Issue Three

An Economy That Included Women: The ‘Sociable Economy’ of Georgian England

by Carolyn Dougherty

INTRODUCTION

Feminists have an uneasy relationship with capitalism. While we value the fact that in this economic system we can support ourselves independently of men, we also recognize that capitalism embeds hierarchy and competition into every aspect of our lives. Feminist scholars have highlighted the countless hours of women’s unpaid, unacknowledged, physical and emotional labour needed to keep capitalism functioning, and how capitalism systematically devalues work done by women, commodifies femininity and the female body, and penalizes women for the reproductive labour required to create the next generation of workers. Our level of comfort with this structure often depends on how successful we are within it, and achieving ‘equality’ with men in this individualized, competitive, alienated, misogynist and destructive economy is ultimately neither healthy nor desirable.

In the process of writing a PhD thesis on the economic history of 18th-century Britain, I discovered, or rediscovered, an economic system that existed in Britain between the decline of feudalism in the 16th century and the rise of modern capitalism in the mid-19th century. In this economy, which Adam Smith described in the Wealth of Nations, economic interaction was a subset of social interaction and subject to similar rules and expectations. This economy, which I refer to as the ‘sociable economy,’ differs from modern capitalism in many ways, including in the prominence and place of women in public life.

In capitalism today, women either occupy the same functional roles as men (employees or, less often, managers and investors) while coping with additional and contradictory behavioural expectations, or we do the unseen, unpaid, essential caretaking, maintenance, and reproductive activity that supports those acting in these roles; most women do both. In the sociable economy, women were more integrated into the economic structure of society and played a more visible role. The division of labour between the sexes in Georgian Britain was more flexible than might be imagined, because most economic entities were family businesses in which husbands and wives worked in informal, and sometimes formal, partnership, optimizing the household’s collective skills. In the sociable economy, women working within a household economic unit were active in almost every economic role and occupation, even ones from which they as individuals might have been formally excluded by custom or guild rules.1 In this economy, the traditionally ‘feminine’ tasks of communicating, exchanging gifts, and managing and maintaining personal relationships and social networks, tasks that remained associated with women in the sociable economy, were valued and acknowledged as vital to the success of any economic endeavour.

ADAM SMITH AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR

Adam Smith’s An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is considered a founding document of modern capitalism and provides intellectual justification for the policies of the neoliberal right. Although many scholars have helped us understand the Wealth of Nations in the context of, and as a response to, contemporary politics and government policy, none have yet considered Smith’s work with respect to the day-to-day commerce of 18th-century Britain. It is impossible to understand Smith’s two best known economic concepts — the division of labour and the invisible hand — without understanding the sociable economy.

The Wealth of Nations begins with a vivid illustration of Smith’s concept of the division of labour — how ten men each doing a single task necessary to manufacture a pin could make thousands of times more pins than ten men each doing all of the tasks himself. When we read this description now we think of the production line and industrial factory system; in Smith’s day, however, this system did not exist. At the time Smith wrote, the production line was exclusively a military technology; its first incarnation in the 16th century allowed the Venice Arsenal to produce a warship a day. The technique was not seen again in Europe until the 19th century, when Marc Isambard Brunel used it to manufacture pulley blocks for the Royal Navy. In the United States, manufacturers used it to produce weapons and uniforms for the Union Army during the Civil War. The handful of factories in Britain in Smith’s time were not production lines but rather collections of workshops under one roof. The first water-powered cotton mills, the prototype for the industrial factory, were not built until the 1770s; cotton mills running on steam power did not become common until well into the 19th century.

The actual division of labour Smith was considering was not factory production but rather the division of the manufacture of goods into stages separated by geography. This is clear in the paragraphs just before and just after those describing the pinmaking thought experiment.

[I]n those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people … those employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse … in such manufactures, therefore … the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.
The labour … which is necessary to produce any one complete manufacture is almost always divided among a great number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the cloth!2

Smith describes here what would have been the clearest example to his readers of the division of labour, the production of wool cloth, which involved workers and workshops all over Britain. Sheep were raised in many parts of the country. Their fleeces were sent to London where wholesalers purchased and distributed them to workshops where they were cleaned, combed, spun into yarn, bleached, and dyed. Some of these processes, such as fulling and dyeing, were done in large single-purpose facilities, but others, such as combing and spinning, were typically done in small workshops or homes. The finished yarn was sent back to London for wholesale purchase and distribution to different parts of the country where different types of cloth were woven, again mostly in small workshops or homes. After several more stages of production, the cloth was again sent to London for both retail purchase and wholesale purchase and distribution to manufacturers of such products as clothing and furnishings.

Understanding how these disparate production sites acted in collaboration to produce goods helps us to interpret what Adam Smith meant when he wrote, “by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end [promoting the public interest] which was no part of his intention.”3 Rather than being managed and controlled by a single supervising entity, this complex production process was undertaken by hundreds of small, geographically dispersed, independently owned enterprises interacting via an extensive peer-to-peer network within a complex social structure. Scholars had puzzled over how the elaborate production and payment chains required to support this process could have been maintained without the sophisticated economic institutions seemingly necessary to support them. In his 1998 book The Economy of Obligation, Craig Muldrew showed that this economy depended on participants’ willingness and ability to engage in informal credit and payment arrangements, often for very long periods, based on personal relationships.

Muldrew pointed out that for such an economy to function effectively participants needed to trust each other enough to extend credit. Thus, in order to participate in this economy actors exhibited such ‘moral’ behaviours as frugality, moderation and honesty, to inspire trust in their peers and establish a creditworthy reputation. This requirement to demonstrate what were in effect the traditional virtues led to a culture of ‘competitive piety’ amongst manufacturers, merchants, and traders.4 There was no room for cheating, greed, or competitiveness in this economy; any rumour of unethical behaviour or unfair dealings would reduce others’ desire for interaction with their subject and effectively shut them out of the marketplace. It was thus in everyone’s interest to deal courteously and ethically with all parties in order to protect their own economic viability. Muldrew’s research draws on evidence from 17th- and early 18th-century England, but it is clear that such relationships, and such behaviours, persisted throughout the century and well into the next.

In their 1997 research paper on ‘co-operative competition,’ Siobhan McGovern and Ziene Mottiar describe two types of networks: vertically controlled and horizontally controlled. In the former, the most powerful participant dictates the rules, and deviation from these rules is punished by the group. Horizontally controlled networks, by contrast, are made up of “conceptually equivalent units” whose actions conform to a set of rules agreed to by all parties; the consequence of not following these rules is not punishment but disconnection from the network.5 The sociable economy functioned as a horizontal network, not imposing rules and punishments from outside, or above, but excluding actors who did not exhibit behaviours that gained the trust of other participants.

The fact that the sociable economy facilitated ethical behaviour enables us to decipher the meaning and intent of Smith’s “invisible hand of the market.” When we realize that economic actors needed to demonstrate personal virtue to show themselves worthy of credit and consequently gain the ability to interact in the national and global marketplace, we can appreciate why Smith could assert that economic self-interest would naturally lead to the promotion of virtue and benefit society as a whole. As Alexander Pope wrote in his ‘Essay on Man’ in 1734, “Thus God and Nature link’d the gen’ral frame; And bade Self-love and Social be the same.”6 Setting Smith’s economic ideas in their cultural context also allows us to easily resolve the seeming dichotomy between ‘selfishness’ and ‘altruism.’ Many supporters of our current economic system argue that no other is possible as humans are naturally selfish and it is unrealistic to expect us to be altruistic. Whether or not this is true, the sociable economy did not require humans to be altruistic, but rather to be selfish, protecting and prioritizing their self-interest by exhibiting virtue in their behaviour toward others.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE SOCIABLE ECONOMY

The sociable economy of Adam Smith’s time was largely made up of interactions among a network of families, households, and other social groups comprising the vast ‘middling sort,’ which made up a higher proportion of society in 18th-century Britain than it does now. This economy, with its own customs, rules, and logic, seems to be missing from the economic history of Britain; it is occasionally alluded to as ‘proto-capitalism,’ ‘pre-industrial capitalism,’ or some kind of ‘transition period’ between feudalism and modern capitalism, despite the fact that it is distinct from what came before and after. The industrial capitalism of the mid-19th century, in which poor women and their children worked in factories and rich women presided over their individual domestic ‘separate spheres,’ dominates the scholarly record; the more than two centuries between the decline of feudalism and the appearance of this industrial economy is typically overlooked and little understood.

In addition to the kinds of social controls and sanctions that regulated the marketplace, the sociable economy differs from modern capitalism in that the household, rather than the individual, was the unit of production. This domestic structure was different from that of the modern two-earner family — while the nuclear family itself has remained more or less stable between then and now, a household in the sociable economy typically consisted of a nuclear family, apprentices, servants and employees who may or may not have been relatives, and related or unrelated children and adults taken on as part of the family’s social responsibilities. Unlike in the modern two-earner family, both external and domestic work were done by both women and men, and tasks and roles were allocated by ability and availability as well as sex and age.

Such tasks and roles were generally flexible. For example, household members of both sexes typically participated in casual or seasonal labour, spending part of the year producing textiles and part of the year helping with local harvests, and both sexes also participated in what we now consider ‘domestic work.’ In her groundbreaking book More Work for Mother, Ruth Schwartz Cowan points out that until the mid-19th century the labour involved in, for example, housecleaning, food preparation and laundry occupied the entire household, and it was only after the widespread adoption of such technologies as the electric or gas stove and oven, vacuum cleaner and washing machine, that household chores became solely the responsibility of the woman of the house.7 While there may have been some differentiation between ‘men’s work’ and ‘women’s work,’ this distinction was often not honoured in practice. Hans Medick, for example, points out that:

[u]nder certain market conditions … [optimizing labour resources within the family] could go so far as to erase the traditional division of labour between the sexes … Generally … the proto-industrial situation was characterized by a rather strong degree of assimilation between the production functions of men and women … Occasionally this adaptation of familial work organization to the conditions of survival went beyond the disappearance of the traditional separation of labour between the sexes. It could lead to its reversal: where the necessities of production compelled women to neglect household “duties”, this “loss of function” could be compensated for by the men assuming traditional women’s roles … “men … cook, sweep and milk the cows, in order never to disturb the good, diligent wife in her work.”8

He quotes a contemporary source describing a visit to a rural household: “It does not seldom happen, that grandmother, mother and grandchild are occupied with spinning, whereas the father and his grown-up son work in the field or do other jobs around the house, such as to prepare the meals, clean turnips or peel potatoes …”9

A household economy in which tasks are shared in a way that optimizes the economic value of the household as a whole, in which such optimization of prosperity is a higher priority than adherence to gender roles, reflects the concept of ‘foul weather feminism.’ While remaining fundamentally patriarchal, societies without resources to spare, or which value practical prosperity higher than theoretical purity, are less likely to prioritize gender roles than those which can afford to sacrifice economic value for sexist illusions.10

A household economic unit in which all of the participants are economically active to some degree differs from a modern family unit with only one or two economically active individuals. A household can balance work and tasks to achieve optimum success for the whole. Its flexible structure can cope more robustly with the incapacity or death of one member, as participants alter the internal division of labour to adapt to changing circumstances (growth of children as well as disability or decline of older members). As everyone in the household contributed to its economic viability, everyone developed useful skills. Multiple and redundant means of support meant households could afford to take risks, to diversify and pursue new opportunities. Women’s skills and labour were valued for their contribution to the economy of the household itself, rather than as support for the ‘man of the house’ as an individual employee. The household benefited from connections to both men’s and women’s family networks, and their families’ extended networks, as sources of capital and other support. Finally, the multigenerational household was naturally oriented more toward the long term; members were more inclined to make economic decisions that took future as well as present benefit into account. Modern capitalism maintains itself by using up resources, both natural and human, while the households comprising the sociable economy saw the value in preserving and developing these resources to hand over a legacy to their descendants.

Some of the trust required to facilitate economic interaction in the sociable economy was built on family connections; families in related or complementary businesses often intermarried, and households made matrimonial and reproductive choices to optimize their prosperity. The trust required to participate in the marketplace was generated through these formal personal connections, through membership in clubs and societies, and through religious affiliation (much has been written about the success of Quakers in business in this period), but most relied on the ongoing efforts of individuals to develop and maintain personal relationships with those they did business with. This work required the same skills and behaviours needed to initiate and maintain personal relationships today — letter writing, gift giving, and other activities we engage in to maintain our social networks were recognized as economically valuable. Just as with other household duties, these tasks were done by the female members of the household too, and they remained associated with women and ‘feminine’ labour at the same time as being elevated to a respected status. As every economic transaction happened within the context of a personal relationship, every interaction was unique and visible; anonymity could not allow participants to assess the trustworthiness of the parties involved. Give and take, reciprocity, negotiation, courtesy and compromise were expected, and business transactions had the air of, and were governed by the norms of, agreements between friends or relatives.

THE SHIFT TO MODERN CAPITALISM

My research describes how the managerial, profit-driven and contractual business model of the domestic joint-stock companies, the forerunner of modern corporations, that gained power and influence after the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825 undermined and eventually superseded the business model of the sociable economy.11 The salaried managers of these companies, who made decisions based on economic rationality and shareholder value, did not seek success by establishing and maintaining personal connections, but instead sought to reduce risk and manage their economic environment using strategies of vertical integration — controlling suppliers, customers, competitors and regulators.

Joint-stock companies, created by Parliament to accumulate capital and resources to accomplish specific economic objectives, have existed in British law since the 16th century. Between the passage of the Bubble Act in 1720 and its repeal in 1825 — a period during which any company which wished to be incorporated required an act of Parliament — domestic joint-stock companies were formed primarily to build infrastructure or to provide banking and insurance services. The first significant corporations created after the repeal of the Bubble Act were the railway companies; as infrastructure companies, they followed this pattern, but as they required substantial amounts of initial capital they issued large volumes of shares, and soon became the dominant class of companies on the Stock Exchange, raising £230 million in capital by 1849. This explosive growth in railway shares initiated the development of an impersonal investment market in which shareholders knew nothing of a company or its activities beyond its expected share dividend.

The joint-stock company was legally, and ethically, separate from its owners, who were both anonymous and impermanent; their own reputations were not affected by the actions of the corporations that paid their dividends. These companies’ business decisions were made by salaried managers, often anonymous themselves, who did not own and were not personally responsible for the company. The absence of the sociable economy’s social control over individuals desiring to preserve their reputations in order to participate in economic life, combined with the vast resources joint-stock companies controlled and the unclear legal responsibility for their actions (including the nature and limits of their liability towards shareholders), often led to unethical business practices.

Adam Smith had expressed concern about the way these companies did business:

it cannot well be expected that [managers of joint-stock companies] should watch over [joint-stock companies] with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own … Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail … in the management of the affairs of such a company.12

The contemporary business community held similar views; joint-stock companies (referred to as ‘public companies’) were seen as poorly run, prone to ‘waste, extravagance and inefficiency,’ and reliant on government-granted monopoly privileges because they could not otherwise compete with ‘private enterprise.’ They believed that joint-stock companies ‘undermined the importance of character in business’; as contemporary legal scholar John Horne Tooke wrote, “Public Companies have no bodies to be kicked, and no souls to be d—-d.”13 Because those taking action on behalf of these businesses had no social or ethical constraints on acquisitive behaviour, they rapidly developed large stocks of capital which gained them the power to control both the economy and the government.

This corporate model was first used to form and operate the regional trading companies, most notably the East India Company, which were set up to exploit the resources of societies that were not militarily powerful enough to protect themselves. While devastating to the parts of the world they acted in, these companies had little direct effect on the organization of the English economy. But once this exploitative business model became more prominent and visible in the domestic economy, it began to undermine the structure of the sociable economy. Economic interaction began to rely less on personal relationships and more on formal rules of engagement developed for single-exchange transactions. Although business owners, with varying degrees of success, continued to attempt to apply the rules of the sociable economy to these types of transactions, the transition to the capitalism we’re familiar with, once begun, was not reversed. Economic transactions are now no longer personal interactions between equals but rather anonymous exercises of dominance and submission. Atomized producers no longer own their own means of production but are either beholden to an employer to meet all of their material needs or do their best to scrape together a living with small businesses, gigs, and side hustles.

WOMEN IN THE SOCIABLE ECONOMY

Although my field of expertise is not women’s history, I would like to briefly explore the role of women in the sociable economy and the effect that the economic reorganization of the mid-19th century had on women as economic actors. First of all, while women in our current economic structure participate in the economy by emulating men, and anything that distinguishes us from men reduces our economic value, many so-called ‘feminine’ behaviours were highly prized in the sociable economy. In the sociable economy, while these tasks were also performed by men, behaviours traditionally associated with women — such as forming and maintaining relationships, expressing care, communicating, and managing conflict — were explicitly acknowledged as having economic value. Communicating ‘gracefully’ and ‘politely,’ offering pleasant and attractive gifts or gestures, and cultivating ‘connections’ were activities not only considered appropriate for men as well as women but also recognized as necessary to economic success. Unlike the minimal, or at best directly instrumental, consideration of their value in our individualistic culture, this appreciation of interpersonal skills represents a shift in the respect granted to so-called ‘women’s work.’

Although these behaviours were adopted and valued by men and women in the sociable economy, the traditional patriarchal association between women and caregiving, relationship-maintenance work persisted. This association is incredibly pervasive, deriving from the axial patriarchal religions, and it was not annulled simply because ‘feminine’ behaviours were valued at the time. To take a related example, at various times in history (including our own, in some Christian cultures) Jesus’s teachings were considered ‘feminine,’ since they emphasized compassion, thought and care for others, and ‘servant’ behaviours. According to Christian teachings, both sexes are instructed to love our neighbours, practise forgiveness, and extend unlimited generosity, but the patriarchal framing that characterizes these behaviours as ‘feminine’ still persists. Georgian England was a patriarchal society, and care work was coded as feminine, but patriarchal ideas and norms were not as powerful and universal as the requirements of ‘sociability’ (at least in the area of economic and social behaviour). This led to the valuing of feminine-coded activities in the economic sphere within the broader frame of patriarchal gender.

Additionally, women in the sociable economy were more integrated into public life. They were more visible as economic actors; newspaper accounts of the 18th and early 19th centuries, for example, mention women in business as if it were commonplace, as compared to even current journalism where a woman acting in a significant economic role is still often portrayed as unusual or distinguished from men in the same role by a focus on her appearance and clothing choices. Contemporary and even modern scholars typically do not specifically acknowledge the presence and activities of women in everyday life and activities, but those of us who look for them see women integrated thoroughly into the sociable economy. Women’s economic activity can be difficult to discern at first — while men in the earliest censuses are identified by their occupation, most women are only given the description ‘wife of’ — but scholars such as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall have begun the task of uncovering “the hidden investment of female knowledge, labour and capital in apparently male-only enterprises.”14 While women were typically excluded from political leadership and certain professions, women were, if not in equal numbers, well represented in most economic and business activity in the 18th century. My doctoral research identifies several businesses in what we would now classify as ‘male-dominated’ occupations owned and managed by widows, married women, and single women. The names of female business owners appear in city directories, newspaper articles, and wills transferring ownership of business assets. It is impossible to tell exactly how common such economic activity by women was, but it appears to have been common enough to be unremarkable to contemporary observers.

The change from the sociable economy to modern capitalism reduced women’s participation in public economic life. Although historians have discovered that a substantial percentage of shares in joint-stock companies in the 19th century were owned by women, either outright or in trust, and have demonstrated that many women participated in banking and investment during this period, no women are visible in the early joint-stock economy — no women sat on boards or acted as managers or officers of joint-stock firms. Women’s sudden disappearance from public life in England during this period coincided with a new emphasis on ‘separate spheres’ of home and work. It seems more than coincidental that this disappearance, sometimes referred to as the ‘return to the parlour,’ as well as other changes to women’s legal and political status such as the 1832 Reform Act’s denial of women’s right to vote, occurred between the 1830s and the 1860s, at about the same time joint-stock companies were becoming the dominant business type (at least in wealth, if not in number). Although not considered in Amanda Vickery’s comprehensive 1993 review of the concept of ‘separate spheres’ in the historical literature, and some of the work that has expanded on the topic since then, there may be a connection between the growth in the dominance of domestic joint-stock companies, the change from relational to transactional business practice, the increasing economic dominance of business sectors less congenial to women, and the decline of women’s participation in management.15

CONCLUSION

Understanding the economic history I have outlined here can help us appreciate how modern capitalism developed and potentially provide some ideas and tools that could help us shape our current economy into something that can better sustain us and the world. Economic behaviour did not always, and does not have to, prioritize the values we now associate with modern capitalism — individuality, competition, and greed, as well as short-term thinking, exploitation, and sacrifice of the future for the present. In fact, as Smith argued, the sociable economy rewarded ethical and sustainable behaviour and excluded those who behaved in ways we now associate with success under capitalism.

Although I have attempted here to describe an economy that appeared to be more equitable than modern capitalism, and that set economic interaction within a social structure in which women played a significant and distinct role, I would like to end this essay with a thought from David Graeber and David Wengrow about the nature of family life. While to me, and possibly to others, the ‘family firm,’ with its reliance on all members to prosper and its flexibility with respect to work and economic roles, seems to offer a more valued place for women and for ‘feminine’ interpersonal skills, Graeber and Wengrow caution us not to be too sanguine about the role the family has played in history.

[A]lmost everyone nowadays insists that participatory democracy, or social equality, can work in a small community or activist group, but cannot possibly “scale up” to anything like a city, a region or a nation-state. But the evidence before our eyes … suggests the opposite. Egalitarian cities, even regional confederacies, are historically quite commonplace. Egalitarian families and households are not.

Once the historical verdict is in, we will see that the most painful loss of human freedoms began at the small scale — the level of gender relations, age groups and domestic servitude — the kind of relationships that contain at once the greatest intimacy and the deepest forms of structural violence. If we really want to understand how it first became acceptable for some to turn wealth into power, and for others to end up being told their needs and lives don’t count, it is here that we should look. Here too, we predict, is where the most difficult work of creating a free society will have to take place.16

Carolyn Dougherty enjoys discovering hidden things and sharing them with people.

1 The formal exclusion of women was firmer in occupations such as the military, law enforcement, the legal and medical professions, and the church, based on data from the 1841 census, the first for which women’s occupations are recorded. These occupations appear to be outside the household economic structure.

2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1 (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1852), p. 3.

3 Smith, p. 184.

4 Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 148.

5 Siobhan McGovern and Ziene Mottiar, ‘Co-operative Competition: A Foucauldian Perspective,’ DCU Business School Research Papers, 20 (1997), p. 3.

6 Alexander Pope, ‘An Essay on Man’ in Epistles to a Friend: Epistle III (London: J. Wilford, 1733), p. 20.

7 Ruth Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983).

8 Hans Medick, ‘The Proto-Industrial Family Economy: The Structural Function of Household and Family During the Transition From Peasant Society to Industrial Capitalism,’ Social History, 1.3 (1976), 310-12.

9 Medick, p. 311, n. 82.

10 Hasyn Hornbeck, ‘Foul-Weather Feminism: An Analysis of Short-Term Labour and Economic Trends,’ Journal of Undergraduate Research in Alberta, 3 (2013), 15-24.

11 Carolyn Dougherty, ‘The Carrying Trade and the First Railway Companies in England, c1750-c1850’ (doctoral thesis, University of York, 2018), .

12 Smith, p. 124.

13 James Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2006), p. 22; J. T. Norris, The Carriers’ Case Considered in Reference to Railways (London, J. T. Norris, 1841), p. 11.

14 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (London: Routledge, 2002); cited in Amanda Vickery, ‘Golden Age to Separate Spheres? A Review of the Categories and Chronology of English Women’s History,’ The Historical Journal, 36.2 (June 1993), 383-414 (p. 393).

15 Vickery, ‘Golden Age.’

16 David Graeber and David Wengrow, ‘Are we city dwellers or hunter-gatherers?’ New Humanist, 14 January 2019.