by Sophie Watson
Kajsa Ekis Ekman, Being and Being Bought: Prostitution, Surrogacy and the Split Self (Victoria: Spinifex Press, 2013), 223pp., $29.95 AUD.
When I was a little girl, we used to go on holiday to the South of France. My parents would take it in turns to drive through the night as my little brother and I dozed and bickered and laughed in the back seat, stopping at petrol stations to eat limp-lettuced sandwiches and watch flocks of starlings wheel through the yellow sky. At some point after we arrived, we’d all pile back into the car and drive across the border into Spain to indulge my father’s quest for cheap tobacco. We’d drive down the highway, past the sun-scorched hills and the concrete toll booths. Past the women too, standing in bikinis and miniskirts at the side of the road. Some of them had white plastic chairs and cool boxes, others walked laboriously up and down in precarious shoes. Their faces were pale smudges as we drove past, separated by the sun-glare on our car windows.
My little brother and I would point them out to each other in the same way that we played ‘yellow car’ and ‘read the street names’ on car journeys back home. “There’s another one!” we’d say, into our parents’ uneasy quiet. They were just grown-ups to us, doing whatever it is that grown-ups do. Later, I learned they were called ‘putas’ and they were waiting for the men who drove past in cars and trucks. The lorry drivers who crisscross Europe, stopping casually to buy 20 minutes with a woman as if women were the fruit the locals sell by the side of the road. My mum lives there now, and when I go back to visit her the women are still waiting. Timeless, anonymous — they’re not grown-ups after all. They’re my age or younger, in their late teens or early 20s, just as they have been since I was seven years old. I sometimes wonder where they are now, the girls who were my age 15 years ago.
Around the same time that I was a child peering out of car windows, Kajsa Ekis Ekman was living in Barcelona with several other women — including a Russian immigrant named Oksana whose boyfriend drove her in his car every day to stand by the side of the road. In 2007, a year after returning home, Ekman got word that Oksana was dead. This was the impetus for Being and Being Bought, first published in her native Sweden in 2010. Sweden had pioneered the abolitionist approach to legislating prostitution in the late 90s, after extensive fieldwork with prostituted women. Swedish researchers painstakingly described the psychological toll prostitution took on the women who lived it: the dissociation of body and self that was necessary to endure violation by unknown men, and the growing difficulty of putting themselves back together again. The Swedish approach, or Nordic Model, soon gained traction internationally through the efforts of anti-prostitution campaigners (not least because criminalizing sex buyers has the effect of reducing human trafficking).1 But Ekman felt that “there was something besides the physical harm and the male dominance, something psychological [that] was often overlooked.” This psychological something, the way that women are forced to create split selves to navigate being both ‘person’ and ‘object to be used,’ is at the core of her critique of prostitution and surrogacy in Being and Being Bought.
The sheer scope of the book, never compromising its journalistic detail, is impressive for a volume of less than 200 pages (I cannot do it justice in this review). It covers the history of prostitution and encompasses Ekman’s investigation into the myths of the modern ‘sex work’ movement. The touted ‘trade unions for prostitutes,’ which so captured the imagination of men on the left, are exposed as a motley collection of organizations, founded by pimps and PhD students — none of which engage in anything resembling actual union disputes. Instead, the focus is on ‘harm reduction,’ which seems to mean spending millions of euros of funding intended for HIV/AIDS interventions on lobbying for sex buyers to be decriminalized. The mantra (so often repeated by pro-prostitution academics and campaigners) that ‘she is an agent, not a victim’ is similarly defenceless against Ekman’s clear-eyed analysis. She observes that, in the pro-prostitution view, it is worse “than any other physical or psychological violation” to speak of the prostituted woman as a ‘victim,’ because the opposite of ‘victim’ has implicitly come to be understood as ‘subject,’ rather than ‘perpetrator.’ It is considered problematic to acknowledge the victimization of women because victimhood is no longer viewed as a relational state but as a character flaw.
This false dichotomy between victimhood and agency is nothing new. A spate of texts criticizing ‘victim feminism’ appeared in the 1990s, perhaps epitomized by Naomi Wolf’s Fire With Fire (1993) in which she contrasted ‘victim’ with ‘power’ feminism. These critiques were founded on the idea that second-wave feminism (with its focus on the pervasive and structural nature of women’s oppression) had embraced a female identity of victimhood to the extent that it framed women as having no control over their own lives. ‘Power feminism’ called on women to take back responsibility for their circumstances and, with it, control. Rebecca Stringer has questioned the idea that this critique represents a genuine ‘backlash’ against feminist failures, however, noting that the appearance of victim feminism critiques coincided with a period in which neoliberalism was on the rise. In her view, its proponents were not so much concerned with promoting women’s agency as with wider “efforts to replace the concept of structural oppression with the concept of personal responsibility.”2 Arguably, victim feminism critiques reflected a broader shift towards a political economy which relies on notions of individual success and failure to explain all things.
Stringer emphasizes how critiques of victim feminism proclaim themselves revolutionary yet ultimately seek to uphold the status quo, an idea that also recurs throughout Being and Being Bought. Ekman describes how queer academia rescues the prostituted woman from a victim’s fate, not by addressing her material circumstances or condemning the men who abuse her, but by reconceptualizing her as invulnerable between the pages of academic journals. She cites one anthropologist (Heather Montgomery) who will not even describe prostituted children as ‘victims,’ preferring to focus instead on the small ways in which they exercise ‘agency’ within the confines of extreme poverty and sexual abuse. The Western men who rape them exist in her narrative only as sources of food and money, as if they were the ones being exploited rather than the other way around. “None of the children liked prostitution,” Montgomery concedes (in one of several passages in the book that made me physically sick with rage), but without it they would have to resort to things that don’t pay “nearly as well.” Benevolent academics also assert the benefits of surrogacy for women in the industry. According to Christine T. Sistare, “the acceptance and practice of surrogacy would reveal a meaningful respect for maternity … in the capitalist mode of paying well for what is deemed rare and precious.” It is unclear how this “meaningful respect for maternity” actually translates to the lives of surrogate mothers in commercial contexts. In a recent, excellent anthology of surrogates’ stories (also from Spinifex Press), one American woman describes how she felt like the “‘hired help,’ and when things didn’t go right, well, we’ll just throw her to the curb.”3
It is tempting to dismiss criticisms based on agency/victimization out of hand. But recognizing a person’s agency — in the truest sense of the word, as that last stubborn inch of a person that cannot be bound by external constraints — is a fundamental part of recognizing their humanity. The failure to do so can also have unforeseen practical consequences. Feminist legal theorist Elizabeth M. Schneider argued several decades ago that “feminist work has too often been shaped by an incomplete and static view of women as victims or agents.” In cases where abused women killed their perpetrators, she observed that their legal outcomes could be negatively influenced by a victimhood paradigm which “ignored women’s active efforts to protect themselves and their children, and to mobilize their resources to survive.” On the other hand, an exclusive focus on women’s agency inevitably trivialized the challenges they faced, resulting in their being blamed (even vilified, in cases where children were involved) for not leaving their violent partner sooner.4 Being and Being Bought would perhaps have benefitted from a more detailed discussion of agency and victimization, in light of how often criticisms utilizing them are deployed by pro-prostitution campaigners. It is natural that feminists and abolitionists should respond to those who ruthlessly assert the agency of exploited people for their own ends by emphasizing the fact that they are victimized. But prostituted women require more from us than a feminism rooted in ‘either/or.’ It is also crucial that we stop focusing so wholly on the characteristics of the prostituted woman, agent or victim, and at last drag the reclusive pimp and john out into the light.
Being and Being Bought is a book about false dichotomies and the damage they cause. Victim and agent, body and self, Madonna and whore. It is not a new idea that surrogacy and prostitution have much in common; both involve the sale of some part of a woman, and both reduce her from person to function. But Ekman exposes the psychological commonalities of the two practices, not in the abstract but from the perspective of the functionalized woman. They are united by their dependence on an implicit belief that the self is something separate from the body, and the body (or its sexual and reproductive resources) can consequently be bought and sold. Ekman describes how the basic realities of the two practices have been even further obfuscated and abstracted by the industries involved. Nowadays, pro-prostitution campaigners do not even speak of selling bodies but ‘sexual services.’ As Ekman puts it, “sex hovers in the air between two people as if it were completely unattached, a product that women happen to possess.” But the prostituted woman sells the punter not only sex, but also a fantasy in which she desires him (or else online sex buyers’ forums would not be full of complaints that she just ‘didn’t really seem into it’). It is not a service he is buying, but a false version of herself for him to use as he will. The psychological pressures of this are severe — she must protect her personhood whilst simultaneously being used as a tool, forcing her to create what Ekman terms a “Split Self.” Surrogate mothers are similarly divided, reliant on psychological defences against the reality of the situation. Stakeholders in surrogacy continuously remind each other that surrogate mothers are not mothers — they are ‘incubators,’ ‘carrying someone else’s baby,’ or (more positively) ‘a helping angel.’ Regardless, they are rarely allowed to be part of their child’s life.
There is little need for Ekman to spell out the policy implications of her book; it is polemical simply by stating the facts. Prostitution is “sex between two people—between one who wants it and one who doesn’t.” Surrogacy “is not only a desire to raise a child, but also a demand that the mother be absent.” Calmly, methodically (yet with a genius for cutting through the academic and the abstract to expose the painful realities of people’s lives), she dismantles the arguments and excuses which allow the female body to be exploited and commodified. The adoption of the Nordic Model is one obvious solution, and Ekman does not shy away from advocating it: “Change is not only a fantasy, a utopian dream,” she tells us. “It is possible in our time.” Yet the change she argues for is as much personal as legislative. Being and Being Bought is a journalistic endeavour, grounded in data and detail, but it is also an appeal to our humanity. Ekman’s great discovery is that prostitution and surrogacy “fragment the person” and thereby society as well. She asks us to believe that “I am a person, and I have the right to feel. I am not either/or, I am both—and.” But nothing will change until we say it for every woman as well as ourselves. While we are still willing to numb ourselves to the violence committed against even just one of us, there will always be women standing at the side of the Barcelona highway. The world will always be peering at them out of car windows.
Sophie Watson (@psycholophie) is a finalist in Psychological and Behavioural Sciences at Newnham College, Cambridge. She is also a freelance journalist and co-president of the Cambridge Radical Feminist Network.
1 Janice G. Raymond, ‘Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution,’ Journal of Trauma Practice, 2 (2015), 315-32.
2 Rebecca Stringer, Knowing Victims: Feminism, Agency and Victim Politics in Neoliberal Times (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), p. 18.
3 Jennifer Lahl, Melinda Tankard Reist and Renate Klein, Broken Bonds: Surrogate Mothers Speak Out (Victoria: Spinifex Press, 2019), p. 41.
4 Elizabeth M. Schneider, ‘Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency,’ New York Law School Law Review, 38 (1995), 387-99.
