Issue Two

Blob’s Corner: The Neutral That Isn’t

by Blob

Once upon a time, engineers built machines that could be switched off. These early computers were discrete objects, unlike the networked, always-on computational technology that is now part of everyday life. These networks of machines comprise personal devices and work equipment, and extend to embedded computational technology in everyday objects. They are often used to control logistics. This technology is sometimes called ubiquitous (or ‘quiet’) computing — ’ubicomp.’ You may know it as the Internet of Things. In the last few years, people have described the idea of increased automation through machine-to-machine networks and the Internet of Things as the fourth industrial revolution; and, just like its predecessors, it comes with far-reaching promises, opportunities, challenges and consequences. The ‘dematerialization’ of engineering since the 1970s, when focus shifted from hardware to software, revivified technological modernity and its promise of escaping the confines of the human condition, including time and space.

Technological developments and their attendant utopianism have changed theory and practice across media and finance, and supported the demassification of capitalist structures and exchanges since the mid- to late 1970s.1 The idea of demassification, as discussed by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, describes the decentralization of production that emerged in tandem with the development of digital technologies in late or ‘connexionist’ capitalism. Under the aegis of efficiency, demassification brings systematic modularization and ‘just in time’ production and distribution chains. Flying its flag in the winds of optimism, it has provided a compelling rationale for minimizing reserve capacity within organizations and societal structures. Notable examples include the replacement of permanent jobs with zero-hours contracts and the business model of Amazon, but the demassification paradigm affects whole economies and the way we think about the world. The systems that support it are at once distributed and dominant, mirroring the way protocols control internet traffic.2 They reflect the idea(l)s of efficiency and neutrality, and embody unmodern ideas of omnipresence and omniscience. This new transcendent is at once everywhere and nowhere, eliding direct interrogation and accountability: a cool godhead that outsources, much like its ancient forebears, the friction between the system (ideal/software) and the world (corporeal/hardware) to system users.

Even as networks pervade the private and the personal, the demassification paradigm depends on this distinction between system and world. Here lies the perimeter and the bottom line, across which connectivity and exposure is negotiated and traded: a contemporary mind/body dichotomy has been playing out through a disorientating range of tensions since the beginning of the 21st century. The dotcom bubble modelled the trajectory of utopian (from ou-topia, or no-place) ideas fuelled by venture capital, still travelling within the reality of time and space. Since then, the friction generated within interfaces between systems and their users has become a commodity in its own right, along with monetizable churn from escalated anxiety and the cultivation of identitarian sentiment across an increasingly incoherent political spectrum. The attention and data economies were not foreseen by the creators and early users of the ARPANET, or by Tim Berners-Lee, who is credited with the creation of the World Wide Web and who, in 2019, expressed his concerns about the dysfunction and “perverse incentives” of the data industry. To a great extent, the issues we see are artefacts of software legacy heuristics and monetization mechanisms, scaled far beyond what was originally intended. Nevertheless, the vast scaling of computational systems (and their user bases) reveals the DNA and structure of the ideas upon which they are based.

The negotiation of connectivity and exposure between networked systems and the living world is the subject of intense interest for data mining as well as for nanotech and bio-hacking: the “inhuman(e)” political economy of “bio-genetic” capitalism.3 Life itself, from stem-cell therapies, genetic manipulation and the life-giving capacity of the female body to our everyday habits, social networks, and behaviours, has been a new frontier for some time. Capitalist expansion has turned its gaze from the promises of new horizons and ‘virgin’ territories, be they earthly continents, outer space or cyberspace, to a new vision for the systematized body, sanctioned by idealized neutrality. An example is stem-cell therapy, which is subject to a great deal of research and speculative interest. It is currently only used to generate new blood cells in the bone marrow of, for example, cancer patients undergoing treatment, but scientists believe it can be developed for other types of therapies. If their development can be controlled, stem cells, i.e. cells from which all specialized cells are generated, offer potential treatments for degenerative illnesses including heart disease, stroke and diabetes. Stem cell therapies thus contribute to the ‘fount of youth’ mythos, whether they become feasible or not. Embryonic stem cells are a particularly salient example. They derive from unused embryos that are donated to science after in vitro fertilization and are pluripotent, that is, able to generate different types of cells. The supply of embryonic stem cells at scale is problematic in several dimensions, and researchers are seeking to manipulate adult stem cells so that they resemble embryonic stem cells. Such processes render adult stem cells, which are specialized, more neutral and, through this, pluripotent.

As an idealized state, neutrality may be potent, even powerful, but it is a misnomer. Peggy Phelan identifies neutrality as the unmarked norm that favours maximum mobility and range within power structures, while hiding hegemony to itself.4 Similarly, protocols and incentivization mechanisms in networked digital systems (created in an image of neutrality that is anything but) are embedded within the infrastructures that underpin the digital industries globally.5 These infrastructures, significant parts of which are software code rather than tangible and physical, control machine-to-machine networks and the model according to which platform providers monetize traffic, engagement, and churn.6 Through distributed networks that span the globe, ideas that are local to Silicon Valley are scaled and reified, until recently in the guise of neutrality. It is only in the past five years that the industry has begun to question its own influence in spasms of often peculiar and typically ineffective self-reflection.7

The go-to destination for cyber-romantic and accelerationist attempts to escape all that is flawed in humanity is in- or a-humanity. In a perfect reversal of the conditions of possibility that human life has always faced, the immanent becomes alien and hostile, and the transcendent becomes a ‘safe space.’ Hope is invested in divine-adjacent concepts such as the singularity, a man-made godhead of networked intelligence and ultimate neutrality that will finally afford escape from history and the codes of representation that order the human world. The singularity thus encapsulates the aesthetic vision that is found in both romanticism and modernism, to which the tension of “forever be becoming and never be perfected” is central.

This tension, and how it is shared by modernism and romanticism, is perhaps best understood not through exclusive focus on the transcendent ideal, i.e. perfection, but through interrogation of ideas around its opposite: entropy. As a descriptor of chaos, inefficiency, and decay in relation to ideas of structure and order, entropy is ‘other’ to the transcendent in both modernism and romanticism. This dichotomy is central to the sublime, a disturbing kind of beauty that is idealized in both. However, they differ in how the sublime is understood, and whether it derives from the promise of control or the possibility of failure.9 In somewhat simplified terms, the modern sublime is a vertigo of soaring, and of transcending or controlling the chaos of entropy, while the romantic sublime can be described as aestheticized vertigo before the chasm of dissolution. We might even read culture and aesthetic expression through the tension between entropy and idea(l)s of perfection, particularly from the early 19th century onward. In art, entropy is embraced in, for example, Symbolism, Dada, Surrealism, Art Informel, and abstract expressionism. Broadly speaking, it is resisted in classicism, abstract minimalism (often employed as a cipher for modernism), optical art, pop art and naïve hyper-realism, where it is expressed through a desire for ‘cleanness’ and efficiency of form.

Our relationship with entropy is complex, essential to life and to creativity. In the sense that it conveys the aspect of matter that is unavailable to the order prescribed by efficiency, it is relevant also to a critique of late or connexionist capitalism and what is deemed good — and what is not — within its paradigm. We cannot fully know, predict and control processes of making. In making and creating — whether our medium is gardening, childrearing, friendship, communication, music, dance, painting or sculpting — the touch exchanged by our desire for or idea of what can take shape and our medium is reciprocal and emergent. Mastery or skill is expressed in the unfolding of encounters, the outcomes of which carry the traces of touch forward in time through the specificity of instantiation. Remote neutrality is anathema to creativity; mastery can only emerge through nuanced and fertile play in close dialogue with our medium, and with entropy. The best expressions of our humanity come through in love, humour, music, and art. None of these instantiations are the products of neutrality; they flow from specificity, desire, shared systems of representation and empathy, mediated across time and space by the skill of artists and the slow care of archivists, conservators, and curators.

The networked machine systems that are supposedly meshing with our everyday lives in the fourth industrial revolution are fragile to entropy, whether it comes in the form of data that is unintelligible to the system or through penetration by human creativity or mischief. Computational systems, as they mesh with our daily and professional habits, depend on narrowing our inputs to forms that are intelligible to their processes, and on keeping delinquency at bay. Accidental, creative, or mischievous emergence that crosses the interface between world and system is generally not a good idea from the system point of view. At the same time, this meshing of system and world depends on our inputs: the data economy feeds on our habits, harvested in forms that are rendered intelligible, as far as possible, through interface design.

Human desire, creativity, and curiosity are the messy fossil fuel of the data economy. They are extracted and monetized in exchanges between systems and humans through interface design, which models and interprets human curiosity and interaction to fit the objectives and capacities of systems and their designers. At the point of exchange, human curiosity, interest and desire are reduced to digital code and aggregated with that of millions of other system users, demassified in every sense of the word: discontinuous and neutralized; detached from its point of origin and rationale; de-concretized or abstracted; networked and available for redistribution and repurposing. How this commodity or fuel for the data economy is conceptualized and modelled impacts on the design of the interaction and the interface, and the consequences of these decisions are scaled globally. The idea of desire as a fundamental driver of capitalism is not new,10 but its direct mining arguably is. What’s more, the nature of these systems, derived as they are from a transcendent idea of neutrality that is quite brittle in the face of entropy and emergence, necessarily enforces a design paradigm that emphasizes their reduction to readily digested data. At the interface level, this is reflected in the solicitation of streamlined inputs from users in place of complex feedback, e.g. Facebook ‘reactions.’ The business rationale for gathering such data dovetails with interface design so neatly that it is difficult to say anything definite about their causative relationship, but both build on infrastructures with low ambiguity tolerance. Systems that feed on desire but struggle to process ambiguity and emergence, and thus also entropy, will necessarily seek to mould desire into predictable formats.

The efficiency principle promises certainty and predictability, and systems designed in its image will seek to shape human use or participation accordingly, while the monetization mechanisms that dominate free-at-the-point-of-use platforms incentivize churn derived from desire and friction. These factors drive the conditions of possibility for human users of such platforms, resting on such systems, that require us to be predictable yet messy: forever becoming, never perfected, reifying romantic modernism. Ongoing observance requires that you cede the opacity and density of your privacy, and submit your passion and drive, predictably formatted, to be reduced to discrete bits of information for aggregation with sufficiently similar data points from thousands, even millions, of other interactions. Desire and curiosity are thus at once solicited, circumscribed and demassified: extracted and separated from their embodied seat and converted into tradeable commodities. In that milieu, resisting transparency, predictability, and demassification is antagonistic, and nearly blasphemous.

Blob. Vive la différence. Le Blob, @tryingattimes.

1 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism‘ (London: Verso, 2005), p. 194.

2 Alexander Galloway, ‘Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization‘ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).

3 Rosi Braidotti, ‘The Posthuman‘ (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 65.

4 Peggy Phelan, ‘Unmarked: The Politics of Performance‘ (London: Routledge, 1996).

5 Carina Westling, ‘Immersion and Participation‘ (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 135.

6 Galloway.

7 Andrew Marantz, ‘Silicon Valley’s crisis of conscience,’ The New Yorker, 26 August 2019.

8 Judith Norman, ‘Literary Criticism in the Age of Critical Philosophy’ in Brill’s Companion to German Romantic Philosophy, ed. by Elizabeth Millán Brusslan and Judith Norman (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 215

9 Jacques Rancière, ‘The Sublime from Lyotard to Schiller: Two Readings of Kant and Their Political Significance,’ Radical Philosophy, 126 (July/August 2004), pp. 2-15.

10 Pierre Klossowski, ‘Living Currency‘ (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).