems. Like the social marginalization and economic oppression that feminist and civil rights groups critiqued for the damage and harm that has echoed on through all these decades. In the US, we have passed three laws meant to close the pay gap for women. None of them have been enforced well enough to have the outcome. I could go on about education and childcare and sexual violence and medical practices … They’ve changed, but not in ways that solve the diagnosed problems, and most efforts have stalled (as regarding sex-based violence) or morphed into parodies that feel like traps.
I still don’t know what to make of the corporate team-up of Betty Crocker and Barbie in a campaign to get girls interested in math and science through (buying products for) pink and rainbow themed baking projects!! For the love of Gaia.10
These philosophers, journalists, sociologists, and poets (many of them polymaths) meant, in earnest, to make the world more humane, supportive of human being and flourishing. It’s in their projects, but it’s also in what they did with their lives outside of their books.
THE ALGERIAN WHO DESTROYED THE LYCEUM
It is also the becoming-space of the spoken chain—which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible … every passage from one to the other. The activity or productivity connoted by the a of différance refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. The latter are neither fallen from the sky nor inscribed once and for all in a closed system, a static structure that a synchronic and taxonomic operation could exhaust. Differences are the effects of transformations, and from this vantage the theme of différance is incompatible with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in the concept of structure.11 — Jacques Derrida, Positions
Jacques Derrida. First of his name, the Deconstructionist, Destroyer of Meaning, Terrorist of Order and Reason, Annihilating Event-Horizon of All Hope. Again, so much energy spent putting people off means there is a real challenge here to the powers that be. It’s easy to lie about what Derrida said or meant because his books are hard to read. Very. Hard. And they require a lot of shared context between reader and philosopher, and that is a huge time commitment most people are not at liberty to make (and that some of us go into debt to create in our lives). I am about to trouble readers with a gloss of the conference paper that kicked off this whole ‘postmodern’ debacle. I have to do that because the intervention presented in Derrida’s paper has actually changed a lot of the world, and is a grounding text of a difference-inflected post-structural radical feminism, and is part of the deep error made by ‘woke’ and ‘queer’ theories that Jane Clare Jones discusses in the introduction to this issue. Derrida gets at an unexamined root of a problem in this paper, and he does it in a way that redirects the history of metaphysics forevermore.
Kind of like the intervention radical feminists seek to make in the patriarchy that explains itself to itself with that very metaphysics.
Derrida arrived at the first symposium on structuralism in the US in 1966 to present his paper to the hundreds in attendance, including most of the major living philosophers, literary critics, anthropologists, and psychoanalysts in the world. In his biography of Derrida, An Event, Perhaps … , Peter Salmon condenses structuralism this way: it rejected humanist approaches to the history of cultures and proposed that not only all elements of culture but a human life itself could be understood “as being part of a ‘structure,’ and any explanation of motives, action, and behaviour had to overcome the illusion of a free subject” (p. 2). Both our works and our selves are produced by their “place within the system of shared narrative techniques, shared tropes, shared conventions and worldviews. Meaning is produced by a work’s [or a life’s] place in a genre (or outside of one), by the circumstances of its production and by the social (and intellectual and cultural) position of the reader” (p. 2). It all has a rather tidy 1950s vibe about it. Everything means by being in its place, serving its function, and all we have to do to understand it is read its own motifs and tropes in the context of its type, manner of making, and cultural location. Sorted. As one of my favourite professors used to say, “structuralism makes life meaningless by reducing everything in the world to ten things.”12 You’re doing a bit of structuralism when you watch a movie and 15 minutes in you can predict the remaining plot points. As a structuralist, if you were to encounter a new plot, or new type of character, you would first work quite hard to ‘reduce’ it a familiar one, or then admit that a new ‘meme’ had come along and rest assured that more would come and build out a new ‘category’ in the Vast Classification.
As Peter Salmon tells it, Derrida stood at the podium and simply read the paper ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,’ which begins, “Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an ‘event.’” It took a half-hour to read. When he was finished and looked up, “the entire structural project was in doubt, if not dead. An event had occurred: the birth of deconstruction” (p. 2). All these eminences, some gris, of France came to the US to introduce US academics to structuralism, and Derrida rendered the project dead on arrival. It was as if a bomb had gone off.
Derrida had noticed what he called an aporia, a kind of unresolvable contradiction or paradox at the heart of every concept (or idea, or description, or value). The aporia is a kind of resonating tension in the hyphen or the slash mark between two terms in a dichotomy. One might picture an oscillation, a to-and-fro, between whatever is set up as Subject and the disavowed other that interrupts the illusion of a Subject’s unitary isolation. So, between a concept, like Presence or Subject, and their often unspoken or erased negatives poles, like absence or other, there’s a space where aporia functions to keep them related to each other and radically distinct from each other. The relation, then, supports their meanings. And that relation is one of dynamic equilibrium. Presence or Subject (what Jane Clare Jones calls ‘idea/mind/gender/society’ in her introduction to this issue) would like to pretend that this resonance or oscillation is not happening, that its hierarchy or binary is fixed, permanent, real, ordained. Presence would like us never to notice the disavowed other (‘matter/body/sex/nature’) because that way Presence can continue to (try to) assign all negativity to this other, way over there, that I am not, and that I can use to my own ends. Hierarchy and binaries operate by using a logic of either/or and superiority/inferiority, by exclusion. Difference and the aporia operate using a logic of both/and, neither/nor, by relationality. From the point of view of Presence (the Subject, Truth, the Masculine), this looks like a radically untrustworthy instability — a threat to the security of power. From the point of view of difference, this looks like the interdependence we experience as embodied creatures. Just as what we once thought was space and time is really a more undecidable thing called space-time, the being that is a complex life-form is not a body and a mind, but a body-mind.13 Remove one and kill the other. Nourish one and enliven the other. But in our current arrangement of life, Mind would very much like to pretend that it is another thing than the body. Pre-Enlightenment the flesh was Sin, and post-Enlightenment the flesh is just meat. Neither view is correct because neither view accounts for the necessary interdependence of (pure, incorruptible) Mind with its (corruptible) meat.
Aporia doesn’t work like a machine or a lever. As the example of the body-mind indicates, it’s an operation, but it’s fundamental, elemental, very nearly quantum. The aporia is a figure of paradox; it’s more like a dimension in which the relation of difference is always happening. In the worlds of philosophy and politics, however, this play and relational differing among concepts often goes unstated, unexamined. In philosophy we call this way of describing concepts the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ and in politics we call this way of describing people ‘power’ and ‘discipline’ and ‘ideology.’ Typically, nearly always, the unstated or unexamined pole of a pair also represents and is treated as somehow anathema, other, both merely deplorable and existentially dangerous. As, say, ‘woman’ is in the metaphysics and politics that make ‘Man’ what he ‘is’ in patriarchy. This aporetic relation between terms is, Derrida would say, the unacknowledged operation of all metaphysics. Presence is always haunted by absence to make any sense at all. Worse for the gathered assembly and for the conformism of the mid-20th century, this aporia of the unspoken not-present (gap, abyss even) muddles about in ways that trouble linear and familiar forms, but in that turbulence the aporia is also creative, generative.
Once I read that thanks to the emptiness between atomic particles, every solid thing we encounter is mostly empty space. Turns out, even that emptiness is really quite full of mostly movement, flow, all manner of strings that might more be thought of as vibrations that make ‘things’ more of an accretion of resonances. That we can kiss, and feed, and birth, or make into cars and drive about on roads, but still mostly just empty space.
Once I read that most of a human body is not human. In terms of plain numbers, most of the cells walking around with your name and identification number are bacteria — but you cannot live without them. The human, that creature that so much wanted with all its religion and metaphysics and sexism to remove itself from base nature is, numerically, mostly base nature and would die if sufficiently cleansed. We tenderly call this other-that-is-also-us our microbiome. We are symbiants. Turns out almost everything — and especially ideas or stereotypes or empires — are symbiants. It’s in all the ways that we deny this that we do violence.
So, the aporia and difference are the tension, the resonance, and the oscillation between two positive terms that are (and can be placed in) dichotomous relation. A and B are radically different and mutually constituting. A and B could be ‘Man’ and ‘woman,’ but A and B are also you and your microbiome. Take away one, eventually no more of the other either. All the burbling in the 11 dimensions of quantum reality that seem from another dimension to be ‘nothingness.’ Aporia and difference are Derrida’s figures for the fundamental, and generative, paradox of all being.
Read for this tension, and the violence of the choice to place A over ~A begins to reveal itself. To think of Man or Capitol or Identity as if they could even mean anything without woman or colony or difference requires a foreclosure or suppression that parallels the violence of social and political suppression. That which is submerged, denied, or subjugated as absent/other both frustrates the concept and the text about it, and so produces further meaning. Reading for that further meaning, reading from the ‘logic’ of following the suppressed term (absence), makes a text mean more and mean differently than it claims. Within the well-sorted world of structuralism, Derrida had noticed something unruly, and alive, and well — feminine (though that connection comes later).14 More dynamically, this aporia is not a feature of only one text, or even one branch of philosophy, but “belonged to the whole history of Western metaphysics … from Plato to the present” (p. 5). Reading différance, or deconstructing, is to take metaphor and connotation and magnify them where ‘logic’ and ‘meaning’ usually want us to reduce them as much as possible. Derrida did not say anything about power in this paper read at this suddenly pivotal conference, but everyone in the room knew the implication was there and that Derrida was setting it loose.
BOOM! … reverb still troubling us today… rumblerumblerumble … postmodernism destroys meaning and threatens the nuclear family!!!
They itch, aporias, once you notice them, they never go away. A text, an argument, a social system might present itself as a coherent totality, but this tension generated by what is repressed or shunted aside for the sake of that coherence is never not-there. These others and differences are always-there, embedded (usually un-spoken) paradoxes in metaphysical arguments and political schemes. The aporia is subjected to a process of splitting and othering in order to maintain a ‘transcendental signifier’ or ‘Identity’ or ‘the Subject’ or ‘Man.’ That is, hierarchies (tenuously) maintain themselves by trying to freeze differences in place. Men have worked out the meaning of ‘Man’ by making everything man doesn’t want to be (not-man) into ‘woman’ in the question of the human. The particulars that constitute Man and woman might change, but that the value and power of Man over woman remains era to era (in culture and in society), that is the hierarchy being maintained by this deliberate splitting and freezing.
Where structuralism would have us think we had made sense at last of the churn and chaos of the wide world and all creation, Derrida said, well no, actually, you’re just reading as if “consciousness is fully present, that the world is fully present, and that we can analyse” this presence with “concepts that are fully present, and that, in some sense, exist as things” (p. 5). That ‘as if’ makes all the difference. Quite the other way around, this not-fully-present-ness of the objects of our attention, investigation, even love, is what generates the ever-more meaning of on-going life. When we deconstruct, we read a text ‘against the grain’ (goes the mantra). That means that we seek out the denigrated, devalued term in the binary of meaning on whose suppression the meaning of a text (or society) depends (the evil, the negative, the impure, the complex, the accidental, the writing, the woman, the feminine, the darkness, the non-white, the Oriental, and so on) and read the text back at itself by privileging these debased terms. By re-seeing the text-world framed by what it would exclude, colonize, control, a deconstructionist reveals the violence of the ‘as if,’ real and discursive, that keeps the top term in the binary on top.
The further-meaning and proliferation of ‘what is’ that opens within the aporia becomes the “play” of ‘Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.’ Play is the operation of aporia, a very different way of meaning or being from the operation of metaphysical violence. Different, not opposite. Play sets loose both A and B to interact openly, to interact beyond their own binary system. That play can be generative, and, as is usually figured, it does not exclude violence. Rather play is a process of meaning that does not rely on violence. Différance and play make meaning by respecting differences, the boundaries between A and B (and C and D …), and that way making their relation possible. Baldly put in radical feminist terms: if woman is only a mirror that reflects and magnifies Man, then there can be no love because there is no woman other than as a service to Man. In the metaphysics of différance, the presence and boundaries of both concepts or kinds of subjects is not only acknowledged but activated in creativity.
You can see how this other scheme for understanding meaning-making — one that said the very deepest possible structure of thought/culture/meaning is not a structure so much as a play among mutually constituting differences — would make people in powerful places nervous even if Derrida himself is obsessing over a really obscure paper no one else had much read for a while. Why ever would that matter? This insight, this look through a microscope at a black hole, would go on to influence, indeed make possible, the kinds of critical thinking we do today in nearly every area of the human sciences. Where structuralism saw determination, Derrida saw play, and in play a great deal of meaning. This is not to say that these structures are not meaningful, or impactful even to the point of killing people, but they are a little less certain, less grounding, than we thought. There is rather more meaning at work than any structure wants to admit, permit, include, allow.
The lecture ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Humans Sciences,’ like nearly everything Derrida wrote, is not about politics or the social order, but it does have some destabilizing implications for them. That’s because they are created largely by ideas expressed in language and ‘authorized’ by the metaphysical ur-binary of Presence/absence that orders all the other binaries through which we structure the meanings of our human world. Presence/absence is the deep structure of all meaning, no matter what terms or ideas are ‘centred’ for consideration, examination, critique, or proof. To read the political up from the metaphysics’ support of the patriarchy, then the masculine, the colonizer, the divinity, the lord, the owner, the husband, is to make them the centre, the theme, the concept. While the social order’s principle may change, the centre is always found to mean, to assert or evince its being, not of itself but only in relation to other centres that it ‘de-centres’ by devaluing them. Presence is good, absence not-good. Presence is God, absence is God’s flawed creation and its total negation in Satan. Presence is the Ideal Form, light, reason, the phallus of phallogocentrism. Whiteness. Eurocentrism. Heteronormativity. Sexism. A and ~A. Always, but not necessarily. Balance is an alternative to hierarchy, difference an alternative to identity.
To be brutally glossy about it, structuralism found patterns in the world, myth, literature and argued that meaning inheres in the relation between signifier (word or meme) and signified (object, action) which manifests in the ‘Sign,’ which is (loooosely) the concept in our minds that is made for us by our shared habits of language and thought, all of which can be mapped structurally. It’s like the 18th- and 19th-century craze for categorizing everything into types and kinds, but run amok. But, structuralism does not challenge any of these orders. Yes, it is here that the fatuous notion that ‘cultural constructs’ can be remade by shuffling language enters into the world as the weak form of discursive subversion and, with it, the strategically tragic idea that one can explode patriarchy by reifying gender rather than negating it. This is the ontological error of much contemporary queer theory. Structuralism can be over-read to say that if you change the category of the thing, you change the meaning of the thing, and that changes the thing itself. But merely changing descriptions does not dislodge the history and power that built the system. One does not explode the gender binary by pretending it’s a sex binary, exchange some members of each group, and thereby destroy sexism and patriarchy.
Actual post-structuralists would read that last sentence and say we all needed a quick nap and some tea, for nothing called ‘subversion’ is so easy. The stronger post-structuralists, of which Derrida is one, would admit that their manner of reading also involves an ‘as if.’ They read, and thought, and often acted ‘as if’ the play of difference could be leveraged toward liberation. The kind of ‘postmodernism’ that I’m defending here sees in ‘play’ another metaphysics, one where no term in a dichotomous pair is devalued. In this metaphysical play, presence and absence both take place, act upon each other and separately, in the generation of meaning. It’s messy, and it’s not strictly logical.
Mine are inelegant summaries, and Derrida’s analysis only becomes more paradoxical and elegant as it confronts the history of phenomenology’s attempts to describe Being — a term so vague it could only be an absent-present rumour of what it wants to mean. And that conundrum of the word for what-is, ‘Being,’ not at all capturing what is leads these philosophers to argue about how the problem can be.
It turns out that describing fundamental stuff is very hard, and so is changing the systems into which we have ‘organized’ it all.
What Derrida finds in all this struggle to get at what is is that, if the Sign is underwritten by the relationship between the signifier and the referent as an epiphenomenon arising from the presence and absence of the word and thing in a kind of electron’s toggle, then it is the toggling and its play and fluidity that both underwrites and destabilizes meaning. He will call this toggling différance. Différance (a misspelling of ‘difference’ meant to highlight its work as both a noun and a verb) is the operation and the effect of the aporia, and it reverberates everywhere. And the play of différance exports quite elegantly as a metaphor for how creativity, and life, and open horizons emerge from what is into what may, into an ‘as if’ world that might not have elite, white, French or American males dominating its every quadrant.
This what may of difference is why feminists like me are fond of Derrida’s work. This was his gift to us, that when we read a metaphor or a paradox or a binary so that neither term can be devalued—when we honour difference instead of subsuming it into sameness — wild new creations emerge and spiral out into worlds the hidebound patriarchs and their fauke minions are not prepared to explore.
People who are impatient with ‘postmodernism’ are not entirely without reason. They’re just working with a broad and unhelpful brush. Play is one of those Derridean ideas that gets us all in trouble. People just ran off over the hill with it to say that nothing means anything and that reading texts against themselves means that you can make out like T. S. Eliot’s The Wasteland is about baseball. These people are wrong in almost exactly the way that Judith Butler is wrong about sex and gender. Separating the performance of gender from the human being doing it might have liberating implications (this is Simone de Beauvoir’s point), but re-inscribing the performance back into the human being as an essence is just saying that The Wasteland is about baseball — only with hugely regressive political and social implications.
Very smart people over many centuries got parts of this Truth and Being thing sorted out, but not quite, not in its paradoxical fullness and sublimity, because they wanted more consistency than language or evolution or entropy will allow. No, far more subversively than creative misreadings of Eliot (or gender), Derrida found that if a force like difference/play and inter-relationality is what’s holding our world together, this is — though Derrida himself had not yet gone this far — rather bad news for a lot of power structures that rely on the ‘authority’ of the Sign (and force or coercion) to maintain and justify their position. The Sign might be the King, or Tradition, or Masculinity. Lacan’s transcendental signifier was about to be in a world of trouble, destabilized in a serendipitous pincer movement by Derrida’s deconstruction and Irigaray’s reading from the other-woman. 16
TEXT AND CONTEXT
All paradoxes are true.
— Esmée Streachailtsidewalk, Normal, IL, the early 1990s
Derrida delivered this paper reading the humanities for trash, birthing the post-structural project just as structuralism shook hands with the US academic class. He did this in a United States embroiled in a proxy war with the Viet Cong that was really a war with the communist Soviet Union and amongst intensifying anti-war, civil rights, and women’s liberation movements all challenging the existing structures. You can see how this might be upsetting to a white-heteronormative-masculine-military-industrial-capitalist society and all its justifying mythoi.17 The man, the normies, the patriarchy never stopped trying to stop this play of difference leaking its way into the world and rearranging all the bedrock. But, it’s a fluid concept, difference, and like water almost impossible to control.
Crucially, without the certainty of ‘presence’ and ‘centre,’ events like the Holocaust, of which Derrida’s own exclusion from grade school under the Vichy regime was an echo, must not and cannot proceed with smooth brows. In a metaphysics of différance, instrumental reason can’t proceed so easily to such terrible ends. This of course, is also a challenge to all the foundations of power, especially the foundations power uses to justify abuse-oppression-othering. Difference is the ‘sabot’ of sabotage, the wooden shoe of the seamstress thrown in the mechanical loom of a ‘logic’ that treats people as fungible and disposable. In this critique, in the implosion of the binary of Presence > absence, many heard the destabilization of the bi-polar geopolitical order that was The Cold War, and with it the justification for whatever the hell the US was doing in Vietnam. Any school of thought that made presence and absence interrelated and co-creative antagonists arising out of the complexity of existence was a school of thought that might undo the justification for a war meant to assure that the US had History/God’s Imprimatur. The Soviet Union, in this narrative, plays the role of absence, the negation, the existential threat to Presence. Of course, this narrative reads quite the other way around from the Soviet side. Otherwise, deconstruction would just be an obscure little philosophical cul-de-sac in the tradition, wouldn’t it? And certainly nothing public intellectuals all the way over in the US would need to warn you off for (looks at watch) 50 years now.
Deconstruction is a manner of engagement — asking it to express a positive political agenda is asking too much — though it has political effects.18 Deconstruction is the slash mark in neither/nor and both/and, the aporia (play of paradox, or the flows of space-time) that creates relationality, the contradictions and weirdly poetic registers always lurking in the rational discourse. Bennington describes it this way: “Deconstruction is going to find itself between, not in the middle but in the milieu, and will think politics neither as the objective product of an ontological ground, nor, in the absences of such grounding, as a simple competition of more or less antagonistic (individual or subjective) subjectivities …”19 For deconstruction, because the aporia is relational and productive, politics simply is the case.
The problem for critics of the post-s, such as Turner, is that sometimes they share the same goals. Turner, the humanist, wants “an ever-richer and more open-ended historical condition, in which new possibilities are always opening up, and thus new problems and challenges are always arising.”20 That sounds very progressive. It’s just that Turner’s beneficent classism will not unsettle the neo-liberal order anywhere near drastically enough to really open up the historical horizon. The difference between a Turner and a Derrida is that Derrida knows the Western Tradition to be many iterations of the same sticky ideas and motifs and that if we really want out of them and into an open-ended historical condition, we will have to throw out our eschatology with the patriarchy.
And now, nearly 20 years after Turner’s Culture of Hope was first published, the planet is closing that conditional window as quickly as She can. By some estimates, we have only 60 harvests worth of fertile topsoil left on the whole Earth. We must change our farming practices, to something more ‘natural,’ less ‘industrial,’ or perish.21
Editors’ Note: ‘Welcome to the Occupation’ continues, more optimistically, in Issue Four.
Esmée Streachailt, PhD is a nom de guerrière. Esmée’s cultural and organizing work leverages strategic alliances across differences for the liberation and flourishing of humans. Her writing embraces feminist critical theory, cultural hermeneutics, comparative religion, and poetics. Esmée is a co-founder and contributing editor with THE RADICAL NOTION: A FEMINIST QUARTERLY.
1 The subtitle cuts both ways. One the one hand, liberation movements arise and occupy not only the social, but also the artistic and philosophical landscapes. Among them radical feminism: witness the way it’s been occupied by hard-line feminist purists. On the other hand, colonized by queer and gender theory. But also, on a larger scale, the occupations and gatherings that defined key moments in this geopolitical crisis: the Prague Spring, May ’68 in Paris, the burgeoning counterculture in San Francisco and the anti-war movement in the US. Each of these were cultural and street rebellions against both communist and capitalist capture of nearly all of daily life. Parallel to these, the Civil Rights and Women’s movements pushed against the white and male domination of public discourse, space, and accommodation. But the habitus always adapts, and economic neoliberalism ushers in a new conservatism that holds to this day and undermines much of the ground 20th-century justice movements gained. The phrase is the title of a song by R.E.M. from the 1987 album Document (I.R.S. Records), the dominant theme of which is this liberation-retrenchment tension that defined the 1980s-90s in much of Europe and the US, and that we are still wrestling with in the 21st century.
2 Readers familiar with these debates will note that postmodernism does harbour some relativist, even nihilist, strands. Some work by Richard Rorty, Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, even Donna Haraway’s later work, can be counted as examples. It’s important to note that these three writers don’t work on the same problems and probably would not have got on well at a conference, but it’s more important to note that they are not of the strand of post-s that I’m describing here. My own genealogy traces back to Stanley Cavell instead of Rorty, Gilles Deleuze instead of Baudrillard, Lauren Berlant instead of Žižek, and Rosi Braidotti instead of Haraway. I think of these as weaker and strong strains of post-s, the stronger being mine-of-course because it’s characterized by the love for humans and our works that defines Humanism, but with its optimism and entitlement chastened by the experiences of the 20th century.
3 Frederick Turner, The Culture of Hope: A New Birth of the Classical Spirit (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995).
4 ‘Faukes’ is not my coinage. It refers to the ‘wokeish,’ the progressives who hold some familiar animosities. I owe it to a rad fem on Twitter, who made a portmanteau of ‘woke’ and ‘faux’ and ‘folks’ in order to preserve the original and excellent meaning of ‘woke’ in the world of black justice activists.
5 Or trickle-down economic grift—again, no analysis of power is at work here. We have the evidence now, in addition to our own clear-eyed observations, that the Reagan-Thatcher world of plucky, self-disciplined individuals and supply-side economics would never, never ever, render up flourishing for all of us. See two articles from 2019: David Lazarus, ‘Trickle-down theory is a monstrous lie intended to justify the rich getting richer,’ The LA Times, 19 August 2019. And Matthew Lichtblau, ‘The Fallacy and Persistence of “Trickle-Down Economics,”’ The Brown Political Review, 15 November 2019.
6 On ‘phobia.’ Fear doesn’t really encapsulate what these terms want to convey. They point to the hatred behind the denigration, social and economic exclusion, and emotional abuse and personal or state violence that that comprise the oppression or discrimination faced by social ‘others’ at hands of and in the mouths of patriarchy. Not fear, but hate. The better suffix for that comes also from the Greek, ‘-misia,’ which denotes hatred and aversion. Like ‘miso-gyny.’ So ‘homomisia’ or ‘transmisia.’ See ‘-misia,’ Wiktionary.
7 Manda Scott, ‘Episode 2: Awakening into Connection,’ Accidental Gods podcast, 1 January 2020. If you listen to this pod, I strongly recommend listening in order rather than dropping in arbitrarily. She’s building a case for becoming the kind of people who can meet this chaotic moment and turn it for the better.
8 See page 113 and the footnote on page 125 of the previous instalment of this essay, ‘The Plot Twist,’ available in THE RADICAL NOTION, Issue One, October 2020
9 Jacques Derrida, Positions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 21. When in doubt, read the interviews. The French publication of Positions was with Éditions de Minuit in 1972, so the concept of ‘différance’ and ‘aporia’ was clearer to francophone readers for some time than it was to anglophones. Point of fact, the ‘a’ Derrida highlights here indicated that active-passive dynamism in that ‘à’ means ‘to’ in French: there is a to-ing and fro-ing across this ‘spacing’ that is the relation of difference rather than the stoic ‘solidity’ of presence and identity. I get into this to-and-fro in the next subheading.
10 I deplore this, and I am a sourdough baker for these last 11 years. See ‘Betty Lab,’ Betty Crocker by General Mills.
11 Derrida, Positions, p. 28. Seriously, interviews are super helpful.
12 She also said that deconstruction makes life meaningless by making the ten things into ten million things. She is an existentialist.
13 Frankly, philosophers tend to get into trouble when they work on time. He’s no easier to deal with than Derrida, but the one who gets it right for me is Henri Bergson, who does not think about time as a line or point or a web, but as duration and expansion. Every new moment contains every previous one and is building out into the next. It’s quite beautiful. Time is mobility. Rather feminine in the metaphysical sense. Listen to ‘Henri Bergson,’ Episodes 145-46, Philosophize This podcast, . Or read ‘The Concept of Multiplicity’ in Leonard Lawlor’s entry ‘Henri Bergson,’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020.
14 Peter Salmon, An Event, Perhaps…: A Biography of Jacques Derrida (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2019), pp. 4-5.
15 The glosses I am in the midst of offering are better described in the following freely accessible sources: ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,’ Wikipedia. Some good videos are linked at the bottom of the entry if you want to pursue this a little further without registering for class. My other source for this summary is the recent biography by Peter Salmon, An Event, Perhaps…: A Biography of Jacques Derrida. It’s very readable, user-friendly.
16 Much on this other-woman to come in the fourth part of this long-long essay.
17 In Issue Two, I offered a column on ‘damage’ that explains how those mythoi functioned and a little more of what was at stake. See ‘Extra-Feminist: Damage,’ THE RADICAL NOTION, Issue Two, February 2021.
18 It’s a little like asking quantum mechanics to have opinions on your posture and mobility practice. Just not the same level of being. The quantum realm isn’t something you can ask to do things for you at the Newtonian level where your body exists, but it is the deeper flow in which your body is participating all the time.
19 Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 214.
20 Turner, Culture of Hope, p. 242.
