Issue Seven

On the Possibility of Penetrable Being

by Jane Clare Jones

“Questions of metaphysics are questions of sex.”
—Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse1
In ‘A Woman’s Body Is Like a Foreign Country,’ radical feminist Rebecca Whisnant observes, correctly, that our culture is littered with “rhetoric and metaphor” which “routinely merg[e]…violations of national sovereignty and…bodily (especially sexual) sovereignty.”2 We speak, she notes, of ‘virgin territory,’ of troops ‘penetrating’ a conquered nation, of the ‘rape’ of Iraq. Conversely, we also think men’s physical penetration of women – as suggested in my opening editorial discussion of the argument of ‘Political Lesbianism: The Case Against Heterosexuality’ – in terms of ‘invasion,’ ‘colonization,’ and – as in the title of the crucial chapter seven of Dworkin’s Intercourse – as ‘Occupation/Collaboration.’ Indeed, as events currently unfolding in Ukraine remind us, this merging of the violation of nations and women’s bodies is much more than simply a matter of ‘rhetoric and metaphor.’ Acts of invasion are invariably accompanied by acts of rape. Land and women’s bodies have long been the intertwined territory on which men play out their dreams of conquest and appropriation.
But there’s something wrong here, and what is wrong is that women are not, in fact, countries. Humans are embodied awareness, and our bodies are parts of our personhood, not just bits of territory for men to acquire and appropriate3, no matter what their fantasies might pretend. These images of invasion and conquest are part of what Irigaray would call the ‘masculine imaginary,’ and we cannot understand rape – and how it might be distinguished from penetration which is not rape – without understanding how the patriarchal imagination in-forms so much of our sexual behaviour. Irigaray was working in the tradition of French philosophy and psychoanalysis that was critical of what we might call ‘phallocentric’ conceptions of the self, an understanding of what it means to be a human person that just happens to think the only proper persons are patriarchal male subjects. This is a thinking of human being – indeed, if we look back through the philosophical record, a thinking of being as such – entirely in thrall to the image of a solid, bounded, invulnerable atom. This is the thinking of man as an island, or a fortress, or a city-state surrounded by high impregnable walls, an imaginary in which, as Catherine Keller writes, “Virility lies above all in impermeability.”4 And this is also the thinking – the metaphysical imaginary – which in-forms the feminist analysis of heterosexual penetration as a de facto abnegation of women’s personhood. As Dworkin writes in Intercourse:

The skin is a line of demarcation, a periphery, the fence, the form, the shape … and in purely physical terms, the formal precondition for being human. It is a thin veil of matter separating the outside from the inside … The skin is separation, individuality, the basis for corporeal privacy … It is the formal limits of a body, a person. (pp. 26-27)

If this is how you define the being of a human, then it follows, necessarily, that a being that is penetrated is, in some sense, a not-being. And indeed, this is what many women experience, having sex with men who think that this is what makes a human human, and finding themselves waking one morning to discover with horror that their partner thinks they have been somehow transmuted into a degraded not-person by the act of a penis entering them. What Dworkin unfolds in the pages of Intercourse is, in one sense, a precise, magisterial excoriation of what heterosexual intercourse does and must necessarily mean within the symbolic system of the patriarchal imagination, a system grounded on the image of the spatialized form of personhood as bounded, invulnerable, inviolate, impenetrable.

It is on this basis –  and on the basis of the analogy between the territorial sovereignty of the self and the territorial sovereignty of the state – that we arrive at the patriarchal conceptualization of penetration as acquisition, appropriation, invasion, conquest, and occupation. “The woman in intercourse,” Dworkin writes, “is a space inhabited, a literal territory occupied literally” (p. 168). Because “her body can be physically occupied and in that occupation taken over,” woman is granted “a lesser privacy, a lesser integrity of body” and “a lesser sense of self” (p. 155). The possibility of women’s subjectivity is thus, Dworkin suggests, terminally undermined by our penetrability, by the fact that “a woman has a body that is…in intercourse…permeable” (p. 154). The notion that women “lose[s] the capacity for integrity because the body – the basis of privacy and freedom in the material world for all human beings – is entered” is, she argues bluntly, “the key to women’s lower human status” (p. 155).

But as I suggested at the start, something is very wrong here. One way to indicate what is wrong is to point out that women are not, actually, ‘literal territory occupied literally’ but human persons. Indeed, the fact that comparing women to sovereign countries leads to the conclusion that they are desubjectified by being penetrated might suggest that this is not the ontological truth of the matter, but rather, that you are using the wrong set of symbols to represent the situation. Another way to point at the problem here – which actually amounts to the same thing – is to note that this entire analytic depends on accepting – indeed, capitulating to – a patriarchal metaphysics of selfhood, and the entire panoply of harmful symbolizations that it supports. On this point, Dworkin notably equivocates. She will talk, on the one hand, quite correctly, of “the political meaning of intercourse” (p. 156) or note that it is “the discourse of male truth” that “calls…penetration violation” and considers ‘violation’ to be “a synonym for intercourse” (p. 154). At the same time, she will suggest that “the nature of the act and … of the sex organs involved” raises “fundamental questions” about “intercourse as an act with consequences, some perhaps intrinsic” (p. 173). It may in fact be the case, she claims, that woman is “defined by how she is made” with “that hole…synonymous with entry” (p. 155).

It’s not simply because I don’t like the implications of this apparent ‘definition’ of woman that I so thoroughly reject it. (Although, as I’ve suggested, if your conclusion is that a good chunk of humanity is de facto degraded by their sexuality, that might be a good indication that your representation has gone awry.) Rather, as I alluded to in our editorial discussion, my fundamental objection here is that I do not accept patriarchal projections of what it means to be a human self, and the reason I reject them is because, bluntly, they are ontological bullshit. No man, as they say, is an island. And neither is any human being a fortress, a walled city, or an impregnable sovereign state. All human life – all life, in fact – is interconnected, dependent, and vulnerable to that which is outside it, that on which its continued existence actually depends. Besieged cities starve and die, and so does any living being severed from interrelation with its immediate environment. The idea of an impregnable sovereign self is a patriarchal fantasy, a fantasy born of the drive to deny the vulnerability and dependence which is the condition of life itself. And it is a fantasy, moreover, which impels the endless erasure, disavowal, and appropriation that patriarchal male subjects enact on the bodies of women, day in and day out.

Feminist thinking should not collude with this logic. We should not accept an analysis of sexuality, or heterosexuality, or social relation in general, that is grounded on the patriarchal distortion, disavowal, and destruction of the conditions of life. We should not accept an image of personhood that is based on a projected fantasy of an impenetrable male body, which cannot represent the embodied experience of women, and which leaves no way for heterosexual women to distinguish sex which harms them from that which can nourish and sustain them. We need to remember that when we talk of ‘boundaries,’ we are actually talking about needs and desires, and that a spatialized analytic of boundary-crossing and violation incorrectly represents – and obfuscates the understanding of – the situation of women’s needs and desires when we’re dealing with an act of physical penetration. The problem here is not, fundamentally, that woman is ‘made with a hole synonymous with entry’ which means she ‘loses the capacity for integrity’ or ‘privacy,’ and it’s pretty damn close to internalized misogyny to accept that as fact. The problem is not, that is, that women are ‘permeable.’ The problem is that we live in a culture saturated with patriarchal projections, conceits, and fantasies that men are not.

1 Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse: The Twentieth Anniversary Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2007), p. 28.

2 Rebecca Whisnant, ‘A Woman’s Body Is Like a Foreign Country’ in Global Feminist Ethics: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, ed. by Rebecca Whisnant and Peggy Desautels (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p. 155.

3 It’s important to note that this understanding is crucial to being able to give an adequate account of the harm of rape as an attack on the core of a woman’s personhood, not just some type of property crime analogous to theft or trespass.

4 Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and the Self (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1988), p. 9. The thinking of being-as-impermeability is central to the construction of hierarchical binary polarities, which, as we keep seeing, posit the relation between differences such as nature and culture in strictly oppositional terms, where each pole is understood as strictly exterior to the other (‘either/or’), rather than understanding that they are, in empirical fact, intertwined (‘both/and’). That is, all forms of strict conceptual opposition are based on a phallic metaphysics which is a distortion of empirical reality. And all forms of feminist thinking which rely on strict conceptual opposition, collapse difference into hierarchy, or perform mirror image inversions, are, in fact, still operating inside a phallic frame.

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Tags: Issue 7