by Jane Clare Jones
consent (v.)
c. 1300, ‘agree, give assent; yield when one has the right, power, or will to oppose,’ from Old French consentir ‘agree; comply’ and directly from Latin consentire ‘agree, accord,’ literally ‘feel together,’ from assimilated form of com ‘with, together’ + sentire ‘to feel’ (see sense [n.]).
Until modern times used almost exclusively with reference to legal contracts, its sense was extended in the language of sociology and psychology from the 1950s and in the legal discussions of rape and other sex crimes by 1977.1
‘Consent’ is a crap way of working out whether sex is harmful. And if ‘consent’ doesn’t distinguish harmless — we might hope, in fact, nourishing — sex from sex that inflicts damage on its participants, it’s not doing the job we need done. Consent is a concept we’ve inherited from the language of contracts, of exchange, of ‘if you agree to give me this then I’ll agree to give you that. Deal?’ It is a word of commerce and transaction. Not a word of people getting it on. Healthy, nourishing, joyful sex is not a thing you merely ‘agree’ to in exchange for getting something you actually want from another person. It is something you desire, in and for itself, with another person. Something you feel – together. If we were interested in a social, political and legal concept that would halt this endless, institutionalized shattering of women’s psyches, we would not choose consent.
It is precisely in this twist between consent-as-contract and consent-as-criteria-of-sex-being-ethically-okay that ‘sex work ideology’ does its damage. The criterion of sex that is ethically okay is mutual desire. And another person’s desire cannot be bought. This is the truth of Andrea Heinz’s claim that genuine sexual consent cannot be purchased. Desire is at the core of our subjectivity2 and arises from and is expressed through the entire psyche — that is, through the bodymind. Contrary to popular, patriarchal belief, the body is not a meat casing with a person inside it.3 A person is a whole embodied awareness. Sex which is unwanted by that awareness, but perhaps ‘agreed to’ by the rational calculator we’ll call the ego (homunculus economicus?), can often lead the bodymind to split and awareness to dissociate from the body. Given that persons are bodyminds, using a body-as-if-it-were-not-a-person, and causing bodyminds to split, is an extreme harm to persons. (Cf. Rape. Torture.) That is, any sex that is not genuinely desired by a whole person is a harm to them, as a person.
It is a priori impossible to buy the desire of a bodymind. (You can seduce it. Different.) What can be bought is ‘agreement to alienate the body in a sex act the person doesn’t want and to exchange that alienation for something else.’ If you use the meaning of consent-as-desire, you have not here bought someone’s consent, you have bought its negation. But when people claim women consent to, or choose, the paid sex they engage in, they’re using the purely contractual sense of the term. It cannot be a claim that a woman ‘consented’ — in the sense of desired — but only a claim that she ‘consented’ — in the sense of agreed — that her desire, that is, her personhood, was not a matter of account in this exchange.4 This conflation of consent-as-desire and consent-as-contract is key to the rebranding effects of ‘sex work is work,’ to the rhetoric of liberal, autonomous exchange (so queer Marxist!).5 After all, a contract is only a matter of property, of theft, maybe of fraud. It is not a serious assault on another person’s humanity. What the contractual language of consent conceals is that the only ‘consent’ that matters — the desire of one for the other that makes the difference between flourishing and harm — has been suspended, bracketed out, erased.
1 ‘Consent (v.),’ Online Etymology Dictionary.
2 I mean this to refer to sexual desire in particular, but also desire in the wider sense, as the energy of motivation which moves us into the world, not only to acquire things to meet our needs (negative desire) but also to achieve or create things (positive desire).
3 We might think that such an idea could only have been produced by people socialized to dissociate from the sensate and emotional parts of their psyche, and to identify entirely with the abstracting, rational, and calculating parts of themselves.
4 This is true even if, as may possibly be the case, a woman in prostitution finds she does have desire in a specific instance (in which case that encounter may not be harmful). The point is that, regardless of whether she has desire, the consent she has given is to her desire not being relevant to whether or not the sex takes place.
5 If ‘to queer’ means to subvert a norm, then it would make perfect sense that a ‘queer communist’ would be a neoliberal.
