Issue Two

Attack of the Werewords: Meditations on Discursive Kinship, an Awful Gender-Muddle, Woman, and the Threat of Symbolic and Actual Extinction (A Feminist Phenomenological Reflection on Shit That Matters)

by Lucy Tatman

I awoke from the pre-dawn dream with a start: my heart pounding, my breathing laboured. For a split second I could still feel the terror of pursuit, but I was also curiously suffused with joy. In one momentous instant, I became aware that in my dream I had been chased by werewords, and that there is such a thing as a wereword. My delight in the latter discovery overcame my lingering fear of attack. Even in my sleep-dazed state, I could feel the theoretical potential of that concept to illuminate certain troubling aspects of our snarling, dangerous times. What follows is an idiosyncratic meditation upon werewords and upon some of the consequences of their use at this time in particular pockets of Western culture.

Wereword, n.

  1. A word which is transformed over time, or is capable of being transformed at times, from a term with a commonly shared meaning into a term which functions to attack and/or devour established meaning, e.g. gender.
  2. A word which, when used with a certain inflection or in combination with another term, is used to attack the moral, political, and epistemic agency of the person towards whom it is addressed, e.g. TERF, or trans-exclusionary radical feminist (contemporary); essentialist (late 20th century).
  3. A word used to signal one’s discursive kinship with other users of the word, while simultaneously attacking that which is deemed unallowable by the werepack, e.g. Also, if you’re a TERF, you can get fucked with the business end of the barbed-wire wrapped baseball bat.1

OPENING REFLECTIONS

Human beings are such odd creatures: pack animals who lose our minds when separated from the pack, yet each convinced of our startling difference from all the other members of the pack or herd. And yes, we are all radiantly unique moppets, each one of us a never-to-be-repeated life form — but for some inexplicable reason, most of us seem to occupy a place on the spectrum between vaguely to very frightened of ever exposing our unique ‘who-ness’ to the world around us. Bizarrely, we tend to trumpet our ‘individuality’ by means of the most popular expressions, most popular hairstyles, most trendy accessories of any given time and place. By ‘most popular,’ let me hasten to add, I mean most popular within the context of that particular herd or pack to which we belong. You can think of them as sub-cultures, if the language of herd or pack is too off-putting. I, however, am going to continue to think in terms of human packs, because I am increasingly confronted by scenes of howling, barking, growling and slobbering human packs. I have witnessed (from afar) small packs attack individuals, and large packs attack small packs. As I write these words, over in the USA the MAGA-pack is barking at the Never-Trumpers, which is woofing and howling at the MAGA-pack. What is not happening is any human dialogue or discussion between members of these different packs. Pissing contests, yes. Acknowledgement of shared fears, shared concerns, shared pains, a shared world, no.

What is even more odd is that these packs seem to be forming in the absence of any physical relationship or shared connection to a particular place. In other words, the kind of kinship shared by these pack members is unique. Unlike consanguineous kinship, the members of these packs do not share an ancestor. Unlike fictive kinship, the members of these groups do not seem to have an enduring sense of responsibility for each other (no matter what); they do not bestow the honorific ‘Auntie’ or ‘Uncle’ or ‘sister’ or ‘brother’ or ‘cousin’ upon each other, in large part, I believe, because they do not know each other well enough to think of each other in those deeply relational ways. Nevertheless, they find each other and they ‘like’ each other; they band together and they police each other’s speech and thoughts at the same time as they collectively direct their ire at all those who resist being so policed. They accomplish all of this, I suggest, by means of the werewords they use. Accordingly, I cannot help but think of these packs as discursive kinship groups. As far as I can tell, werewords are the only things that all the members of these kinship groups have in common.2 This is a thin sort of kinship indeed; maintaining discursive kinship seems reliant upon repeating the same words over and over again, rather like a chant. This is most likely because discursive kinship groups exist primarily ‘within’ social media; they are mostly composed of Twitter and Instagram (and other similar apps about which I know nothing because I do not use social media at all) users, and these mediums of communication do not allow for lengthy, nuanced discussions. Because it is impossible to say very much at all, each of the words or images used is peculiarly freighted with signifying weight. I have become convinced that this is a weighty matter indeed, for several reasons: one of which is that people choose to use certain werewords because they are desperate for kinship, any kind of kinship at all. Desperate times tend to be dangerous times.

Werewords directed against others are used to end discussion, never to open discussion or engage in conversation. Werewords used against others are final words, last words, words used to obliterate the lived reality of (perceived or suspected) members of an ‘other’ pack, words used to deny the inherent value and worthiness of the other.

My first encounter with a then – young wereword occurred in the late 1980s. I can remember telling a feminist elder that I was uncomfortable with the fact that ‘gender’ was beginning to be used in casual conversation to mean ‘biological sex.’ “The whole point of using the term ‘gender’ is to be able to analyse the ways in which masculinity and femininity are distinct from sex,” I murmured (I was shy around feminist elders, then). I cannot remember what she replied, but I know that my discomfort with that particular bit of terminological confusion remained. It has since grown acute. My next encounter with a wereword, an adult wereword, as it happened, occurred in the mid-1990s. More than once, while reading a second-wave feminist classic in a cafe or library, I had the bizarre experience of a hardly-known acquaintance or stranger accosting me and saying, “But she’s an essentialist — why bother reading her?” At this point you must picture a look of dazed confusion upon my face, accompanied by the following questions, all jumbled together: “But what do you mean by ‘essentialist’? You’ve just totally redefined the term, haven’t you? And why shouldn’t I read her even if she is an essentialist according to your new definition? What is your actual problem with her thought?” To these questions I never, not once, received a detailed answer. Instead, I witnessed a steady stream of feminist theorists — those to whom the wereword ‘essentialist’ had been directed — become passé, out of date, no longer trendy, and thus not worth taking seriously. Some time later, and within the context of feminist Christian theology, I wrote about this practice of sending to oblivion the words and thought of our feminist predecessors. It looked to me an awful lot like theological matricide.3 It still looks like theoretical matricide to me, but I think it would be useful to take a brief detour for a moment, and gaze unflinchingly upon, of all things, the words ‘anti-Semite’ and ‘Nazi.’

Unbelievably, both ‘anti-Semite’ and ‘Nazi’ have become, in different ways, werewords. With regard to ‘anti-Semite,’ I cannot think of anyone who has publicly expressed well-grounded criticism of the Israeli government’s actions within the occupied Palestinian territories and who has not been declared by some to be an anti-Semite (or a self-hating Jew). This tells me that ‘anti-Semite’ is a wereword in the prime of its life. Its purpose, when used in these instances, is clearly to be an attack word, to silence criticism. As for the word ‘Nazi,’ it is now being applied to anyone who is deemed to be ‘too particular’ about anything: grammar-nazi, feminazi, I’ve even heard mention in my workplace of the ‘tea-room-nazi’ (she who feels that each person should wash their own dishes). ‘Nazi’ is now being used to describe anyone deemed to be annoying or difficult.

What causes me intense anxiety is the fact that there are real, actual anti-Semites in the world: they hate all Jews. There are real, actual modern-day Nazis who dream of Aryan rule. It remains terribly important to be able to identify and name actual anti-Semitism and actual Nazism, in much the same way that it is important to be able to identify and to name actual sexism, or actual transphobia, for example. The problem is that werewords so warp and distort, tear and shred established meaning that over time they become useless when it comes to naming reality. One of my grave concerns is that those who are currently deploying werewords in order to silence or ridicule others might one day discover that, just when they need it the most, the term they want to use is no longer meaningful in any way at all.

My point is that werewords are real, and that their use has real-world consequences, both immediately and in the long term. I sincerely doubt that the long-term consequences of wereword-usage have been thought through. Their immediate consequences are clear. They are words of power, and those who use them seek to control human meaning and shape human actions in accordance with their chosen meaning. Those who refuse to agree with the new meaning of the wereword are evicted from the pack, or their job, or their circle of friends.

Which brings me back to ‘gender,’ which seems to have become the leader of a pack of werewords—the very werewords which were in dream-pursuit of me. Those werewords roused me from my slumber in more ways than one. They not only woke me up that morning, but also provoked me into writing this text, in which, for the first time in my life, I am deliberately growling back at that wereword ‘gender.’ Although I have taught in the area of gender studies for decades, for years I have deliberately avoided writing about the terminological confusion (I think of it as the ‘gender-muddle’) which plagues gender studies. However, the current combination of gender-muddle and wereword-usage now seriously threatens my/our ability to identify, analyse, and speak about sexism. I find this situation agonizing and appalling.

GENDER: FROM CLARITY TO CONFUSION TO WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY IT IS TO YOU MUST HAVE THIS GENDER IDENTITY WHETHER YOU WANT IT OR NOT

The following is not a nuanced philosophical analysis; it is instead a highly condensed account of various accounts of ‘gender’ which are regularly presented to first-year (university) gender studies students. I present it here in order to demonstrate just how conceptually/meaningfully muddled ‘gender’ has become in Western culture — how it has come to be a wereword.

Briefly, ‘gender’ as we know it in English-speaking Western culture originated within the field of linguistics, where it refers to the fact that some languages have different categories, or kinds (from the Latin genus, whence ‘gender’) of nouns. For our purposes, we are interested in languages like Hindi, French, Spanish, and German in which nouns are sorted into distinct grammatical genders: masculine, feminine, and sometimes neuter. From linguistics, then, we gain the basic but crucial insight that various different cultures are invested in identifying and sorting things out on the basis of a distinction between the masculine and the feminine. Crucially, all of the speakers of any particular language are obliged to follow the rules governing the use of that language. What this means is that the word ‘gender,’ adopted from linguistics, also gives us the ability to identify and refer to a shared, collective, culture-wide set of distinctions between femininity and masculinity which are expressed and perpetuated in part through language. This meaning of the term ‘gender’ is both clear and informative.

Enter psychiatry. In 1968, the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Robert Stoller published the book Sex and Gender: The Development of Masculinity and Femininity. In it, he wrote the following:

Gender is a term that has psychological or cultural rather than biological connotations. If the proper terms for sex are ‘male’ and ‘female,’ the corresponding terms for gender are ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’; these latter may be quite independent of (biological) sex. Gender is the amount of masculinity or femininity found in a person, and, obviously, while there are mixtures of both in many humans, the normal male has a preponderance of masculinity and the normal female a preponderance of femininity. Gender identity starts with the knowledge and awareness, whether conscious or unconscious, that one belongs to one sex and not the other, though as one develops, gender identity becomes much more complicated, so that, for example, one may sense himself as not only a male but a masculine man or an effeminate man or even a man who fantasies being a woman.4

Importantly, while Stoller posits a distinction between sex and gender, the distinction he draws in the above quote is nevertheless a fuzzy one, as sexed bodies are seemingly inescapably filled with some ‘mixture’ of gender, that is, of masculinity and femininity. On the one hand, distinguishing sex from gender enables those of us who speak English to think about the ways in which both chainsaws and bath oil are gendered, even though they are clearly not entities with a sex. Again, and in keeping with what we learned via grammatical gender, this is quite useful, as a great many objects are culturally gendered.5 But on the other hand, it is not altogether clear what Stoller means by “the amount of masculinity or femininity found in a person.” What is this stuff called masculinity and femininity which is supposedly mixing around inside us? What are we to make of the fact that different cultures perceive the same entities as differently gendered, e.g. Amaterasu (Japanese goddess of the sun) and Helios (Greek god of the sun)? Are femininity and masculinity (and, by association, the gendered norms and roles expected of ‘woman’ and ‘man’) always culturally and historically specific? Stoller’s text had the effect of provoking many worthwhile questions. Equally important, part of what Stoller introduced in this text was a highly individualistic conception of gender identity (“one may sense himself”) — even though at the time he wrote it the individual/any individual could only understand themselves as gendered in accordance with a shared, culture-wide set of distinctions between the feminine and the masculine. This conception of gender identity as a ‘sense’ inhering solely within an individual would remain more or less confined to psychiatry for many years, in large part because of the cultural anthropologist Gayle Rubin’s introduction of the concept of ‘the sex/gender system’ in 1975.

In her famous essay, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex,’ Rubin was primarily addressing the problem of sexual inequality. She sought to find and to “provide conceptual tools with which one can build descriptions of the part of social life that is the locus of the oppression of women, of sexual minorities, and of certain aspects of human personality within individuals.”6 The conceptual tool she provided was “the sex/gender system,” which she defined broadly as “the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied” (p. 34). This is actually a vague and confusing definition, as what she meant by “biological sexuality” is not at all clear. Curiously, at the start of the paragraph which concludes with that confusing formulation, she had written of “a systematic social apparatus which takes up females as raw materials and fashions domesticated women as products” (p. 34). Clarity abounds in that quote. This aspect of Rubin’s essay — whereby from one direction the meaning of the sex/gender system is crystal clear (within Western culture it refers to the entirety of the social system which turns biological females into domesticated women and biological males into public men who, as a group, enjoy dominance over women), but from the other direction it is opaque and murky (humans doing sex-things to and with other humans, at a guess?) — this tendency-toward-confusion has, I think, accompanied the term ‘gender’ ever since it was untethered from linguistics.

Partly, this has to do with the fact that wherever sex and gender are present, so too is human sexuality, which is surely one of the most murky and opaque elements of the human condition. As the feminist philosopher Moira Gatens pointed out in her 1983 essay ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,’ while it is possible to make a theoretical distinction between sex and gender, in practice and whenever we are dealing with human beings, “The very same behaviours (whether they be masculine or feminine) have quite different personal and social significances when acted out by the male subject on the one hand, and the female subject on the other. Identical social ‘training,’ attitudes, or, if you will, conditioning, acquire different significances when applied to male or female subjects.”7 In other words, the meaning and value ascribed to the actual enactment of specific masculine attributes (e.g. being hairy-faced), behaviours (e.g. grunting), characteristics (e.g. being unemotional), or qualities (e.g. hardness) will differ greatly depending on the assumed sex of the person enacting them. If it is a male, then he may well be interpreted to be a good heterosexual bloke. If it is a female, then she will probably be interpreted to be a scary hairy lesbian. Thus far, at least, gender understood as femininity and masculinity seems to be a sticky concept, and what it most stubbornly adheres to are sexed bodies (by which I mean bodies as either male or female—regardless of how ‘biological sex’ is technically defined in any given culture at any given time).

At this point we could all be forgiven for whimpering or grunting in exasperation. In fact, doings of this sort represent the next great theoretical step taken by ‘gender’ in Western culture. Two sociologists, Candace West and Don Zimmerman, published ‘Doing Gender’ in 1987, and it remains one of the most lucid descriptions and characterizations ever published of gender as, in large part, a verb rather than a noun. They also shed a great deal of light upon why it is that ‘gender’ is such a sticky concept. In their words, “We contend that the ‘doing’ of gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production.”8 What this means is that all of us are stuck, ‘hostages’ to gender in so far as there is no way any of us can avoid engaging in gendered (masculine and feminine) actions, behaviours, and displays. This is the case because so much of what we do, including sitting and walking(!), and what we wear, and do or do not adorn ourselves with, has always already been gendered by the society in which we dwell. In other words, our actions are always interpreted by others as gendered, and those gendered actions are (shades of Moira Gatens) interpreted by others based upon which sex those others interpret us to be.9 Yet, while it is individuals who ‘do’ gender and, I repeat, cannot avoid ‘doing’ gender in some form or fashion no matter what we do, West and Zimmerman refuse to individualize gender. Rather, they “conceive of gender as an emergent feature of social situations: both as an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society” (p. 127). Which takes us back (to Rubin) in the direction of a sexist sex/gender system. The sexist sex/gender system in Western culture had been on the receiving end of acute scrutiny from a number of feminist theorists and philosophers by this point in time, but (sadly, from my perspective) this is precisely not where ‘gender’ goes from here.

Nevertheless, before I ‘go’ where ‘gender’ goes at the end of the 20th century, I want to dwell upon the systemic and, more precisely, symbolic dimensions of what can be described as the sex/gender system which sticks to the Western philosophical tradition. This sex/gender system informs and is perpetuated by a dualistic, hierarchical understanding of reality. Below is a list of oppositions which represents in condensed form the sexist and racist metaphysics of domination and subordination which structures thought in Western culture.10

One huge problem is that the items in the left-hand column are all valued as superior to the items in the right-hand column. They each represent a form of perfection in relation to which their opposite, their ‘other,’ is defined as imperfect or lacking and thus inferior. As Simone de Beauvoir put it when discussing the symbolic relation between man and woman in her introduction to The Second Sex, “She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the Other.”11 It is not difficult to perceive how sexism, racism, and xenophobia are built into this hierarchical symbolic system. Contemplate for a moment those sticky associations between woman, the feminine, the body, the irrational, the primitive, the dark, the evil foreign outsiders — truly, sexism and racism and xenophobia all draw upon the same symbolic schema for their justification. Again, the problem is not that man and woman and light and dark exist: the problem lies in the negative value judgements rendered against all the items in the right-hand column. As de Beauvoir alluded to, the items in the right-hand column are not approached or defined or cherished as they are in and of themselves, but only as they are not like their opposites.

What happened early on in the second-wave feminist movement was that a number of women all realized that symbolic Woman urgently needed to be imagined and defined and cherished by women as a subject in her own right rather than as the Other of Man.12 The logic behind this realization was the same logic that had, in the USA, led to the Black Power movement in the 1960s and ’70s, and produced the slogan ‘Black is Beautiful.’ It is the same logic as that which impels the Black Lives Matter movement. The not-very-feminist but nonetheless brilliant political theorist Hannah Arendt summed it up in these words: “You can only defend yourself as the person you are attacked as.”14 ‘Woman’ had been demeaned, denigrated, distorted, and denied an existence in her own right by men. If women are ever going to be recognized as fully human, rather than as imperfect beings, then women must imagine and create Woman. What might woman be, Symbolic Woman, if she were not defined as the Other of Man? If she were a subject in her own right? No one knows as yet, for She is still becoming, but I am one of those women who believe that the need and the urgency of imagining/creating/writing, as Hélène Cixous put it, “a universal woman subject who must bring women to their senses and to their meaning in history” remains with us to this day.15

The project of imagining and theorizing and celebrating and honouring Woman as a subject in her own right, as opposed to Man’s domesticated object, could have been articulated as a kind of ‘doing gender’ as well as a challenge to the existing hierarchical, sexist, racist, xenophobic sex/gender system in Western culture. But it wasn’t. Instead, ‘gender’ went elsewhere, primarily via the thought of Judith Butler and her 1990 text Gender Trouble.

The systemic problem Butler set out to challenge via theory in Gender Trouble was not sexism. Instead, it was heteronormativity, or as Adrienne Rich first named it, “compulsory heterosexuality.”15 Fundamentally, heterosexuality depends upon the existence of men and women who are male and female, respectively. So, rather boldly, what Butler attempted to do was to do away with both ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as gender identities, and with ‘male’ and ‘female’ as biological sexes.16 Here, almost at the end of Gender Trouble, is Butler’s explanation of her sustained attempt to de-naturalize gender:17 “The loss of gender norms would have the effect of proliferating gender configurations, destabilizing substantive identity, and depriving the naturalizing narratives of compulsory heterosexuality of their central protagonists: ‘man’ and ‘woman.’”18 Quite clearly, she wants a world inclusive of many different gender configurations, but does not want ‘woman’ or ‘man’ to be among them. Getting rid of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ is indeed one solution to the problem of compulsory heterosexuality, but as a solution it is remarkably destructive. In addition, Butler seems to be claiming that what constitutes the entirety of the meaning of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are gender norms — nothing but gender norms.19 Yet here I sit, a usually-not-very-gendery-one-way-or-the-other lesbian who is correctly identified by others as a woman every single day. In my experience, an individual’s lack of gender norms does not seem to have the effect Butler hoped it would have. I believe this is because all of us are taught from birth to interpret sexed bodies quite accurately even in the absence of gender-normative behaviours, as well as (from the other direction, as it were) to rely upon our interpretation of culturally shared gender norms whenever an individual’s sex is truly not discernible. The issue is that while culturally shared gender norms do change over time, they never disappear entirely, but I digress.

Butler’s definition of ‘gender’ resonates in many ways with West and Zimmerman’s account of the doing of gender. According to Butler, “gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.”20 Again, conceiving of gender as consisting of ‘a stylized repetition of acts’ is a way of conceiving of gender as consisting of various doings. Given that for Butler, these repeated doings result in ‘the illusion of an abiding gendered self,’ Butler is obviously refuting any understanding of humans as containing within ourselves any femininity or masculinity (contra Stoller). Instead, she is suggesting that we all come to believe, falsely, that what we are doing is an expression of an inner gendered self. But she extends this refutation beyond the denial of any internal masculine or feminine essence or substance or identity, and ends up by refuting the reality of biological sexual difference.21

In her words, “within the sex/gender distinction, sex poses as ‘the real’ and the ‘factic,’ the material or corporeal ground upon which gender operates as an act of cultural inscription.”22 But, she goes on to claim, “The ‘real’ and the ‘sexually factic’ are phantasmatic constructions — illusions of substance — that bodies are compelled to approximate, but never can.”23 (You might want to read those two sentences again.)

The first time I had to teach Gender Trouble I was in fact co-teaching it with another woman. The reason I had to teach the second half of the book was because my colleague gave birth mid-way through the semester, and was off on maternity leave before she had the chance to let the students know that her body was only a phantasmatic construction, merely attempting to approximate a female body. A final observation: the idea of sex posing as ‘the real,’ posing as factual, gives to sex an extraordinary agency; apparently sex has the ability to pretend to be something it is not. Or, sex, according to Butler, seemingly has the desire and ability to fool people into believing that sex is a physical fact of life, when it is instead an illusion. I do not know why Butler is invested in giving sex such cunning power while simultaneously insisting that sex is not real. I do know that it is dangerous to deny reality. These are dangerous times.

Much as Butler wanted to get rid of the gender identities ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ they haven’t disappeared, although heterosexuality is a tad less compulsory than it was thirty years ago. In 21st century Western culture we have witnessed the return of Robert Stoller’s understanding of gender as an individual’s internal sense of themselves. Gender self-ID has become the contested gold-standard of gender identity: the contestation is over the question of whether gender self-ID should trump biological sex in every situation. We have witnessed as well the proliferation of new gender identities, ‘gender-fluid’ and ‘gender non-binary’ chief among them. I find these terms confounding, to be honest — from my phenomenological perspective we are all both gender-fluid, or we behave in more gendery ways in some situations and less gendery ways in other situations, and gender non-binary, or, when we consider a person’s whole life, no one’s actions and behaviours are ever either solely masculine or solely feminine (or solely in accordance with the social identity ‘man’ or ‘woman’). What the identities gender-fluid and gender non-binary actually, although perhaps unintentionally, seem to be doing is re-inscribing an understanding of ‘normative’ man as masculine-at-all-times, and ‘normative’ woman as feminine-at-all-times. (If we but paid more attention to each other, we might come to appreciate just how many of us are gender-mutts—gender-thoroughbreds being the rare exception rather than the norm.)

Other new gender identities have also emerged in Western culture in recent years. These are entirely untethered from femininity or masculinity, and are solely expressions of what/how an individual senses and defines their ‘gender’ to be. Examples I found on the interwebs in 2017 include “Astergender: a gender that feels bright and celestial”; “Colourgender: a gender associated with one or more colours and the feelings, hues, emotions, and/or objects associated with that colour”; and “Espigender: a gender that is related to being a spirit or exists on a higher or extradimensional plane.” While these sorts of gendered possibilities are endless, I should note that the ‘gender master list’ on which I found those identities is no longer accessible, and the (sub-)cultural enthusiasm for creating fascinating new gender identities seems to have waned. However, the idea that ‘gender’ can mean anything that any individual says it means has stuck, which contributes in no small measure to our current state of culture-wide gender confusion.

That said, there is one recently created gender identity that has received a significant degree of cultural acknowledgment, and that is ‘cisgender.’ Taken from Latin, the word literally means ‘on this side of kind/sort,’ which is an unintentionally perfect expression of the gender-muddle which has suffused progressive Western culture. Officially, ‘cisgender’ designates any person whose self-declared ‘gender identity’ corresponds with the sex they were ‘assigned’ at birth. (Some people, I am one of them, find this quite conceptually muddled as well, not least because I was in reality female when I was born. No human being assigned me my sex.) In practice, and as far as I can discern, ‘cisgender’ refers to female women and male men who do not self ID as gender-fluid or gender non-binary. Surprisingly, given the shared aversion in certain progressive circles to gender binaries, with the arrival of cisgender a new gender binary has been created, opposing cisgender to transgender. This new binary opposition is worth thinking about for a moment, as it does several things simultaneously. For a start, it explicitly glues ‘gender’ back onto everyone, and once again, as per West and Zimmerman, our “competence as members of society is hostage to [our] production” of a specific gender identity (when I explain that I am not cisgender because I am not on gender’s side my social competence is definitely questioned by some). Secondly, it re-affirms the existence of sex-at-birth even as it insists that gender (however it is defined) takes precedence over sex. And lastly, when it comes to the symbolic distribution of moral, political and epistemic agency between the gender binary transgender/cisgender, it produces not one but two distinct sets of hierarchical dualisms. In the left-hand/right-hand schema, they look like this:

FATHER Man Masculine Mind Reason Rational Intelligible (known through the mind) Immaterial Universal One Independent Self-sufficient Eternal/Static Transcendent Immortal Sky Civilized Human Culture White Citizen Inside Absolute/Immune Impenetrable/Impregnable Inviolate/Invulnerable Good MOTHER Woman Feminine Body Emotion Irrational Sensible (known through the body) Material Particular/Contextual Many Dependent Relational Mutable/In process Immanent Mortal Earth Primitive Animal Nature Black Foreigner Outside Corrupted/Infected Penetrable/Pregnable Violable/Vulnerable Evil<>
transwoman woman (whether they identify as cisgender or not)
man (cisgender or not)  transman

 

In one way, these oppositions map directly onto the existing sexist symbolic order which suffuses Western culture. Those who were born male are in the position of dominance over those who were born female. But what evidence am I drawing upon to make this claim? I will get to that evidence, but I ask you to bear with me as I tell the story of what led to my dream-attack by werewords.

INTO A GENDER MAELSTROM

Recently something shocking happened.24 I was informed by a student that anyone who acknowledges the existence of biological sex is a TERF, one of those trans-exclusionary radical feminists. In response, a part of me burst out laughing (I was alone in my office at the time, reading an online discussion thread). I laughed because I had a vision of 99% of the world’s population wearing a TERF T-shirt, which I found amusing because at least 98% of the world’s population has no idea what TERF means. I laughed also, a tad hysterically, as I considered the stupendous illogic of insisting upon designating people as cisgender — sex and gender aligned — and then insisting that sex doesn’t exist.25 (Reason seems to have departed from the rhetorical space surrounding gender.) But another part of me was not amused at all. I was dumbfounded.

Eventually it dawned on me that the student wanted confirmation of reality. She knew before she wrote her online discussion post that I constantly affirm the stubborn, intractable fact of human sexual difference, that difference grounded in human sexual dimorphism. 26In every one of my units I point out that one of the limits of human existence given with existence is that only those babies born female may be able, upon sexual maturity, to bear children. Only those babies born male may be able, upon sexual maturity, to impregnate someone born female. All sex/gender systems all over the world are structured around this material reality. To wish and to fantasize for things to be otherwise is to wish and to fantasize in vain. Yet my student had found herself in some online forum in the midst of a pack of gender-werewolves, all of whom were howling that sex is an arbitrary, fictional concept — one which, moreover, was originally disseminated by white Western colonizers, or so I was informed. In response to this additional ‘information’ my jaw dropped to the floor.27 Here is an example of the werewordian dissemination of this ‘information’: “Not to mention that Sex itself is an arbitrary concept predicated on European standards in order to subjugate other peoples during the bloody age of Colonialism.”28

Quite obviously, the werewords led by ‘gender’ are now attacking ‘sex.’ But there is so much more going on here. This is, to my mind, an example of Queer Theory Colonization of epic proportions. Think about it. An online pack of gender-howlers: what’s the demographic? A pack of mostly white, mostly middle or upper class, mostly in their late teens or twenties, mostly well-educated, mostly self-identifying as cisgender or gender-fluid or gender non-binary or trans, mostly the descendants of white Western colonizers — this cohort is now telling each other as well as the descendants of the people whom their ancestors colonized that Queer Theory has finally arrived with The Truth! Indigenous peoples of the world, you were duped by the colonizers, who, by means of that crafty Foucauldian knowledge/power complex, convinced you that there were such things as females and males, and made you shape your culture’s sex/gender system accordingly. Never mind about traditional initiation rites and marriage ceremonies and secret women’s business/secret men’s business (all of which so confused the white anthropologists) — you didn’t really believe in sexual difference until we told you it was real. But now we’re telling you that it is not real, and you must believe us, and if you do not, then we are going to chant the same thing over and over until you shut up.

A BRIEF INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS

This is lunacy, lunacy coming from a place of peculiarly privileged racist-classist-sexist thoughtlessness. The members of this pack are ridiculously privileged because they truly believe they have not just the right but the obligation to define reality for everyone (I think of this as a case of contemporary Gnosticism, in accordance with which the privileged initiates into the higher forms of gender-knowledge feel compelled to dispense portions of that secret knowledge by Twitter and Instagram force). They are racist-classist because they cannot conceive of either pre-colonized or post-colonial black or brown-skinned people as being very fine epistemic agents who in fact knew/know full well what they need/ed to know about their own sex and gender identities and their own culture’s sex/gender system. They are classist-sexist because within that pack of gender-trendies there are very few who have to worry about being able to afford or to obtain access to safe, reliable contraception or a safe, legal abortion. And they are sexist-racist when/because it does not even occur to them that it will be women, those who were born female, especially those who were born black or brown and female, who will suffer the most harm from the obliteration of sex which they champion. Or, if it does occur to them, they do not care.

It hurts when I think about it, and it hurts to type these words, but I suspect some of them really do not care. My suspicion is based on the fact that they do not like to use the word ‘women’ in an unqualified manner when referring to women — with one exception. They are insistent that transwomen are women.29 ‘Other women’ are all too often referred to as menstruators, or bleeders, or breeders, or feeders, or cunts, or birthing bodies. To the best of my knowledge, transmen, many of whom also menstruate, are not ever referred to collectively as menstruators, bleeders, breeders, feeders, cunts, or birthing bodies. Instead, it is only female people collectively who are so characterized. This alerts me to the fact that these are werewords in action. They are attack words directed at a very specific group, one which has historically been and is to this day discriminated against in many different ways on the basis of their sex.

What is striking about that list of names for ‘other women’ is that they all reduce ‘other women’ to a list of fleshy functions, fleshy bits and pieces. Ironically, paradoxically, ‘other women’ — and only ‘other women’ — are reduced to our sex, but it is a sex which is not one, meaning a sex which is not a sex, because a pack of gender-howlers has declared that sex does not really exist.30 And poof, in this pocket of Western culture approximately half the human race has just been symbolically wiped out in an invisible extinction event. ‘Other women’ are nothing but leaky matter, for whom there is no symbolic representation allowed. ‘Woman’ can now signify only Transwoman because she is the only Woman whose existence can be posited in a non-reductionistic, unqualified manner. Put differently, the woman who was once the Other of Man is now, in certain pockets of Western culture, the Other of Transwoman. About Woman-who-is-not-Transwoman, one is not allowed to tweet. More accurately, if one does tweet of this Woman, one will be TERF-ed almost immediately. And this is my evidence for my claim that Transwoman is in a position of symbolic dominance over Woman.31

Another striking thing about that list of names for ‘other women’ is just how demeaning and dehumanizing it is. Anger, fury radiates off of that list. Bleeder, breeder, feeder, cunt: this is a list of wereword droppings, wereword excrement. “Shit, shit, shit, shit, I hate you, you fucking piece of shit.” This is the meaning I perceive in those names for women, and it causes me to wonder. Was Jung right? Do human beings share a collective unconscious? Is it possible that buried deep within our collective Western cultural psychic sludge there is a painful awareness that our life is dependent upon our mother? That all our lives are dependent upon not one but two mothers? She who bore us, and Mother Earth, the Mother we have been steadily tearing apart, shredding, polluting, poisoning and destroying? What I wonder is whether the symbolic annihilation of Woman-who-is-not-Transwoman is an expression of rage against our m/Mothers? Our mothers, after all, gave us life, but never exactly the lives we dream of living. As for our Mother Earth! She is letting species go extinct. She will let us go extinct, too, and not even lift a finger to help her human children. Deep within that psychic sludge the figure of the Bad Mother is stirring, and She is a Bitch. A terrifying bitch. In response, rage, accompanied by werewords of symbolic annihilation. In reality, our mothers never had the power or authority or means to wreak such havoc upon the earth. In reality, the extinction mess we find ourselves in was brought about by the Fathers, the actual patriarchs who own/ed the corporations and rule/d the countries which despoil/ed the earth. They have names. Their names are not bleeder, breeder, or feeder, but John D. Rockefeller, Frank Seiberling, Henry Ford, Rupert Murdoch, Jeff Bezos, Donald Trump, Scott Morrison, Boris Johnson.

The feminist philosopher within me takes a deep breath and lets it out slowly. Shared terror I can comprehend. A shared sense of helplessness, lack of mastery, lack of control: this is our collective reality at this point in time with regard to catastrophic ecological destruction. But the symbolic murder of the female Woman IS NOT GOING TO HELP ANYONE. Look at that: I just shouted.

It should not be necessary to write this, but it is. Women and transwomen share some very real fears and experiences, male violence and the imposition of confining, damaging (physically and emotionally) gender norms chief among them. It ought not be difficult to respect and support each other to be able to live lives of dignity, lives not marred by discrimination, harassment, or oppression. We ought to be able to work together to create a world in which there are sufficient toilets and change rooms and homeless shelters and refuges and prisons for everyone to feel and to be safe while they are inside them. There are ways to solve what is currently a significant conflict of legal rights and political representation that do not result in sacrificing the needs of any. But we are not going to solve these matters if ‘TERF’ is snarled at every woman who dares to murmur that she is traumatized by the sight of a penis or is incapacitated by the thought of undressing in front of a stranger who had been socialized for years to become a man. Far too many women have every reason to be so traumatized, so incapacitated. We are not going to be able to address these issues if ‘TERF’ is howled at every woman who points out that sex is real and so too is a culture of male dominance and female subordination.33 Moreover, the denial of these realities perpetuates the oppression of women as a sex-class. It is that simple. Werewords are fomenting a thoughtless, dangerous, misogynist attack-culture. At the precise moment in history when we need to acknowledge and cultivate our physical, material kinship with all other earth-beings, when we must pour our efforts into nurturing life and preventing extinction events, virtual werepacks are threatening death instead — both literally and symbolically. This is lunacy:

cis people are mad about terfs getting punched or whatever, but, my election platform is that i will kill every terf & eat their ribcages (14 September 2017)
All TERFs deserve to be shot in the head (11 September 2014)
I want to rape a terf to death then chop its body into pieces and leave them for the crows — Same (11 February 2018)
Don’t you mean “Should the basic rights of human beings be afforded to everyone, or just people like us?” Coz either I get to self ID as a woman or i’ll start id’ing as a fucking pissed off ball of rage and come at transphobes with a nail encrusted baseball bat. (19 July 2018)
Burn your local terf today
boil ‘em in oil (22 August 2018)
friendly reminder, if youre a terf im Going to slice your throat actually i Will run a knife through you and Sever your spinal cord uwu (17 August 2016)
This is why I can no longer remain silent.34 This shit matters.

Lucy Tatman coordinates the Gender & Diversity major at the University of Tasmania. She is a Post-Menopausal Feminist who looks forward to becoming a Crone.

1 Anonymous Twitter user, 1 April 2018. Accompanying image: barbed-wire wrapped baseball bat

2 I suspect there are other commonalities which are widely but not wholly shared: see my discussion of gender-howlers, below.

3 Lucy Tatman, ‘Theological Matricide, Essentially,’ Feminist Theology, 12.3 (2004), 305-318.

4 Robert J. Stoller, Sex and Gender: The Development of Masculinity and Femininity (London and New York: Routledge, 1968, 1974), p. 5.

5 The important thing to note is simply the fact that in many cultures a great many sexless objects and entities are gendered masculine or feminine. There are plenty of instances where the grammatical gender of a word is the opposite of its cultural gender; in French, the word for chainsaw is grammatically feminine, for instance, but chainsaws are nonetheless culturally associated with masculinity.

6 Gayle Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex’ in Women, Class, and the Feminist Imagination, ed. by Karen Hansen and Ilene Philipson (Philadelphia: Temple, 1990), p. 34.

7 Moira Gatens, ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ in Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx, ed. by Judith Allen and Paul Patton (Sydney: Intervention Publications, 1983), p. 148.

8 Candace West and Don Zimmerman, ‘Doing Gender,’ Gender and Society, 1.2 (June 1987), 126.

9 West and Zimmerman distinguish between ‘sex’ (biological, however that is defined in a given society) and ‘sex category’ (the sex others assume you are, because you provide enough ‘identificatory displays’ for them to make such an assumption) (p. 127).

10 A slightly edited version of a chart compiled by Jane Clare Jones: Jane Clare Jones, ‘A note on “smashing the binary,”’ 1 October 2018,

11 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. by H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. xix.

12 I’m thinking of Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and Hélène Cixous (all of whom were living in France at the time), as well as Mary Daly, Alice Walker, Susan Griffin, and Audre Lorde in the USA.

13 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, ed. by Jerome Cohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), p. 137.

14 Hélène Cixous, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa,’ trans. by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs, 1.4 (1976), 875-76. My own contribution to this project is most fully developed in Lucy Tatman, Numinous Subjects: Engendering the Sacred in Western Culture, An Essay (Canberra: ANU Press, 2007).

15 In her essay ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,’ Rich posited that the existence of lesbians is “a source of knowledge and power available to women,” and that heterosexuality as an institution is “a beachhead of male dominance” (p. 633). Her analysis of compulsory heterosexuality is fundamentally an analysis of the perpetuation of sexism via numerous means. Butler’s approach differs greatly. Adrienne Rich, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,’ Signs, 5.4 (Summer 1980), 631-60.

16 Throughout this brief explication of (some of) what Butler put forward in Gender Trouble, I am taking her at her word, and interpreting what I take to be key sentences in the text to mean exactly what they say. The reason I am taking this literal approach to Gender Trouble is that I perceive the extraordinary impact the book has had on contemporary gender ideology to have come from literal readings of the work. I do not address any other texts by Butler because nothing else she has written has had the cultural impact of Gender Trouble.

17 What precisely it means to de-naturalize gender according to Butler is radical indeed. In the 1999 preface to Gender Trouble, Butler explains that she had wanted to criticize “those views that… restricted the meaning of gender to received notions of masculinity and femininity” (p. vii). In other words, she wanted to change the meaning of the word ‘gender,’ which had been widely acknowledged to refer to masculinity and femininity for quite some time. She did not want simply to ‘unstick’ masculinity and femininity from male and female bodies; she wanted, I think, to new-gender and un-sex Western culture, and then see what happened. Alas, to this day many girl children are still being given pink sparkle-ponies on their birthdays, while little boys receive laser light rockets (feminine and masculine norms are still being imposed upon girls and boys). Many other girl children are being forced to endure female genital mutilation (because of their sex). While Butler has certainly caused some gender trouble, sticky sex/gender systems all over the world remain firmly in place.

18 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), p. 187.

19 ‘Man’ and ‘woman’ currently have two distinct co-existing meanings. On the one hand, they mean ‘adult male human being’ and ‘adult female human being’ respectively. But at this point in time they also designate a person whose social identity is interpreted by others to be ‘man’ or ‘woman’ on the basis of their enactment of gender norms. Sometimes these meanings do not co-exist peacefully, but it is important to acknowledge that they are both widely shared meanings of these words.

20 Butler, p. 179, italics in original. Butler provides this definition of gender after her discussion of the ‘performativity of gender,’ in which she stresses “the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated” (p. 178). While most of the attention paid to Gender Trouble has focused on ‘gender as performative’ (and I fully agree that humans ‘do’ gender), I am obviously attending more closely here to other of Butler’s claims, those which seem to be re-emerging in contemporary Western culture in 2020.

21 Two points: first, Butler’s disavowal of the existence of internal feminine or masculine gender identity has been spectacularly ignored of late. Second, in the 1999 preface to Gender Trouble, she writes of her opposition to “sexual difference fundamentalism” (p. viii). It is striking that Butler equates the acknowledgement of sexual difference with a dogmatic religious faith claim. Reading Butler, I am constantly reminded that dogmatism comes in many forms. From my perspective, the insistence that sex is not factual or real is a most extraordinary faith claim, readily comparable to faith in the physical resurrection of the body.

22 Butler, p. 186, italics in original.

23 Ibid.

24 The following is a true story, in that it is a truth-filled distillation of a number of recent conversations I have had with people far younger than myself. However, it is not a literally true account of any exchanges I have had with any one; ‘the student’ in this text is a fictional creation. Nevertheless, I was prompted by numerous conversations to undertake an online foray into these matters, and there I encountered a mind-boggling eruption of gender chaos and werewords, hence the title of this section.

25 To elaborate: the denial of biological sex leaves in existence ‘sex-assigned-at-birth,’ but the arguments I’ve encountered around ‘sex-assigned-at-birth’ all end up making the claim that ‘sex-assigned-at-birth’ isn’t really real, which ultimately leaves us with no sex at all, as far as I can tell.

26 Yes, intersex people exist, as I remind my students every semester. But Homo sapiens would not exist if we were not, as a species, sexually dimorphic.

27 I honestly thought the person who informed me of this was joking. Sex didn’t exist before the 15th century? Just how European is, oh, The Book of Genesis, in which males and females are not only mentioned, but forcibly installed in a sexist sex/gender system immediately after tea, if I recall correctly? Again, reason has been replaced by werewords.

28 Anonymous Twitter user, 15 November 2020.

29 Those three words, ‘transwomen are women,’ serve to obscure a complex reality. I understand them to mean that all transwomen must be acknowledged as having become social women, or to have taken on the social identity ‘woman.’ This is true for some but not all transwomen. For instance, there are some transwomen who are regularly interpreted by others as women (have indeed become social women through a great deal of time and effort), but who prefer to be known as transwomen. There are other transwomen who aspire to become social women, but who are regularly interpreted by others as transwomen rather than as women. There are also transwomen who do not aspire to become social women, but who wish to, and do, live as transwomen and are interpreted by others to be transwomen. To insist on the blanket statement ‘transwomen are women’ is to deny the complexity and variety of transwomen’s lives, and I am aware that a number of transwomen are not happy with this state of affairs—for good reason. I also take it as axiomatic that in order to have a social identity of any sort you must be widely acknowledged by others to have that identity. This is the point at which problems erupt, for some people’s gender self-ID is at odds with their social identity. The issue is that it is not possible to replace all others’ perceptions/interpretations of you with your own perception/interpretation of yourself.

30 This situation is, tragically, pretty much the opposite of what Luce Irigaray had in mind in This Sex Which is Not One.

31 My evidence for the fact that Man is in a position of symbolic dominance over Transman is of the via negative sort. There do not exist werepacks of transmen threatening to fuck non-trans men with barbed-wire wrapped baseball bats if those men insist on the reality of biological sex.

32 See Callie H. Burt, ‘Scrutinizing the U.S. Equality Act 2019: A Feminist Examination of Definitional Changes and Sociolegal Ramifications,’ Feminist Criminology, 15.4 (2020), 363-409, for an insightful, caring analysis of the conflict of legal rights which is created when gender identity is always given precedence over sex.

33 There is an important difference between the reality of sex and the reality of the current culture of male dominance and female subordination in which we dwell. With a great deal of time and effort, it may be possible to change our culture.

34 I would like to acknowledge and to thank the few, painfully few, feminist scholars who have spoken out publicly in recent years about the importance and material reality of biological sex, and who have provided cogent arguments against the blanket replacement of ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity.’ For their efforts, these women have been TERF-ed and vilified: Kathleen Stock, Holly Lawford-Smith, Jane Clare Jones, Mary Leng, Selina Todd, Alice Sullivan, Rosa Freedman. I am gobsmacked that women are receiving death threats for saying that females exist and for saying (I think this is the ‘controversial’ claim) that the existence of females matters. Like many women, all I have wanted to do in recent years is to go quietly about my business, all the while hoping