Issue Five

Sex Matters: A Feminist Legal Analysis of the Bostock Decision and Executive Order 13988

by The Women’s Collective on Law and Policy

Editors’ Note: The Women’s Collective on Law and Policy have kindly supplied us with this abridged version of their full white paper, which is published online at https://sexandgender.us/. We recommend reading the full document, which gives additional insight into the legal and historical context and provides valuable recommendations for ways in which women in the US can influence the implementation of the Executive Order.

UNDERSTANDING BOSTOCK IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The American legal structure is multi-layered and slow moving by design. Although women have enjoyed federal protection from workplace discrimination on the basis of sex for over 50 years, many of these same women were not protected from workplace discrimination on the basis of being lesbian — which is also discrimination on the basis of sex.

This is because, for decades, Republicans have stoked moral panic and fear of change to successfully block federal legislation to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The history of federal employment protections for gay, lesbian, and transgender employees in the United States is therefore quite brief. Until June 2020, without any federal protection, it was perfectly legal in many states to fire someone for being gay, lesbian, or transgender. This massive gap in national protection is how the Supreme Court came to hear the trio of cases that were ultimately combined into the landmark decision known as Bostock v. Clayton County 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020).

In a very narrowly written opinion, the Court held that firing an employee because of his or her sexual orientation or transgender status is prohibited sex discrimination within the purview of the existing Title VII statute. Though Bostock’s holding is technically limited to the specific section of the Civil Rights Act dealing with employment, Bostock’s reasoning now carries substantial weight in all subsequent legal interpretations of discrimination on the basis of sex. This supersized deference is always given to decisions made by the highest court, but especially those that settle long-contested questions of law with potential impact to millions of people’s lives.1

A WAY FORWARD THAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AND TRANS PEOPLE

While some radical feminist organizations criticized the Bostock decision as wrongly extending employment protections to transgender people, the Women’s Collective on Law and Policy developed an independent feminist analysis of Bostock’s decision and reasoning, revealing a careful insistence that sex matters and that sex must be acknowledged in any legal analysis of discrimination against transgender people. We argue that Bostock must be understood and applied consistently with the protections against sex discrimination that are the bedrock of its holding. We recognize that single-sex classifications are sometimes reasonably necessary to protect privacy, safety, fairness, equality, and/or bodily autonomy. Women, in particular, have vested legal interests in the continued recognition of sex in settings such as prisons, emergency shelters, locker rooms, and sports. Sex matters. We are narrowly focused on the harm caused by the specific conflict created when gender or transgender status is positioned to displace and override sex. Our analysis charts a new legal path that avoids the extremes of both ‘Focus on the Family’-style Christian conservatism and the popular liberal concept creep that promotes gender as a complete substitute for sex under the law. Gender identity as affirmation of self-understanding and expression is widely understood as distinct from sex. Transgender status also should be understood in law as separate from sex, worthy of recognition in its own right but not displacing sex classifications where sex matters. There is, for example, no inherent contradiction between protecting a woman from being fired and protecting a transwoman from being fired. Nor is there an inherent contradiction between protecting males, however they identify, from rape in prison and protecting women, however they identify, from rape in prison. However, contradictions and conflicts overtake good intentions and displace reasonable approaches when sex and gender identity are treated as the same thing. We address our concerns to these conflicts and the adverse effects on women and girls when an individual male’s internal gender identity (i.e. a transwoman or non-binary individual) is treated as if it were identical to the female sex as a matter of law or fact. As we move into a new era of civil rights protections, national policy must not leave behind women and girls whose own rights to equality, safety, privacy, and bodily autonomy have not yet been fully realized.2 Applying a consistently sex-based analysis ensures that protections for all groups can be harmonized.

WHAT DOES THE BOSTOCK JUDGEMENT ACTUALLY SAY? SEX MATTERS

In reaching its decision, the Bostock Court declined to take up the position, advocated for by some, that “sex,” as used in Title VII, is synonymous with gender identity.3 While this position was vigorously debated by litigants and amici, the Court found the debate extraneous to the question before it, stating that “nothing in our approach to these cases turns on the outcome of the parties’ debate.”4 The Court “proceed[ed] on the assumption that ‘sex’ … referr[ed] only to biological distinctions between male and female.” The Court further stated its agreement “that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex.” Importantly, Bostock relies explicitly on biological sex for its expansion of Title VII employment protections to LGBT persons. The touchstone for the Court is neither the gender identity nor the sexual orientation of the litigant: rather it is the sex of the litigant. Bostock implicitly recognizes that “biological distinctions between male and female” are necessary to the coherent construction and understanding of both sexual orientation and transgender identity. And Bostock’s reasoning explicitly holds that legal recognition of sexual orientation and transgender status under Title VII is premised on the biological sex of the litigants. Neither sexual orientation nor transgender status could be brought into coherent legal existence without first acknowledging “biological distinctions between male and female.”5 Federal civil rights protections for LGBT persons were created through recognition of their biological sex.6

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT PEOPLE IS BASED ON SEX, NOT GENDER

Having set the terms of the debate, the Court then held that it was impossible to fire someone for being homosexual or transgender and not refer to their sex. According to the Court, “[a]n employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”7 To discriminate against employees because of their transgender status or sexual orientation “requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex,” which Title VII explicitly prohibits.8

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TRANSGENDER STATUS ARE ‘SEX-PLUS’ CHARACTERISTICS

In accord with Bostock’s reasoning, transgender status and sexual orientation are ‘sex-plus’ characteristics, i.e. when an employer discriminates against an employee because of their sex plus another factor, such as age, or having minor children. Bostock explicitly relies upon the sex-plus holding of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). There, the Court held that an employer’s refusal to hire women with preschool-aged children, while hiring men with preschool-aged children, was sex discrimination. This was true even though a majority of applicants hired were women. The Court found that discrimination based on sex ‘plus’ caregiving status was sex discrimination under Title VII. After Bostock, so too with transgender status and sexual orientation. The sex of the litigant neither disappears nor loses importance by the addition of caregiving status or transgender status. Rather, sex remains the relevant factor even if transgender status or sexual orientation is the employer’s claimed motivation. Just as in Phillips, “it has no significance [to Bostock] if another factor — such as the sex the plaintiff is attracted to or presents as — might also be at work, or even play a more important role in the employer’s decision.”9 Neither transgender status nor sexual orientation replaces Title VII’s sex categories, which remain undisturbed. As Bostock recognizes, LGBT persons are within Title VII’s sex classification and discrimination against them is recognized and redressed as sex discrimination. In other words, sex is not conflated with, changed by, or subsumed into, any person’s transgender status or gender identity.

Moreover, transgender status and sexual orientation are both ‘sex-plus’ categories that can only be understood with biological sex held constant. The nouns we use to refer to sex and social gender are, perhaps unfortunately, the same. But Bostock should not be interpreted to conflate sex, a biological constant, with gender identity, an individual’s evolving expression of personal identity. While Bostock uses the term ‘identify’ to describe both sex and gender (“identified at birth” and “identifies as” later in life), this does not mean that the later act of self-identification erases the first act of biological classification as a matter of fact. It should not do so as a matter of law, either. Because sex matters. Sex matters in a number of contexts directly because of physical differences and also matters to the social, cultural, political and legal work of undoing systemic sex-based discrimination, i.e. the relative status of advantage and disadvantage accorded to male and female persons. For this reason, transgender status as a personal affirmation of self-understanding and expression needs to be understood as separate from sex, worthy of recognition but not displacing sex classification.

THE BOSTOCK JUDGEMENT DOES NOT RELY ON ‘GENDER IDENTITY’

The Bostock Court chose the term ‘transgender status’ rather than ‘gender identity’ to describe the protection Bostock requires. Though neither phrase is well-defined, ‘gender identity’ is the term most commonly incorporated into state level anti-discrimination statutes to protect transgender people. More than 20 states currently provide some form of anti-discrimination protection on the basis of ‘gender identity.’10 In all of these schemes, ‘gender identity’ is positioned as a direct legal replacement for sex, in other words ‘gender identity’ must be recognized regardless of sex.11 By constructing the legal concept of ‘gender identity’ in this way, single-sex spaces and accommodations cease to exist or be enforceable.

Significantly, however, the term ‘gender identity’ appears only once in the Bostock opinion — and then only to describe the arguments presented by the plaintiffs.12 The Court’s failure to make liberal use of the term ‘gender identity’ was plainly intentional. By comparison, the terms “transgender” and “transgender status” are used nearly 50 times. By refusing to employ the term ‘gender identity’ in its decision, the Bostock Court signalled a departure from the growing statutory trend and, in doing so, also refused to endorse both existing and proposed laws that define ‘gender identity’ as a substitute for sex.

We note that ‘gender identity’s’ hierarchy of dominance over sex is replicated in the proposed federal Equality Act where ‘gender identity’ has been inserted as a required proxy for sex where single-sex classifications would otherwise be legally permissible — including Title IX’s allowances for single-sex sports, housing, and changing facilities.13

THE EXECUTIVE ORDER: DID BIDEN ERASE WOMEN?

In January 2021, using Bostock as the primary legal authority, newly elected President Joe Biden’s issued an Executive Order on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (E.O. 13988). This order formally extended Bostock’s legal reach far beyond its original jurisdiction to encompass discrimination in federal housing, education, and prisons, among other contexts. The Executive Order instructs Federal Agencies which administer a multitude of internal rules and federal statutes (including Title IX, the Prison Rape Elimination Act, the Fair Housing Act and other statutes which directly impact women’s and girls’ lives) to make proposals for interpretation and enforcement of these statutes consistent with Bostock’s reasoning.

In expanding the reach of Bostock, we argue that the Agencies acting at its behest are obligated to recognize that sex, and sex discrimination, are at the centre of Bostock’s reasoning. They should not replace sex with gender identity, and protections for transgender persons should not be permitted to destroy or impinge upon sex-based protections for women and girls. Bostock neither replaces sex with gender identity, nor does it mandate sex-blind policies — fidelity to Bostock’s reasoning should not do so either.

E.O. 13988 CONTAINS SELF-LIMITING LANGUAGE — THIS MEAND AGENCY APPLICATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER MUST COMPLY WITH EXISTING LAW

The Executive Order explicitly recognizes that extension of Bostock’s proscription on discrimination against LGBT persons must comply with existing law. E.O. 13988 includes self-limiting language: “Under Bostock’s reasoning, laws that prohibit sex discrimination … prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation, so long as the laws do not contain sufficient indications to the contrary” (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 4(b) of E.O. 13988 states that it “shall be implemented consistent with applicable law” (emphasis added). Far from being mere boilerplate, this language militates against any interpretation that Agencies can or should go beyond existing law to effectuate the policy of E.O. 13988.

Our reading of Bostock suggests that where statutory or regulatory schemes recognize and enforce sex-based classifications as important for effectuating privacy, sex equality, and/or safety interests, those statutes contain “sufficient indications” that differentiating on the basis of sex irrespective of gender identity is allowed. That is, single-sex accommodations or distinctions currently allowed by law remain “applicable law” limiting the scope and application of E.O. 13988.

BALANCING RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: WHAT WOULD A FEMINIST APPLICATION OF BOSTOCK LOOK LIKE?

The Women’s Collective on Law and Policy supports Bostock’s actual reasoning. For the first time in US history, lesbians, gay men, bisexual persons, and transgender persons will receive federal protection from employment discrimination. This significant advancement in human rights must be celebrated! Our feminist analysis finds that the narrowness of Bostock’s holding, its explicit grounding in biological sex, and its refusal to position “transgender status” as a replacement for sex makes it an unusually successful demonstration of balancing rights under the law.

To illustrate the extension of Bostock’s reasoning to other contexts, we have made a detailed analysis of the potential impact on women prisoners.14 This analysis (which is not included here for reasons of space but can be read in full on our website) demonstrates the severe conflicts which can be expected if Bostock is implemented without due consideration for women’s rights and the relevant differences between sex and gender identity or transgender status. It illustrates the complexity and scope of issues raised and highlights the opportunity to notice and address gaps in protections against sex-based discrimination and violence. Our analysis shows that simply adding new forms of discrimination to existing regulations may be insufficient. Women’s right to sex-based classification must be affirmed and, where appropriate, expanded.

There is nothing in Bostock to suggest that extension of civil rights protections to LGBT persons has changed the body of sex equality law, on which Bostock depends, by replacing sex with gender identity. Rather, Bostock’s reliance on sex as the protected characteristic strongly suggests that where sex matters for the purpose of sex equality law, it can and will still matter, even when protection is extended on the basis of transgender status. Precedents which allow single-sex housing, bathrooms, changing rooms, sports, and job classifications are not implicated or affected by Bostock’s holding or its reasoning. As the Court stated, call it what you will, discrimination on the basis of transgender status is sex-based discrimination. And where the law allows distinctions to be drawn on the basis of sex, it is sex, not identity, that is, and should remain, the relevant determinant.15

1 See this map of state-level protections for LGBT people from workplace discrimination: Movement Advancement Project, ‘LGBT populations,’ MAP.org, October 2021.

2 See Appendix B of the full white paper: The Women’s Collective on Law and Policy, ‘Women’s Sexed Status in U.S. History, Custom, Law and Economics,’ Sex Matters, 2021.

3 Title VII states, in relevant part, that “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s … sex.” ‘42 U.S. Code. § 2000e-2(a)(1),’ Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School.

4 Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S.Ct. at 1739, via Google Scholar.

5 Bostock

6 Bostock at 1746-47.

7 Bostock at 1737.

8 Bostock at 1742.

9 Bostock at 1744.

10 Movement Advancement Project, ‘Non-discrimination laws,’ MAP.org, October 2021.

11 As an example, see Iowa Code § 216.2(10), which defines ‘gender identity’ as “a gender related identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth,” Iowa Legislature.

12 “The employees counter by submitting that, even in 1964, the term [sex] bore a broader scope, capturing more than anatomy and reaching at least some norms concerning gender identity and sexual orientation.” ‘Iowa Code’ at 1739.

13 The proposed Equality Act would amend Title VII’s BFOQ by equating sex and gender identity and requiring that when “sex is a bona fide occupational qualification, individuals are recognized as qualified in accordance with their gender identity.” H.R. 5 § 7(c)(2)—Employment (117th Cong. 2021). It would also amend multiple statutes, including Title VII and Title IX, which currently allow for single-sex accommodations, by replacing sex with gender identity: “an individual shall not be denied access to a shared facility, including a restroom, a locker room, and a dressing room, that is in accordance with the individual’s gender identity.” H.R. 5 § 9(2) (117th Cong. 2021). See ‘House Resolution 5: The Equality Act,’ 117th Congress.

14 See Appendix A, ‘Implications for female prisoners of Executive Order 13988,’ Sex Matters.

15 Ontologically and experientially, transgender identity itself requires sex to be understood as a constant against which a person’s self-identification can be understood as transgender. As such, gender identity is already distinct from sex and should legally be understood as such. Sex should not be legally or functionally replaced with gender identity in the body of sex discrimination law.